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Preface 
 
In line with regulations of the Faculty of Psychology, University of Basel, this thesis is 
submitted as a cumulative (i.e. publication-based) dissertation, consisting of four manuscripts. 
The current framework is intended to (1) present the four manuscripts and highlight their 
individual contributions, and (2) based on the combined insights from the different manuscripts, 
derive broader conclusions for the topic of individual differences in risk taking. 
I wish to highlight that the two published manuscripts appear under my maiden name 
Mamerow, whereas submitted manuscripts and those that are about to be submitted appear 
under my married name Tisdall.  
This dissertation is based on the following four manuscripts: 
 
(1) Mamerow, L., Frey, R., & Mata, R. (2016). Risk taking across the life span: A comparison 
of self-report and behavioral measures of risk taking. Psychology and Aging, 31(7), 711. 
 
(2) Yu, J., Mamerow, L., Lei, X., Fang, L., & Mata, R. (2016). Altered value coding in the 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex in healthy older adults. Frontiers in Aging Neuroscience, 8, 
210. 
 
(3) Tisdall, L., Frey, R., Horn, A., Ostwald, D., Horvath, L., Blankenburg, F., Hertwig, R., & 
Mata, R. (2018). Group versus individual differences in the neural representation of 
described and experienced risk. Manuscript submitted for publication. 
 
(4) Tisdall, L., Frey, R., Horn, A., Ostwald, D., Horvath, L., Pedroni, A., Blankenburg, F., 
Rieskamp, J., Hertwig, R., & Mata, R. (2018). The risky brain: Local morphometry and 
degree centrality as neural markers of psychometrically derived risk preference factors. 
Unpublished manuscript. 
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Abstract 
From the time of conception until the time of death, the path of the human organism is 
created and shaped by decisions. Some decisions we make ourselves, some are made for us; some 
will make us, some will break us. What most decisions have in common, however, is that they are 
made under risk, that is, without complete information regarding the potential decision outcomes. 
One interesting feature about decisions under risk is variability: different individuals make different 
choices, and even the same individual may, given repeated occasions, make different choices. This 
doctoral thesis aims to address the issue of individual differences by looking at several specific 
variables which may impact inter- and intra-individual differences in risk taking, namely age, the 
measures used to assess risk-taking, neural function and neural structure.  
In a set of four studies, the following questions were addressed: (1) To what extent do life 
span trajectories of risk taking change as a function of whether self-report or behavioral measures 
are used to assess risk taking? (2) Do younger and older individuals differ in the neural functional 
representation of risk and reward? (3) Do the neural representations of described and experienced 
risk converge, both at group and individual level? To what extent is neural function predictive of 
risky choice? (4) To what extent do individual differences in neural structure explain variance in 
psychometrically derived risk preference factors? The main findings are: (1) Self-report and 
behavioral measures of risk taking do not converge and lead to different life span trajectories. (2) 
The ventromedial prefrontal cortex is differentially activated in younger and older adults, with 
activation differences possessing differential explanatory power for choice in the two age groups. 
(3) Described and experienced risks show convergence at group level, divergence at the individual 
level, and are differentially predictive of risky choice. (4) Neural structural indices explain variance 
in the general risk preference factor, but not domain-specific risk preference factors.  
Based on the findings from all four studies, this thesis provides corroborating evidence for 
the argument that not all risk-taking measures are created equal and that a taxonomy of risk-taking 
measures and their respective cognitive and affective demands is required to understand individual 
differences in risk taking.  
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Introduction 
In 2017, Europe saw a 4-fold increase in measles cases on the previous year (World 
Health Organization, 2018), with the current outbreaks being traced back to vaccination scares 
following unsubstantiated claims of a connection between MMR immunization and autism 
(Flaherty, 2011). In 2008, an unforeseen global financial crisis burnt industries, economies, and 
ultimately countries, which it has been suggested was triggered by endemic ‘wild risk taking’ 
on Wall Street (Williams, 2010). In both cases, global effects are felt as the direct result of 
individuals making decisions in the face of risk, that is, in the absence of certain outcomes.  
But one does not even have to consider global events to recognize the role of risk in 
human decision making. Whether it is choosing a restaurant, a partner, a political candidate, or 
a medical procedure, having to select between two or more alternatives that come with their 
very own list of pros and cons, and for which we do not know with certainty that the anticipated 
(dis)advantages will indeed materialize, is a situation which accompanies our daily lives. Risk, 
it seems, is everywhere: it contributes to our biggest successes as well as our steepest falls. 
Crucially, while some of our decisions remain comparatively inconsequential —unless a 
restaurant does not adhere to health and safety regulations and serves contaminated food, the 
worst outcome of trying somewhere new to eat is going home dissatisfied— others have far-
reaching consequences. In the case of cancer screening, for example, not getting screened may 
result in the early stage of the disease being missed and left untreated. However, given the non-
negligible rate of false positives and the potential for unnecessary treatment to be undertaken 
(Croswell, Baker, Marcus, Clapp, & Kramer, 2010; Elmore et al., 1998), what does one do with 
a test result that has come back positive?  
One challenging aspect of decisions made under risk is understanding individual 
differences. Given the same choice set, one person opts for cancer screening, while another 
declines. Equally, given the same choice set, the same person may opt for screening on one 
occasion but may opt out at another occasion. The question which has spawned much interest 
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and which lies at the heart of this thesis is as follows: Why do individuals vary, both within 
themselves and between each other, with regards to decisions made under risk? Before I 
endeavor to provide some answers to this question, it is necessary to formally define risk as 
understood in this body of work, for how we define risk impacts on the chosen research 
methodology and consequently the interpretation of our results. 
Definitions of risk  
Formally, risk can be defined in the economic sense of outcome variance, which 
assumes uncertainty about the outcomes but is otherwise silent regarding the presence or 
absence of loss in the set of possible outcomes (Schonberg, Fox, & Poldrack, 2011; Weber, 
2010). Under this definition, deciding between a 60% chance of 100 Francs and 10% chance of 
600 Francs constitutes a risky decision. Alternatively, and perhaps more intuitively, risk has 
been defined as uncertainty about decision outcomes which entail the chance of incurring a 
form of loss, be that financial, physical, psychological, social, societal or otherwise (Schonberg 
et al., 2011; Slovic, 1987, 1998; Weber, 2010). It is interesting to note that some authors have 
gone even further and included the probability of loss as a criterion. For instance, Nigg defined 
risk taking as the “[a]daptive or maladaptive selection of rewarding behavioral option in the 
face of high probability of loss […]” (Nigg, 2017, p.4).  
In the context of the studies presented within this doctoral thesis, whenever we 
manipulated risk, for instance in the context of using behavioral measures, risk was almost 
exclusively understood and operationalized as involving both gains and losses. To be precise, 
for all but one behavioral risk-taking measure in manuscript 1 and two behavioral risk-taking 
measures which informed the psychometric factors utilized in manuscript 4, were individuals 
presented with decision problems involving both rewards (i.e. gains) and losses, albeit of 
different magnitudes and probabilities. It could be argued that only by adopting a definition 
which incorporates both rewards and losses can we study individual differences in risk taking, 
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because what seems to drive individuals’ understanding of risk appears to be loss, not simply 
variance (Slovic, 1987; Zeisberger, 2016).  
I will now turn to the contribution this doctoral thesis makes to our understanding of 
individual differences in risk taking, starting with the role of two factors and their interplay: 
age and risk-taking measure.  
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Part I - Risk Taking Across the Life Span 
 Many factors that vary between (as well as partly within) individuals have become 
associated with risk taking. These include, but are not limited to, gender (Byrnes, Miller, & 
Schafer, 1999; Charness & Gneezy, 2012), economic status (Payne, Brown-Iannuzzi, & 
Hannay, 2017), reproductive cycle (Sylwester & Pawłowski, 2011), family background 
(Banducci, Felton, Dahne, Ninnemann, & Lejuez, 2015; Dohmen et al., 2011; Kennison, Wood, 
Byrd-Craven, & Downing, 2016), stress (Lighthall, Mather, & Gorlick, 2009), peer 
relationships (Telzer, Fuligni, Liebermann, Miernicki, & Galvan, 2014), quality of sleep 
(Telzer, Fuligni, Liebermann, & Galvan, 2013), affective state (Shao & Lee, 2014), as well as 
less intuitive factors such as simulated microgravity (L.-L. Rao et al., 2014).  
 One factor which has garnered substantial support for its impact on risk taking is age. 
Why would age capture the attention of researchers interested in risk taking? In a nutshell, 
factors such as improved living conditions, more efficient and effective medical treatment, as 
well as increased fertility, have contributed to a global population that is simultaneously 
expanding and aging. For example, between 1980 and 2017, the number of individuals globally 
over the age of 60 years has doubled from 382 million to 962 million, and is expected to more 
than double yet again by 2050 (Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2017). Moreover, 
not only are there a greater number of older individuals, they are also living to increasingly 
advanced ages: In 2017, the number of individuals aged 80 and over was estimated to be 137 
million, a number which is anticipated to triple by 2050 (Department of Economic and Social 
Affairs, 2017). To support an increasingly longer life span, even older individuals will need to 
stay active members of the workforce and society, and will inevitably face decisions regarding 
medical treatment, housing, pensions, and inheritance, to name but a few. Risk, it seems, is a 
constant companion, even to those of old(er) age.  
To understand whether age influences how individuals deal with and take risks, and if 
so, through which pathways, research has started to address the life span trajectory of risk 
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taking. One prominent finding in this field is that age and risk taking are negatively correlated 
(Rolison, Hanoch, Wood, & Liu, 2013). Like many associations in psychological research, 
however, moderator variables play an important role and often qualify the conditions under 
which established bivariate associations hold. In the case of age and risk taking, studies based 
on panel data as well as meta-analytic approaches have consistently shown that life span 
trajectories of risk taking depend on the measures used to assess risk taking  (Best & Charness, 
2015; Byrnes et al., 1999; Josef et al., 2016; Mata, Josef, & Hertwig, 2016; Mata, Josef, 
Samanez-Larkin, & Hertwig, 2011). The pattern which emerges from these analyses is that self-
reported risk-taking, regardless of domain, decreases across the life span, but that the 
association is less clear for behavioral measures of risk taking; for some measures, risk-taking 
declines across the life span, for others it increases, and yet for other measures no differences 
are observable. How can such divergent trajectories arise? 
At this point, it is important to notice that a vast number of risk-taking measures exist 
(Appelt, Milch, Handgraaf, & Weber, 2011), leading to widespread diversity in the risk-taking 
measures adopted for research purposes. Diversity in the measures used to assess individual 
differences in risk taking is, in itself, unproblematic, for we may expect different measures to 
assess slightly different facets of a phenotype, and thereby yield a more complete picture of it. 
What creates a problem for the theory and measurement of risk taking is that the majority of 
measures do not converge, i.e. do not correlate or only weakly (Frey, Pedroni, Mata, Rieskamp, 
& Hertwig, 2017; Pedroni et al., 2017). This leads to a situation where, depending on the risk-
taking measure used, we may come to very different conclusions about risk taking, for instance 
its change across the life span.  
In manuscript one we directly address this issue by assessing risk taking across the life 
span using different risk-taking measures. 
Manuscript One:  
Convergence of risk-taking measures in a cross-sectional life span sample 
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Mamerow, L., Frey, R., & Mata, R. (2016). Risk taking across the life span: A comparison of 
self-report and behavioral measures of risk taking. Psychology and Aging, 31(7), 711. 
In front of the aforementioned backdrop of studies suggesting (a) low or no convergence 
between measures of risk taking, and (b) measure-dependent trajectories of risk taking across 
the life span, we conducted a correlational study investigating the convergence of risk-taking 
measures, and the extent to which convergence may change as a function of age.  
In contrast to previous stand-alone studies, our research design included a large, cross-
sectional, age-heterogeneous sample of participants, employed prominently used self-report 
and behavioral measures of risk taking, adopted a within-participants design, and compared the 
results obtained for the self-report item from the local sample against household panel data for 
the entire country (Switzerland). A further critical aspect of the study reported in manuscript 
one is that in addition to assessing self-reported general risk propensity (Dohmen et al., 2011; 
Josef et al., 2016; Mata et al., 2016), we employed two behavioral risk-taking measures: one 
experience-based risk-taking measure and one description-based risk-taking measure. The 
distinction between these two types of behavioral measures primarily arises from whether 
individuals are presented with choice-relevant information, or whether they have to learn this 
information over the course of the task, based on the experience of decision outcomes; the 
former describes decisions being made from description, whereas the latter describes decisions 
made from experience (Hertwig & Erev, 2009). We adopted the Balloon Analogue Risk Task 
(Lejuez et al., 2002) to assess risk taking in the context of decisions from experience, and used 
repeated choices between a certain and a risky monetary gamble (Rieskamp, 2008) to assess 
risk taking in the context of decisions from description.  
Moreover, we used within-measure manipulations to gain further insights into why 
different measures (or generally, contexts) may foster different choice patterns. In the Balloon 
Analogue Risk Task, we employed a high-capacity and a low-capacity balloon to manipulate 
the level of perceived risk and increase learning demands within the same measure. For 
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decisions between a risky and a safe monetary gamble, we manipulated the expected value of 
the risky option: for half the trials, the risky option had the same expected value as the certain 
option; for the other half of the trials, the risky option had a lower expected value than the 
certain option. One specific aim of this particular within-measure manipulation was to test the 
‘certainty effect’ reported for older adults (Mather et al., 2012), which suggests that age-related 
differences only emerge in the context of choosing between a certain and a risky option, but not 
between two risky options. 
Overall, we observed patterns indicative of a reduction in risk taking with age for self-
reported risk taking, but the evidence obtained from the two behavioral measures was mixed. 
The effect of a reduction in self-reported general risk taking across the life span observed for 
the local sample was replicated in the nationwide sample. As anticipated, absent or weak 
correlations between measures supported previous results suggesting convergence between 
measures at the level of the individual to be low. The within-measure manipulations for the 
description- and the experience-based behavioral measures yielded support for (a) the 
proposition that some conditions do not engender age differences in risk taking, (b) the certainty 
effect for older adults in the gain domain in equal expected variance trials but, interestingly, not 
in unequal expected variance trials, and (c) the possibility that task demands such as learning 
or computational capacity could contribute to diverging life span trajectories. Indeed, previous 
work indicates many neurological, cognitive, affective and motivational changes to manifest 
over the life span (Samanez-Larkin & Knutson, 2015; Shao & Lee, 2014), which may account 
for the differential effect of measures and within-measure manipulations on risk-taking 
trajectories.  
The main conclusion from manuscript one is that to understand age differences in risk 
taking, research is required which systematically disentangles task demands from true age-
related differences and life span changes. This also implies that instead of continually extending 
the pool of risk-taking measures, for example by developing ever more novel measures or 
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adding yet new variants to established tasks, what the field truly needs is a taxonomy of risk-
taking measures, their cognitive, affective and motivational demands as well as corollaries.  
Regrettably the experimental set up did not allow us to assess individual differences in 
cognitive functions, thus we were not able to test the mechanisms we proposed as underlying 
age-related differences in risk taking as a function of the measure used. In manuscript two we 
attempt to tackle this unresolved issue by shedding light on how the neurobiological basis of 
risk taking in the Balloon Analogue Risk Task is affected by age.  
Manuscript 2:  
Age-related differences in the neural representation of risk and reward in the Balloon 
Analogue Risk Task 
Yu, J., Mamerow, L., Lei, X., Fang, L., & Mata, R. (2016). Altered value coding in the 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex in healthy older adults. Frontiers in Aging Neuroscience, 8, 210. 
The Balloon Analogue Risk Task (BART) has been widely adopted as a measure of risk 
taking and impulsivity (e.g., Lejuez et al., 2002, 2007; Lejuez, Aklin, Zvolensky, & Pedulla, 
2003; Sharma, Markon, & Clark, 2014). In the BART, participants pump a virtual balloon ad 
libitum without knowing when the balloon will explode. Every pump increases the amount of 
money won but also the chance of explosion. When completing the BART, participants can stop 
pumping to save the money earned (cash out), or they can decide to continue pumping. 
However, if continued inflation results in an explosion of the balloon, the money accumulated 
up until that point is lost. Risk in the BART thus refers to the probability of a balloon explosion 
which will result in the loss of reward. 
Presumably because the BART is purported to be an ecologically valid measure of risk 
taking, given its sequential decision-making process, experiential component and increasing 
tension as the balloon gets larger (Schonberg et al., 2011), it has also found widespread 
application in neuroimaging research (Congdon et al., 2013; Helfinstein et al., 2014; Kohno, 
Morales, Guttman, & London, 2017; Lighthall et al., 2012; H. Rao, Korczykowski, Pluta, 
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Hoang, & Detre, 2008; Schonberg et al., 2012). The results from these studies implicate a wide 
functional network as the neural correlates of risk taking in the BART, including the striatum, 
insular cortex, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, (anterior) cingulate cortex, and ventromedial 
prefrontal cortex. Assigning function to neural structures, all of these regions have been 
implicated, albeit with more or less specificity, in the construction, representation and storage 
of subjective value (Bartra, McGuire, & Kable, 2013; Clithero & Rangel, 2014; Levy & 
Glimcher, 2012). Specifically, activation differences in striatum and frontal cortices have been 
associated with deliberative value-based judgments and decision-making, whereas the insular 
cortex activation has been implicated in primarily affective processing (Knutson & Huettel, 
2015; Mohr, Biele, & Heekeren, 2010; Namkung, Kim, & Sawa, 2017; Paulus, Rogalsky, 
Simmons, Feinstein, & Stein, 2003; Platt & Huettel, 2008).  
The research questions underlying manuscript two are as follows: How are activation 
differences in brain regions typically associated with risk taking in the BART affected by age? 
What insights do activation differences in circumscribed brain regions in the BART provide for 
our understanding of the mechanisms underlying age-related differences in risk taking? At the 
level of behavior, age-group comparisons of BART performance have yielded mixed findings 
(Cavanagh et al., 2012; Henninger, Madden, & Huettel, 2010; Mamerow, Frey, & Mata, 2016; 
Rolison, Hanoch, & Wood, 2012), with meta-analytic procedures suggesting risk taking in the 
BART to decline with age (Mata et al., 2011). At the level of the brain, however, we know 
comparatively little about the extent to which differences exist between younger and older 
adults. One potential mechanism for age-related differences to emerge in the BART is through 
activation differences in insular and ventromedial prefrontal cortex. Our ventromedial 
prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) hypothesis was based on previous findings suggesting that (a) the 
vmPFC represents a subjective value signal that is the outcome of a process integrating choice-
relevant signals, including reward, risk and potentially affect (Bartra et al., 2013; Levy & 
Glimcher, 2012), (b) variance in vmPFC-related value signal increases with age (Halfmann, 
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Hedgcock, Kable, & Denburg, 2016), which may be the result of age-related differences in 
feedback-based learning rather than reward representation (Samanez-Larkin, Worthy, Mata, 
McClure, & Knutson, 2014), and (c) risk taking is associated with decreased vmPFC activation 
(Schonberg et al., 2012). Our insular cortex hypothesis was informed by previous findings 
which suggested affective changes over the human life span to impact on decision-making 
(Samanez-Larkin & Knutson, 2015; Shao & Lee, 2014). Within the framework of the mood 
maintenance hypothesis, for example, it has been suggested that older adults may engage in less 
risk taking to avoid negative consequences which may compromise a primarily positive status 
quo (Shao & Lee, 2014). We tested these hypotheses by comparing risk-taking behavior and 
neural activation in the BART for younger and older adults. 
Our findings suggest that younger and older adults show similar risk-taking behavior in the 
BART. We observed no significant difference between younger and older adults in the mean 
number of pumps (adjusted for opportunity to pump), but the proportion of cash out trials was 
higher in older compared with younger adults. Regarding the neuroimaging results, group 
comparison revealed that younger and older adults’ neural responses in the BART were not 
completely aligned. Specifically, when we compared pumps on risky with pumps on control 
balloons, we obtained no marked age differences for striatal and insular activation, or vmPFC 
deactivation. We obtained group differences in posterior parietal deactivation and cingulate 
cortex activation, which may have been indicative of less numerical integration in younger 
adults and more (conflict) monitoring in older adults for risky choices. When we investigated 
the parametrically modulated activation in response to increasing risk on a given balloon, we 
obtained no substantial differences between younger and older participants in the insular cortex 
and striatum. Interestingly, we however observed vmPFC deactivation to track risk in younger 
but not older adults, which point towards age-related differences in vmPFC-related integrative 
value signaling. When we investigated the explanatory power of neural activation differences 
for risky choice in the BART at the level of the whole brain, neural signal in striatum, insula 
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and vmPFC was predictive of the mean number of pumps for younger adults but not for older 
adults.  
The results reported in manuscript two support and extend previous studies concerning both 
behavioral and neural age-related differences in risk taking. Behaviorally, the higher proportion 
of cash out trials for adults supports previous findings suggesting a decline in risk taking in 
older age (Henninger et al., 2010; Mamerow et al., 2016; Mata et al., 2011; Rolison et al., 2013). 
The neuroimaging results shed some light on the potential mechanisms underlying such age-
related differences in risk taking. Overall the regions associated with risk taking in the BART 
in this study are in line with previous results implicating the striatum, insula, and frontal 
cortices, especially vmPFC (e.g., H. Rao et al., 2008; Schonberg et al., 2012). Regarding age 
differences, our results are interpreted as indicating the preserved neural tracking of risk and 
reward in the insula and striatum, respectively, in old age. This interpretation is supported by 
previous results suggesting reward representation in the striatum to remain intact in old age 
(Samanez-Larkin et al., 2014). However, the combination of intact insula and striatal signal in 
the presence of age-related vmPFC differences suggests that differences in risk taking in the 
BART may be rooted in age-related differences in the convergence and integration of 
information into a subjective value signal (Bartra et al., 2013; Clithero & Rangel, 2014; 
Halfmann et al., 2016). This line of reasoning is further supported by functional and anatomic 
changes in the vmPFC across the life span (Samanez-Larkin & Knutson, 2015).  
To conclude, manuscript two suggests that rather than being the result of differences in the 
computation of a reward or risk signal per se, age-related differences in the BART (and perhaps 
in other risk-taking measures) may originate from older adults experiencing more difficulties 
with the integration of different sources of information (e.g. risk, reward) into a coherent, 
choice-preceding value signal. This may also explain why in manuscript one we obtained no 
differences for the low-capacity balloon as part of the within-measure manipulation in the 
BART. Low-capacity balloons may not engender age-differences because the earlier explosion 
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points may keep individuals from exploring and experiencing uncertainty, potentially even 
leading to strategy use. In other words, low-capacity balloons may not rely as much on the 
integration of choice-relevant signals because this type of balloon, regardless of the age of the 
participant, does not evoke the same (complex) decision-making processes compared with 
high-capacity balloons. 
To summarize the contribution of this thesis to understanding risk-taking across the life 
span, the two studies (manuscript one and two) on the one hand provide further support for the 
assertion that age-related differences in risk taking arise from a complex interplay of biological, 
cognitive, motivational and affective changes taking place across the life span. On the other 
hand, and perhaps constituting the more important contribution, the two manuscripts (in 
particular, manuscript one) fuel the debate surrounding the convergence of risk-taking measures 
and by proxy the nature of individual differences in risk taking. How can we make progress 
understanding individual differences in risk taking, when the very existence of such differences 
seems to be dependent on our measures? In Part II of this dissertation, I turn to the idea that the 
biological underpinnings of risk taking, specifically brain function and structure, may yield 
some insights for this debate.  
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Part II - The Risky Brain: Convergence of Neural Indices of Risk 
Consider the following starting point: A genome-wide association study with over one 
million individuals has identified 124 independent genetic loci associated with self-reported 
general risk taking (Karlsson Linnér et al., 2018). These genetic loci are highly expressed in 
brain tissue in the prefrontal cortex, striatum and midbrain. Furthermore, genetic correlations 
between general risk taking and different types of risky behaviors, including smoking, number 
of sexual partners, being self-employed, life time cannabis use, adventurousness, risky driving 
and alcohol consumption, are higher than phenotypic correlations, with many genetic loci being 
shared across risky behaviors and with general risk taking (Karlsson Linnér et al., 2018). In 
other words, a genetically-influenced, domain-general risk-taking factor seems to exist that 
influences individual differences in risk taking, via neural pathways implicated in value-based 
decision-making. Does this mean we can expect to find risk-related brain signals that are 
domain-general? 
Manuscript Three: 
Convergence of the neural functional correlates of described and experienced risk 
Tisdall, L., Frey, R., Horn, A., Ostwald, D., Horvath, L., Blankenburg, F., Hertwig, R., & Mata, 
R. (2018). Group versus individual differences in the neural representation of described and 
experienced risk. Manuscript submitted for publication. 
 As previously discussed, risk is ubiquitous and risk taking as a phenotype has been 
associated with health, wealth, criminality, and general well-being (Moffitt et al., 2011; 
Steinberg, 2013). As a result, individual differences in risk taking and related phenotypes, such 
as self-control, have become promising entry points for intervention and ultimately prevention 
(Conrod et al., 2013). One approach to understanding individual differences in risk taking has 
been to study its neural correlates, including neural activation differences in response to risk. 
In fact, the interest in the neural correlates of risk has been sufficient to facilitate both qualitative 
(Knutson & Huettel, 2015; Platt & Huettel, 2008) and quantitative reviews (Bartra et al., 2013; 
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Mohr et al., 2010; Wu, Sacchet, & Knutson, 2012), converging on the importance of striatum, 
insula, anterior cingulate cortex, dorsolateral, and (ventro)medial prefrontal cortex. 
Interestingly though, the role of risk-taking measures has so far received very little 
attention in the neuroimaging literature. Recall the distinction between experience-based and 
description-based measures of risk taking (Hertwig, Barron, Weber, & Erev, 2004; Hertwig & 
Erev, 2009): Contrary to standard economic theory, the same information encountered in 
different ways —either fully described or experienced— can lead to different choices. As 
prototypical examples of experience- and description-based measures of risk taking, the 
Balloon Analogue Risk Task (BART) and monetary gambles, respectively, have found 
widespread application for studying individual differences in risk taking, also in the field of 
neuroimaging (Barkley-Levenson, Van Leijenhorst, & Galván, 2013; Braams, van 
Duijvenvoorde, Peper, & Crone, 2015; Gilaie-Dotan et al., 2014; Helfinstein et al., 2014; 
Pletzer & Ortner, 2016). Can we assume that the regions identified by meta-analytical 
approaches as functional correlates of risk taking are shared by different types of measures, 
such as the BART and monetary gambles? Moreover, are these conjunction regions promising 
candidates for sources of brain-behavior associations?  
Not necessarily. The crucial argument here is that most of our current knowledge 
regarding the shared neural correlates of risk taking is rooted in average activation patterns 
obtained from different studies (i.e. different individuals). Owing to the well-known but often 
neglected mismatch between group- and individual-level effects (Bornstein, Putnick, & 
Esposito, 2017), we cannot infer consistency (i.e. convergence) of neural function between 
measures from commonality. As suggested by the low convergence between risk-taking 
measures at the level of behavior (Frey et al., 2017), the same individual may respond very 
differently to different risk-taking measures. Thus, it is currently unclear to what extent repeated 
measures designs would support the suggested convergence of activation patterns, or, 
                  
 
22 
alternatively, mirror the weak correlations observed between behavioral measures of risk 
taking.  
 In manuscript three, we directly address this question by comparing the neural 
functional correlates of an experience-based (BART) and a description-based (monetary 
gambles) risk-taking measure, which we assessed as part of a neuroimaging study conducted 
within the scope of the Basel-Berlin Risk Study. The Basel-Berlin Risk Study (BBRS) is a 
large-scale, multi-site, multi-method study which investigates individual differences, 
psychometric structure, and biological underpinnings of risk taking. Participants in the BBRS 
completed a one-day laboratory study involving an extensive test battery, including self-report, 
behavioral, frequency measures of risk-taking measures, as well as cognitive, personality, 
affective and personality assessments. An overview of all subsamples, measures, and further 
details on the BBRS is available from the Open Science Framework (https://osf.io/rce7g).  
The analyses reported in manuscript three are based on a subsample of BBRS participants 
(N=116) who in addition to the laboratory session also completed a MRI session. Of relevance 
to the analyses reported in manuscript three are two measures which participants completed 
inside the MRI scanner, namely the BART and a monetary gambles paradigm. Our analyses 
focus on (1) the overlap of the average neural representation of risk in the BART and in 
monetary gambles, (2) whether individual activation differences correlate between the BART 
and monetary gambles, and (3) the explanatory power of neural indices from BART and 
monetary gambles for risky choice, both within and across the two measures.  
The results from the comparison of activation differences in BART and monetary gambles 
suggest (1) joint activation increases for BART and monetary gambles in a part of the ventral 
striatum, the nucleus accumbens, but (2) inconsistent individual differences in nucleus 
accumbens, insula and anterior cingulate cortex activation across the two measures. With 
regards to (3) the explanatory power of neural indices for behavior, we observe significant 
within-measure brain-behavior associations only for monetary gambles, but not for BART. 
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Using whole-brain analyses, there was no link between neural activation in response to risk in 
the BART and risky choice in monetary gambles; ROI analyses suggest a link between anterior 
cingulate cortex activation in BART and the proportion of risky gambles accepted in monetary 
gambles.  
Taken together, the results reported in manuscript three further help to clarify the 
biological basis of risk taking, specifically the commonalities and differences between 
experience-based and description-based measures. Importantly, our findings fall in line with the 
results obtained for behavioral measures of risk taking (Frey et al., 2017), suggesting that these 
two types of measures should not be used interchangeably if the aim is to capture risk 
preference. As such, these results have strong implications for developmental and longitudinal 
research designs which frequently target the links between individual differences in risk 
preference and neural indices (Braams et al., 2015; Büchel et al., 2017; Grubb, Tymula, Gilaie-
Dotan, Glimcher, & Levy, 2016; Moffitt et al., 2011). Moreover, our results suggest that 
researchers should pay more attention to topics such as individual differences and convergence 
between measurements, and less attention to seductive but likely uninformative single indices 
of risk taking. 
Going back to the starting point of a genetically-informed, domain-general factor of risk 
taking that is primarily expressed via neural pathways, we did not find evidence for this in 
neural function. In line with the argumentation provided in the context of manuscript one and 
partly manuscript two, highly contextualized measures such as the BART and monetary 
gambles may not capture much risk-preference signal amongst the noise created by measure-
specific demands and corollaries. Put differently, there may exist a general risk-taking trait, but 
this is perhaps lost in single behavioral indices and state-dependent, on-task functional 
activation differences. In manuscript four we examine whether more trait-like behavioral and 
neural indices of risk taking shed some light on the biological underpinnings of individual 
differences in risk taking.  
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Manuscript Four: 
The neural structural correlates of risk preference 
Tisdall, L., Frey, R., Horn, A., Ostwald, D., Horvath, L., Pedroni, A., Blankenburg, F., 
Rieskamp, J., Hertwig, R., & Mata, R. (2018). The risky brain: Local morphometry and degree 
centrality as neural markers of psychometrically derived risk preference factors. Manuscript. 
While the neural functional correlates of risk-related processes received considerable 
attention in the past, much less attention has been paid to the contribution of neuroanatomy to 
individual differences in risk taking. In contrast to on-task functional indices such as brain 
activation differences in response to pumping up balloons in the BART or making choices 
between two monetary gambles, however, brain structure is much less susceptible to the 
influence of contextual variables, hence may represent the biological dimension of a risk-taking 
trait.  
In previous studies, grey matter volume in amygdala, insula, thalamus, orbitofrontal and 
posterior parietal regions was observed as differentially associated with various indices relevant 
to risk taking, including risk tolerance, mean number of pumps in the BART, loss aversion, 
cannabis use, alcohol intake and gaming pathology (Cai et al., 2015; Canessa et al., 2013; 
Gilaie-Dotan et al., 2014; Jung, Lee, Lerman, & Kable, 2018; Koehler, Hasselmann, 
Wüstenberg, Heinz, & Romanczuk-Seiferth, 2013; Nasiriavanaki et al., 2015). Considering that 
the brain is characterized better by a system of networks rather than a collection of independent 
regions, perhaps local volume per se is not a useful index of brain structure. After all, the size 
of a particular region may matter much less compared with how well this region is connected 
within the network. Indeed, in addition to volumetric measures, the degree of local structural 
connectivity and integrity of white matter tracts has become associated with various risk-taking 
indices (Jacobus et al., 2013; Jung et al., 2018; Kohno et al., 2017; Kwon, Vorobyev, Moe, 
Parkkola, & Ha, 2014; Squeglia et al., 2015).  
                  
 
25 
One shortcoming of these previous studies is the use of a vast number of risk-taking 
measures with little to no systematic understanding of the mechanisms underlying the suggested 
brain-behavior associations. For example, the association between volume in the right posterior 
parietal cortex and risk tolerance has been replicated in independent samples and using model-
free as well as model-based indices of risk tolerance (Gilaie-Dotan et al., 2014; Grubb et al., 
2016). The right posterior parietal cortex however is mainly associated with numerical 
processing. Given that the task used to elicit the aforementioned association between grey 
matter volume and risk tolerance relies heavily on the integration of various numerically 
presented pieces of information, it is possible that the association is indeed one between 
numerical ability and grey matter volume, rather than risk tolerance. The same problem may 
arise using other measures, especially behavioral measures, which have a ‘risk-taking’ tag but 
first and foremost distinguish individuals based on risk-independent processes such as affect or 
numerical ability (Figner, Mackinlay, Wilkening, & Weber, 2009). 
To overcome the specific problem of using a single neural measure, in manuscript four 
we report the results of a multi-modal imaging analysis that was based on grey matter volume 
and local degree centrality. The latter represents a quantitative indication of how connected a 
neural structure is to its first neighbors, and is computed as the number of direct connections to 
other regions inside the network under investigation (Rubinov & Sporns, 2010). For the 
structural analyses, we utilized a set of regions which we identified via meta-analytic 
approaches implemented in Neurosynth (neurosynth.org) as core correlates of the term ‘risk’. 
This approach has the distinct advantage of being rather inclusive and based on previously 
established links between neural function and risk. As a result of this approach, we ran analyses 
initially for 18 regions, but reduced these to 10 regions after correlation analyses highlighted 
multicollinearity between predictors that was most strongly evident between hemispheres of 
the same structure. Thus, we generated a mean index for both volume and degree centrality 
across the two hemispheres of all bilaterally represented structures. 
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To address the issue of low convergence between risk-taking measures and overcome 
related shortcomings of previous studies, we combined the multi-modal imaging component of 
manuscript four with psychometrically derived risk preference factors from the Basel-Berlin 
Risk Study (BBRS) imaging subsample. One of the main contributions of the BBRS to date has 
been the extraction of psychometric factors of risk preference by Frey and colleagues (2017). 
Specifically, the authors implemented a bifactor model that gave rise to a general risk preference 
factor R, and seven orthogonal domain-specific risk preference factors. In contrast to single 
behavioral indices of risk taking, R was observed to account for 62% of the explained variance 
and showed high retest validity (.85). The general risk preference factor R, it is argued, captures 
the trait-dimension of risk taking (Frey et al., 2017). As a result, we worked with neural 
measures and risk preference indices which have been argued to represent the comparatively 
more stable, trait-like dimensions of risk taking.  
The main research questions driving analyses reported in manuscript four are as follows: 
To what extent can neural structural indices account for variance in psychometrically derived 
risk preference factors? Here we are particularly interested in the individual contribution of the 
set of volumetric and connectivity indices, as well as how much additional variance would be 
explained if volumetric and connectivity indices were combined to account for risk preference. 
Moreover, given that the 10-region risk network we built using Neurosynth covered all regions 
which previous studies had indicated to be linked to risk taking via grey matter volume and 
degree centrality, we attempt to provide a conceptual replication of these established brain-
behavior associations using the BBRS risk preference factors. To quantify the robustness of the 
contribution of individual neural indices, we supplement traditional multiple regression 
analyses with Bayesian model comparison and selection. 
The results from our multiple regression analyses suggest that structural indices can 
account for variance in the general risk preference factor R, but that they are not predictive of 
domain-specific risk preferences. The latter finding is particularly interesting given that one of 
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the psychometric factors (F7) comprises behavioral measures of risk taking (e.g. monetary 
lotteries). Thus, if not for R, it was reasonable to expect associations of previously identified 
structural indices with F7. Volumetric indices explained close to 9% of variance in R, 
connectivity indices only around 5%, and the combination of volumetric and connectivity 
indices explained over 15% of variance. At the level of individual predictors, grey matter 
volume in the ventral striatum was identified by Bayesian model comparison as the most 
influential predictor of general risk preference, followed by grey matter volume in frontal 
regions and degree centrality of the amygdala. The finding for ventral striatal volume had 
previously only been observed for pathology (Cai et al., 2015; Koehler et al., 2013). The 
striatum was already firmly on the map based on its functional role for reward-related processes 
of risky choice. The finding of increased volume in the striatum to be linked to increased general 
risk preference is therefore very informative for understanding the mapping of structure to 
function and their respective contributions to risk taking. Equally, frontal cortices and amygdala 
contributions are in line with functional and structural links to risk-related indices. As such, our 
results support and extend the importance of certain neural region for risk taking to the 
structural domain.  
Interestingly —and contrary to expectations— some of the regions which had 
previously been linked via grey matter volume to individual differences in risk taking were not 
observed to be linked to the general risk preference factor, including insula and posterior 
parietal cortex. We suggest that these results, which we take to constitute a failed conceptual 
replication of earlier findings, are indicative of the fragility of brain-behavior associations and 
arise because individual differences in some risk-taking measures are primarily driven by 
specific task demands, such as numerical ability. 
The results reported in manuscript four imply that neural structure may indeed provide 
independent contributions to general risk preference, and as such map onto the suggested 
genetically-influenced domain-general factor of risk taking called into existence by a genome-
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wide association study (Karlsson Linnér et al., 2018). Of course, much variance is left to be 
explained, but given that we utilized decontextualized risk preference factors, the fact that 15% 
of variance in general risk preference is explained by very simple indices of neural architecture 
provides new hope for a general risk-taking trait. As a major upshot of this study, we 
recommend that other researchers follow suit and build their research studies around robust, 
psychometrically informed phenotypes. 
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General Discussion 
This thesis set out to address the fascinating question of why individuals, sometimes 
between each other, sometimes within themselves, differ. Differ with regards to the choices they 
make when faced with uncertainty, specifically, when faced with risk. Many factors have been 
found to be associated with and potentially even drive individual differences in risk taking, 
ranging from factors that arise from within the person, to external factors, such as how risk 
taking is assessed. In this body of work, my co-authors and I looked specifically at the 
contribution of age, risk-taking measures, and their interplay, as well as the extent to which 
biological substrates, in this case neural function and structure, vary with risk taking.  
The results from the four manuscripts cultivate the following four conclusions. (1) Life 
span trajectories of risk taking may arise not simply from age-related differences in risk 
perception, but from the (compromised) integration of complex information. Thus, we can 
relatively easily help the aging decision-maker deal with risk by communicating information in 
ways that it can be easily integrated. (2) Individuals matter! If we want to understand individual 
differences in risk taking, group-level (i.e. aggregate patterns) can at best suggest hypotheses 
for individual differences, but these most certainly need to be tested. (3) Biology, particularly 
the brain, still holds many promises for discovering the pathways underlying individual 
differences in risk taking. If the neural correlates can be mapped onto cognitive, affective, and 
motivational processes, we may find an entry point to causative inference. (4) Across the 
manuscripts contained in this dissertation, a unifying conclusion speaks to the importance of 
knowing our measures better. The field of risk-taking research, particularly when geared 
towards understanding developmental patterns or pathology, suffers from many piecemeal 
approaches, due to the diversity of risk-taking measures available and utilized. For now, the 
field does not need more measures, or even better measures, but first a taxonomy of the 
measures that are in use. This taxonomy needs to spell out, perhaps even classify, the cognitive, 
affective and motivational demands, corollaries, and other contextual factors that need to be 
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distinguished from the risk signal captured by a particular measure. Otherwise, when we try to 
see the wood for the trees by synthesizing the evidence for/against certain pathways, we come 
to an early fork in the road. The story of this thesis is a story of choice, not just risky choice, 
but also choice between measures. 
 
Two roads diverged in a yellow wood, 
And sorry I could not travel both 
And be one traveler, long I stood 
And looked down one as far as I could 
To where it bent in the undergrowth; 
 
Then took the other, as just as fair, 
And having perhaps the better claim, 
Because it was grassy and wanted wear; 
Though as for that the passing there 
Had worn them really about the same, 
 
And both that morning equally lay 
In leaves no step had trodden black. 
Oh, I kept the first for another day! 
Yet knowing how way leads on to way, 
I doubted if I should ever come back. 
 
I shall be telling this with a sigh 
Somewhere ages and ages hence: 
Two roads diverged in a wood, and I— 
I took the one less traveled by, 
And that has made all the difference. 
 
Robert Frost (1916) 
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Abstract 
Aging has long been thought to be associated with changes in risk-taking propensity. 
But do different measures converge in showing similar age-related patterns? We conducted a 
study to investigate the convergent validity of different self-report and behavioral assessments 
of risk taking across adulthood (N = 902). Individuals between 18 and 90 years of age 
answered a self-report item and completed two incentivized behavioral tasks, a gambles task 
and the Balloon Analogue Risk Task. Our results indicate that although all measures show 
some patterns indicative of an age reduction in risk taking, the correlations between measures 
are small. Moreover, age differences in behavioral paradigms seem to emerge as a function of 
specific task characteristics, such as learning and computational demands. We discuss the 
importance of understanding how specific task characteristics engender age differences in risk 
taking and the need for future work that disentangles task demands from true age-related 
changes in risk-taking propensity. 
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Risk taking across the life span:  
A comparison of self-report and behavioral measures of risk taking 
Aging is associated with changes in cognitive abilities, motivation, and affect that may 
have important implications for decision-making preferences and outcomes (Figner & Weber, 
2011; Samanez-Larkin & Knutson, 2015). For example, some researchers have concluded that 
just “as elders show profound declines in cognitive function, they also show profound 
declines in choice rationality compared with their younger peers” (Tymula, Rosenberg 
Belmaker, Ruderman, Glimcher, & Levy, 2013; p. 17143). One prominent feature of many 
decision situations encountered across the life span is risk. Whether to party or study for an 
exam, start a family or pursue a career, spend or invest the money earned, which way to vote, 
take up treatment or not: all of these decisions involve some level of uncertainty regarding the 
nature and probability of future outcomes. Individual differences in the tolerance of and 
appetite for risk can lead to substantially different choices given the same set of options, yet 
comparatively little is known about the trajectory of risk-taking propensity across the life 
span. Previous research has been inconclusive, showing different and sometimes even 
opposite age-risk trajectories. Although many studies suggested a decline in risk taking with 
age, some have suggested an increase in risk taking with age, and still others found no 
differences between risk-taking propensity of younger and older individuals (cf. Best & 
Charness, 2015; Henninger, Madden, & Huettel, 2010; Mata, Josef, Samanez-Larkin, & 
Hertwig, 2011; Shao & Lee, 2014).  
One potential reason for the observed divergence of trajectories is the adoption of 
different approaches to measuring risk-taking propensity, such as self-report measures or 
diverse behavioral measures. Beyond choosing between risky options, some of the latter also 
tap into additional cognitive demands, for example, learning. How these different approaches 
relate conceptually and psychometrically still remains poorly understood (Appelt, Milch, 
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Handgraaf, & Weber, 2011). Moreover, our current understanding regarding the convergent 
validity of different risk taking measures is based primarily on adoption of multiple measures 
within a particular age group. Consequently, little is known about the convergent validity of 
risk-taking measures across the adult human life span.  
Using a large-scale cross-sectional study that allows for the treatment of age as a 
continuous variable, we report independent age-risk trajectories for three measures, each of 
which is representative of the main approaches to capturing risk-taking propensity: self-
reports, description-based, and experience-based behavioral measures. Further, we examine 
the convergent validity of these three measures as a function of age in order to contribute to 
the conceptual debate regarding the measurement of risk-taking propensity. 
Risk Taking Across the Life Span 
The assessment of whether and how core factors, such as cognitive and motivational 
variables, affect age-related changes in decision-making requires a good understanding of 
decision measures and their interrelations. Yet the empirical and conceptual diversity 
associated with risk taking make such an enterprise difficult (Aven, 2012; Schonberg, Fox, & 
Poldrack, 2011). Different measurement approaches have been adopted to approximate 
individuals’ risk taking in real life, namely self-report and behavioral measures (Josef et al., 
2016); the latter category of behavioral measures can be further divided into description and 
experience-based tasks (Mata et al., 2011).  
Age-risk trajectories for self-report measures. Mirroring the complexity of the risk-
taking construct, self-report measures of risk taking are inherently heterogeneous: while some 
items and instruments assess general propensity (e.g. Benjamin et al., 2012; Dohmen et al., 
2011; Drobetz, Maercker, Spiess, Wagner, & Forstmeier, 2012; Josef et al., 2016; Mata, 
Josef, & Hertwig, 2016; Vieider et al., 2013) others tap into more domain specific aspects 
(e.g. Bonsang & Dohmen, 2015; Dohmen et al., 2011; Lönnqvist, Verkasalo, Walkowitz, & 
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Wichardt, 2014; Rolison, Hanoch, Wood, & Liu, 2013; Vieider et al., 2013). Regardless of 
specificity, both general and domain-specific items used in cross-sectional and longitudinal 
studies coincide in the suggestion that aging is associated with reductions in risk-taking 
propensity across the life span (Dohmen et al., 2011; Josef et al., 2016; Mata et al., 2016; 
Rolison, et al., 2013; Vieider et al., 2013). This trend also holds for many countries around the 
world, albeit with systematic variation between countries as a function of the utility and 
necessity of risk-taking behavior in the (local) ecological context (Mata, et al., 2016). For 
general and domain-specific self-report items, there is an overall age-related decline in risk 
taking for financial, recreational, ethical, social and health-related activities, yet form and 
magnitude of this change may be domain-specific (Josef et al., 2016; Rolison et al., 2013). 
Critically, research by Dohmen and colleagues (2011; also see Vieider et al., 2013 and Josef 
et al., 2016 for comparable findings) indicated that self-reported general and domain-specific 
risk taking were strongly correlated. Thus, although self-reported general and domain-specific 
risk taking follow slightly different developmental trajectories, using a general risk-taking 
index is an efficient way to capture individual differences in risk-taking propensity (Dohmen 
et al., 2011). Speaking to the test-theoretic utility of a general risk-taking item, self-reported 
general risk taking has been found to relate with real-world behavior (Dohmen et al., 2011), to 
evidence high test-retest reliability and moderately correlate with genetic factors (Benjamin et 
al., 2012), and to describe a phenotype with moderate stability across the adult human life 
span (Josef et al., 2016).  
Age-risk trajectories for description-based behavioral measures. In contrast to the 
overall homogenous pattern of a negative association between self-reported risk taking and 
age, trajectories derived from behavioral measurements are less consistent, even making 
opposite predictions for the association between age and risk taking (Best & Charness, 2015; 
Defoe, Dubas, FIgner, & van Aken, 2015; Mata, et al., 2011; Shao & Lee, 2014). A 
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commonly used way of eliciting propensity for risk taking via tasks is to present individuals 
with two or more lotteries (gambles) within a forced-choice framework (Holt & Laury, 2002; 
Rieskamp, 2008; Weller, Levin, & Denburg, 2011). Tasks of this kind provide the decision 
maker with all decision-relevant information, such as outcome magnitude and probability, and 
do not require any learning; they are therefore sometimes referred to as ‘decisions from 
description’ (Hertwig, Barron, Weber, & Erev, 2004). For example, the realistic scenario of 
selecting between a pension fund with a stable return and investment schemes with 
probabilistic returns can, in principle, be represented by a lottery with a fixed outcome A and 
a risky outcome B (assuming that the variance of the investment scheme is known from 
historical data and presented accordingly). 
Age-risk trajectories derived from description-based gambles suggest common as well 
as unique trajectories, depending on various aspects of the task. Across studies, trajectories 
for description-based decisions between options associated with gains indicate increased risk 
aversion in older age (Mather et al., 2012; Tymula et al., 2013; Weller et al., 2011), a pattern 
matching that observed for self-report measures. When it comes to decisions involving losses, 
however, findings become more differentiated, for older adults were found to make similar 
(Weller at al., 2011) or more risk-seeking choices compared with younger adults (Mather et 
al., 2012, Tymula et al., 2013). A recent meta-analysis confirmed the influence of outcome 
domain on decision-making in younger and older adults (Best & Charness, 2015), concluding 
positively (negatively) framed items to be associated with more (no differences in) risk-averse 
choices in older relative to younger adults. Apart from the domain, whether the choice set 
includes a sure outcome seems to impact on age-risk trajectories. Decisions between a risky 
and a sure option for instance have been found to yield similar (Mata et al., 2011) or divergent 
(Mather et al., 2012) choice patterns for older and younger adults. Interestingly, whilst Mather 
and colleagues (2012) found no age differences for gambles involving two risky options, age-
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differences were observed in another study (Weller et al., 2011). These patterns are further 
qualified by the observation of a non-linear development of risk-taking propensity across the 
life span, accompanied by increased choice inconsistency and decreased choice rationality by 
older individuals (Tymula et al., 2013; Weller et al., 2011). 
These results exemplify the notion that description-based decisions are not impacted 
equivocally by age, but instead that task-specific attributes contribute to diverging age-risk 
trajectories. Some of the observed age differences may result from the complexity of the task, 
for it has been shown that the integration of several described cues (e.g., outcome magnitudes, 
probabilities) poses more of a challenge to aging decision makers (Bruine de Bruin, Parker, & 
Fischhoff, 2012; Tymula et al., 2013). Additional task demands that tap into wide-ranging 
cognitive, motivational, affective and perceptual differences - many of which have been 
linked to developmental changes in neural correlates (Samanez-Larkin & Knutson, 2015) - 
may further contribute to age-related certainty and framing effects, such as developmental 
affective changes leading to a shift in the weighting of gains and losses (Shao & Lee, 2014).  
Age-risk trajectories for experience-based behavioral measures. In stark contrast to 
description-based measures are paradigms that entail (some level of) exploration and 
feedback-based learning. In real life, decisions often have to be made based on information 
that cannot be condensed into neat outcome magnitudes and probabilities. Instead, individuals 
often have to repeatedly extract and update their beliefs about the environmental 
contingencies – that is, to learn about the underlying option attributes - through exploration, 
choice, and feedback. Whether to study for an exam or enjoy one’s free time, only repeated 
experience will furnish the individual with option-associated values. If the individual does not 
learn from previous experience or does not calibrate his/her behavior accordingly, sub-
optimal choices may result.   
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Several behavioral measures that simulate decision-making under experienced risk 
exist, including the Balloon Analogue Risk Task (BART, Lejuez et al., 2002). The BART has 
become one of the go-to risk-taking measures because it holds predictive qualities for 
individual differences in actual risk taking (Lauriola, Panno, Levin, & Lejuez, 2014), 
including substance use, delinquency, rebellious and risky sexual behaviors (Aklin, Lejuez, 
Zvolensky, Kahler & Gwadz, 2005; Lejuez, Aklin, Zvolensky, & Pedulla, 2003; Lejuez, 
Simmons, Aklin, Daughters & Dvir, 2004; Skeel, Neudecker, Pilarski, & Pytlak, 2007), as 
well as a composite score of risky behaviors in adolescents (Lejuez et al., 2007) and 
psychopathy (Hunt, Hopko, Bare, Lejuez, & Robinson, 2005). Importantly, the BART has 
been shown to yield moderate to high test-retest reliability across different temporal intervals 
(Lejuez et al., 2007; White, Lejuez, & de Wit, 2008; Weafer, Baggott, & de Wit, 2013). Age-
risk trajectories for the BART, like self-report and some description-based behavioral 
measures, delineate a negative association between risk taking and age (Mata et al., 2011), 
however different versions of the BART have also led to trajectories suggestive of increased 
risk taking in older adults (Cavanagh et al., 2012). The heterogeneity of trajectories is not 
restricted to versions of the BART, however, but applies to other experience-based behavioral 
measures, including the Iowa Gambling Task (cf. Mata et al., 2011), Columbia Card Task 
(Figner, Mackinlay, Wilkening, & Weber, 2009), as well as classical sampling paradigms 
(Frey, Mata, & Hertwig, 2015; Spaniol & Wegier, 2012). Interestingly, age-risk trajectories 
differed not only between tasks, but also between different versions of the same task (Frey et 
al., 2015; Figner et al., 2009; Mata et al., 2011). 
One potential reason for the observed disagreement between experience-based measures 
is the extent to which different measurements tap into different cognitive processes that are 
subject to age-related changes. For example, we have argued that learning and memory 
demands may contribute substantially to age differences found in experience-based risky-
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choice paradigms, with differences reflecting effects of age differences in cognitive abilities 
rather than risk propensity per se (Mata et al., 2011; Frey et al., 2015). Specifically, tasks that 
require the extraction of information from samples of experienced choice outcomes – such as 
BART, Iowa Gambling Task, Columbia Card Task - yield more or less risk-seeking behavior 
for older adults, depending on whether the underlying contingencies favor more or less risk 
taking to achieve a higher payoff (Mata et al., 2011; Shao & Lee, 2014). If the contingencies 
are not sufficiently extracted from choice and feedback, behavior on subsequent trials may not 
be appropriately calibrated. Importantly, even within risky-choice paradigms with learning 
demands, the extent to which age-differences emerge has been found to depend substantially 
on task demands, with age differences only arising as a function of increasing task complexity 
(e.g., number of choice options to learn about, Frey et al., 2015).  
Returning to the convergence of trajectories derived from self-report, description and 
experience-based behavioral measures, under some circumstances, all three measurement 
approaches suggest risk taking to decline with age. However, especially for behavioral 
measures, age-risk trajectories vary, possibly as a function of different measures tapping into 
different cognitive processes that are impacted by age-related changes (Mata et al., 2011). 
Simply put, just as the (cognitive) demand placed on the decision maker increases from self-
report to description-based to experience-based behavioral measures, so does the potential for 
trajectory divergence, especially when task demands are differently or insufficiently met by a 
cognitive system subject to age-related change. Task characteristics may therefore not only 
play an important role in engendering differences between measures within a specific age 
group (e.g., decisions from description vs. from experience in younger adults, Hertwig et al., 
2004), but particularly across age groups (Mata et al., 2011). 
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The Current Study 
Our main goal was to examine the cross-sectional age-risk trajectories obtained from 
three different measures, each representative for the reviewed measurement approaches, and 
to assess their convergent validity as a function of age. Our battery comprised the self-report 
item of the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) assessing general risk-taking (Dohmen et 
al., 2011; Josef et al., 2016), a gambles task involving described monetary lotteries (e.g., 
Rieskamp, 2008; Tymula et al., 2013) as an example measure without a learning component, 
and the Balloon Analogue Risk Task (BART; Lejuez et al., 2002) as an example of a 
behavioral measure with a learning component. The three specific measures a) are arguably 
the most prominently used ones in each of the categories and b) are therefore among the best-
studied measures regarding their test-theoretic properties, including test-retest reliability and 
external validity (cf. Benjamin et al., 2012; Dohmen et al., 2011; Josef et al., 2016; Lejuez et 
al., 2007; Lauriola et al., 2014). Evidence pertaining to the test-retest reliability of common 
indices derived from description-based behavioral measures is mixed, but was suggested to be 
better for less complex measurements (Chuang & Schechter, 2015). 
To examine the role of task characteristics and their interplay with age, we used the 
following specific within-task manipulations. In the gambles task, we included both trials in 
which the risky option featured the same or a lower expected value relative to the safe 
(certain) option (cf. risk-disadvantageous options in Weller et al., 2011). The two task 
conditions were introduced to vary the utility of taking a risk: in equal expected value trials, 
selecting either option confers no benefit over the alternative other than deciding for or 
against certainty. In trials for which expected value was lower for the risky option, however, a 
safe choice is the better strategy. One focus of our analysis was thus to examine the certainty 
effect in the domain of gains reported for older adults (Mather et al., 2012), specifically 
whether this is influenced by the utility of a safe or risky choice (Weller et al., 2011). In 
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general, we expected such within-task manipulations to help us examine whether individuals 
adjust their risk taking as a function of task characteristics and assess their role in engendering 
age differences. In the BART, we varied balloon capacity across two types of trials, thus 
increasing learning demands and allowing us to examine whether age differences in learning 
can account for potential age differences in risk-taking propensity. 
Finally, many previous studies on age-differences in risk taking relied on extreme age 
comparisons (e.g., young vs. older adults) and/or collected data from comparatively small and 
non-representative samples (cf. Best & Charness, 2015; Mata et al., 2011; Tymula et al., 
2013). An additional aim of this study was therefore to collect and analyze data from a fairly 
large sample, characteristic of the local adult population, to better estimate cross-sectional 
trajectories of risk-taking across the entire adult life span using both self-report and 
behavioral measures.  
Method 
Participants  
973 individuals between 18 and 90 years of age participated in a survey of the 
population of Basel, Switzerland. Participants were recruited from the street in the city center 
and in a large shopping mall and asked to complete a computer-assisted personal interview 
(CAPI). Data from 71 individuals were excluded from all analyses due to incomplete data or 
repeated runs of the survey, which arose from technical problems in data collection due to 
temporarily poor quality of Internet access at the study locations. The final sample included 
902 individuals (Mage = 47.4, SD = 17.4, range = 18–90; 492 females, 55%). Individuals could 
earn money depending on their performance on the two behavioral tasks and earned on 
average 10.1 CHF (Swiss francs, 1 CHF ~ 0.98 USD) (SD = 6.18). Informed consent was 
obtained from all individuals prior to participation. The Institutional Review Board of the 
Faculty of Psychology, University of Basel, reviewed and gave ethical approval for the study. 
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In addition, we used cross-sectional data from 13,699 participants of the Swiss 
Household Panel (swisspanel.ch; Zimmermann et al., 2003) to perform a qualitative 
comparison of the developmental trajectories for self-reported risk taking between our local 
sample and the Swiss population at large (see Supplementary Materials for additional sample 
details).  
Materials 
Self-reported risk taking. Participants were presented with the following item (cf. 
Dohmen et al., 2011): “How do you rate yourself: Are you in general a risk-taking person or 
do you usually try to avoid taking risks? Please provide your answer with reference to a scale 
of 0 to 10. The value 0 indicates absolutely not risk taking, and the value 10 indicates very 
risk taking. You can adjust your response by selecting any value in between.” Participants 
were presented with an integer scale ranging from 0 to 10, and indicated their response 
accordingly. 
Description-based gambles task. All participants completed two sets of eight 
description-based gambles (Supplements, Table S1; cf. Mather et al., 2012; Rieskamp, 2008). 
On each trial, individuals were required to choose between a certain and a risky option 
presented as two boxes on the screen (Figure 1). The certain option either offered 4 or 8 CHF 
(Swiss francs, 1 CHF ~ 0.98 USD) with a probability of 1, whereas the risky option offered 
between 6 and 40 CHF with a specific probability and 0 otherwise. Half of all trials had a 
50/50 chance associated with the risky option, and the other half of trials were associated with 
a 20/80 chance of winning money or not, respectively. The 50/50 and 20/80 trials were further 
divided into trials that yielded the same expected value (calculated as option outcome value 
multiplied by its probability, hereafter referred to as “equal EV trials”) for the risky and the 
safe option, whereas the other half of trials yielded a higher expected value for the safe option 
(hereafter referred to as “unequal EV trials”). The two task conditions were introduced to 
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assess whether differential utility of risk taking as a function of EV (in)equality engenders 
age-related differences in risk-taking behavior. The order in which the eight gambles were 
presented was randomized across participants. Participants selected their preferred option by 
clicking on the respective box; option selection was self-paced. Each choice was then played 
out and the outcome saved on a temporary account (but not presented to participants, in order 
to avoid any sequence/learning effects). Participants obtained written instructions for the task 
and were provided with an independent (i.e., not included in the test set) example trial in 
order to become familiar with the task objective and response modus. Inspection of the data 
revealed that two participants did not complete two sets of eight unique gambles but instead 
one gamble was presented more than twice across the two sets. These two participants were 
excluded from analysis of the gambles task to ensure all participants had seen the same full 
set of gambles and had made decisions on the same eight unique lotteries. 
Balloon Analogue Risk Task (BART). We employed a variant of the Balloon 
Analogue Risk Task (BART; Lejuez et al., 2002) in which participants could pump up 
balloons to gain monetary rewards. In each trial, participants could administer sequential 
pumps up to the point where the person decides to stop inflation or the balloon bursts (Figure 
2). Each successful pump resulted in an increase of .02 CHF on a temporary account, and the 
total score of the current trial was saved and added to the final payoff if a person decided to 
stop pumping before an explosion. Otherwise, the temporary account was reset to 0. 
Participants completed 20 trials of two types of balloons differing in their color (red, blue) 
and pumping capacity (low vs. high; 32 vs. 16 maximum pumps), with assignment of balloon 
type and color being counterbalanced across participants. The two balloon conditions were 
introduced to vary learning demands. On inspection of the trial-by-trial data we discovered 
that a small number of participants completed more than 20 trials per balloon type (likely due 
to a lag in the Internet connection resulting in a few repeated trials; n = 40). The findings 
RISK TAKING ACROSS THE LIFE SPAN 
 
14 
below are based on analyses for which the maximum number of trials was restricted to the 
first 20 trials per balloon type; however, control analyses yielded the same results including 
the extra trials.  
Demographics. Beyond the self-report item and behavioral tasks related to risk 
taking, we collected information on individuals’ age, gender, number of children, marital 
status, work status, highest level of completed education, area of residence (postal code), as 
well as financial information regarding personal income, assets and debts. For the main 
analysis, we used age as a continuous independent variable (IV), participants’ gender (male = 
0, female = 1), whether they have children (0 = no, 1 = yes), their work status (0 = not 
employed, 1 = employed) as binary categorical IVs, and education (nine levels, reference = 
primary school) and marital status (eight levels, reference = married and living together) as 
categorical IVs on a nominal scale. Area of residence and financial information were not 
included in the current set of analyses because the former only served to warrant a sample of 
participants that characterizes the local population, and only a minority of participants 
provided responses to the latter. 
Procedure  
We employed an independent market research company to recruit and collect data 
from a quota-driven sample of participants in Basel, Switzerland. Six interviewers were 
trained on the study materials and provided with detailed instructions and study protocols. 
Recruitment of participants took place on the street in the city center and in a shopping mall, 
and included a brief introduction of the research as well as an initial screening consisting of 
individuals’ postal code of their main residence, gender, and age, to confirm eligibility for 
participation with respect to the quota required for a fairly representative sample concerning 
residence, gender, and age. Successful recruitment on the street resulted in immediate data 
collection in a nearby hotel or coffee shop. Individuals recruited in the shopping center 
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completed the study in the shopping center. The setup was kept as similar as possible across 
the three test locations, with each location providing separate, closed off workstations with 
laptop computers and a mouse for participants to complete the study. Participation involved 
the same set of questions and tasks for all participants, with interviewers guiding individuals 
through the study on a one-to-one basis. The latter was thought to facilitate participation by 
older adults and improve data quality (i.e., reduce the number of missing items or incorrect 
data entry). On entering the test setting, participants’ responses to the three screening 
questions were confirmed and recorded, followed by the provision of detailed information 
about the study’s aims and content, and consent procedures. Subsequently, participants were 
presented with the self-report item assessing general risk taking, the two behavioral risk-
taking tasks, and several questions concerning their demographics. The order of 
measurements was fixed (self-report, BART, gambles). All oral instructions and written 
materials were given in German. Data were recorded electronically using CAPI and entered 
either by the interviewer or the participants themselves (e.g., sensitive questions, responses 
during the two behavioral tasks). All earnings were paid to participants immediately after 
study completion. 
Results 
Overview of Statistical Analysis 
Our goal was to examine the effect of age on risk taking across a variety of measures 
whilst controlling for demographic variables shown to be associated with risk taking, 
including gender, educational attainment, work status, marital status and parenthood (e.g., 
Baker & Maner, 2009; Byrnes, Miller, & Schafer, 1999; Dohmen et al., 2011; Rolison et al., 
2013; Schurer, 2015; Wang, Kruger, & Wilke, 2009). Given the correlational nature of this 
research, multiple regression analyses were used to discern the relation between the 
continuous variable age and the three risk-taking measures (i.e., self-reported risk taking, 
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choices in gambles task, performance in BART). Sample-based descriptive statistics for all 
risk-taking measures used are given in Table 1.  
Age-risk trajectories for self-reports were analyzed using a fixed effects regression 
model. We applied mixed-effects modeling to individuals’ trial-by-trial performance in the 
BART (number of pumps) and the gambles task (choice of risky or safe option) in order to 
account for variance in the outcome measure that is not systematic across the group but 
instead originates from random (i.e., individual level) effects, such as effects of trial or 
condition, which may vary significantly across participants. For the gambles task, the binary 
choice outcome (risky or safe option) was regressed on age, gender, trial type (i.e., whether 
the trial was an equal or unequal EV trial), and two interaction terms (age and sex, age and 
trial type). The model also allowed for random effects of trial type, clustered within 
participants. For the BART, mixed-effects modeling included the following fixed effects: age, 
gender, balloon capacity (high or low), whether the previous trial resulted in an explosion (yes 
or no), the trial number (scaled separately for high and low-capacity balloons), and interaction 
terms for age and sex, age and balloon capacity, age and previous explosion trial, age and trial 
number, balloon capacity and trial number as well as a three-way interaction term between 
age, balloon capacity and trial number. We allowed for random effects for trial number, 
balloon capacity, previous explosions, and a trial number by capacity interaction, clustered 
within participants.  
Analyses were carried out in the software R (R Core Team, 2014) using the packages 
lme4 (Bates, Maechler, Bolker, & Walker, 2015) and lmerTest (Kuznetsova, Brockhoff, & 
Christensen, 2015) for mixed-effects modeling of continuous (lmer) and binary (glmer) 
outcome variables. Calculation of the denominator degrees of freedom required to derive p-
values for the fixed effects test statistics in lmerTest (Kuznetsova et al., 2015) uses 
Satterthwaite’s approximation (based on SAS proc mixed theory). For all analyses reported, 
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continuous outcome variables were normalized prior to analysis; self-report scores were 
normalized across the entire sample, while individuals’ number of pumps per trial in the 
BART were normalized separately for each balloon type. Continuous predictor variables (e.g. 
age) were normalized, and categorical variables dummy-coded. Reflecting previous findings 
that indicated the effect of age to take non-linear forms and follow different trajectories as a 
function of domain and/or gender (Josef et al., 2016; Rolison et al., 2013; Tymula et al., 
2013), all initial analyses included linear, quadratic and cubic effects of age and gender as 
well as their respective interactions. Initial analyses yielded no support for the inclusion of 
quadratic or cubic terms in the mixed-effects models of individuals’ trial-by-trial performance 
on the BART and the gambles, hence were dropped and only a linear term for age was 
included. Parameter estimates for the set of demographic variables (besides gender) entered 
into the modeling process in order to control for potentially confounding effects were not the 
focus of the current research, and are not discussed here. 
All analyses were conducted using the entire age range (18 to 90) and compared with 
analyses including only individuals between 18 and 78 years of age to control for a marked 
reduction in data points from individuals between 79 and 90 years of age (i.e., fewer than five 
individuals for every year). The general pattern of results was robust against in/exclusion of 
individuals between 79 and 90 years of age (n=15); only the results obtained from analyses 
covering the entire age range are reported below. 
Self-reported risk taking 
Self-reported risk taking was negatively associated with age (=-0.27, SE=0.1, 
p=.01) and gender (b=-0.34, SE=0.1, p<.001), where increasing age and being female were 
attributes associated with lower self-reported risk taking (Table 2; Figure 3, Panel A). In 
addition, a significant interaction between age (linear term) and gender emerged (b=0.29, 
SE=0.14, p=.04). Quadratic and cubic age terms as well as their respective interactions with 
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gender were not significant. Main effects for age and sex remained after removal of non-
linear terms, and both main effects and the interaction effect remained significant after 
controlling for educational attainment, work status, marital status, and children; marital status 
emerged as significantly predictive of self-reported risk taking (Supplements Table S2). The 
results from the local survey are in line with previous research, which has indicated self-
reported risk taking to decrease with age and to be lower for females than for males. 
Moreover, a very similar pattern—negative association between age and self-reported risk 
taking and a main effect of gender—was observed for fixed effects modeling using Swiss 
Household Panel data (see Supplements for further details), albeit suggesting a non-linear 
association between age and risk taking. Overall, the analysis suggests that our local sample 
captures the common findings regarding the patterns of age and sex on self-reported risk-
taking propensity that generalize across the Swiss population.  
Gambles 
Sex and age were not significantly predictive of choosing the riskier option, but a main 
effect of trial type emerged (b=-0.52, SE=0.05, p<.001; Table 3). For an individual of mean 
age this effect translates into a 12% decrease in the probability of selecting the risky option, 
from 46% on equal EV trials to 34% on trials in which the higher expected value was 
associated with the safe option. Moreover, relative to younger participants, older participants 
selected the risky over the safe option more often in trials in which the safe option had a 
higher expected value than the risky option, as indicated by a significant age by trial type 
interaction (b=0.24, SE=0.04, p<.001; Table 3; Figure 3, Panels B and C). To put these 
estimates into context, whereas the probability of selecting the risky option in unequal EV 
trials (31%) was lower than the probability of selecting the risky option in equal EV (49%) 
trials for a younger individual (mean age minus 1 SD), this reduction was comparatively 
smaller for an older person (mean age plus 1 SD), from 43% in equal EV trials to 36% in 
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unequal EV trials. Note that Panels B and C in Figure 3 depict trial type-specific densities and 
coefficients, which were standardized separately for equal and unequal EV trials; 
consequently, the zero point representing the mean proportion of risky choice in equal and 
unequal EV trials is not the same in the two conditions (0.48 and 0.39, respectively). The 
results were robust against removal of interaction terms and inclusion of control variables. For 
the model containing demographic control variables, marital status emerged as an additional 
significant predictor of choices on the gambles task (Supplements Table S6). Compared with 
married respondents’ choices in equal EV trials, individuals living in a civil partnership were 
more likely to choose the riskier option (b=1.50, SE=0.75, p<.05), whereas individuals in a 
civil partnership but living apart were less likely to select the risky option (b=-2.53, SE=1.28, 
p=.05).  
In summary, patterns obtained from the gambles task highlight the importance of task 
characteristics for risk taking in the absence of main effects of age and gender. The interaction 
between trial type and age suggests that task demands differentially affect younger and older 
respondents and thereby influence their respective choices. In unequal EV trials the safe 
option offers a higher EV compared with the risky option. If individuals base their decision 
making on EV, it stands to reason that the safe option is the more attractive one, and therefore 
risk taking should decrease on unequal EV trials. The likelihood of selecting the risky option 
on unequal EV trials increased with age, however, suggesting that older adults may be more 
risk taking because they cannot (or prefer not to) adhere to EV calculation.  
Balloon Analogue Risk Task 
We used the average number of pumps in the BART (the same results hold for the 
“adjusted number of pumps”, cf. Lejuez et al., 2002) as a measure of risk taking. The 
regression analysis revealed significant main effects for balloon capacity (b=-0.22, SE=0.03, 
p<.001), whether the previous trial was an explosion trial (b=-0.19, SE=0.01, p<.001), and 
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trial number (b=-0.11, SE=0.02,  p<.001) on risk taking (Table 4). Moreover, several 
interaction effects were observed (Table 4), including interactions between age and balloon 
capacity (b=-0.1, SE=0.03, p<.01), age and previous explosion (b=0.03, SE=0.01, p<.01), as 
well as between balloon capacity and trial number (b=0.25, SE=0.03, p<.001). Specifically, 
high-capacity balloons were associated with more pumping compared with low-capacity 
balloons, whereas having experienced an explosion on the previous trial was associated with 
less pumping. Higher age was associated with significantly less pumping on high-capacity 
balloons (Figure 3, Panels D and E), but significantly more pumping on trials following 
explosion trials. 
Across individuals, a learning effect was inferred from the main effect of trial number 
and an interaction between trial number and balloon capacity: contrary to low-capacity 
balloons for which pumping decreased over time, on high-capacity balloons the number of 
pumps administered increased with increasing number of trials (Supplements Figure S1). The 
results obtained from the mixed modeling of pumps on the BART were robust against 
controlling for demographic confounds (Supplements Table S7). Moreover, removal of the 
interaction terms preserved the main effect of balloon capacity, explosion trial and trial 
number, whilst age and sex remained not significantly predictive of pumping. 
Overall, results from the BART support the idea that aging is associated with a 
reduction in risk taking. Notably, age differences were only visible in low risk (high capacity) 
trials, presumably because these trials facilitated elicitation of individual differences with 
respect to risk taking and cognitive capacity, and consequently increased variance in 
behavioral outcomes. Whilst learning was not directly assessed, differences in learning may 
account for the differences in risk taking between young and older adults in the low risk 
BART trials. 
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Convergent validity of risk measures across the life span 
To address the question of whether different measurements paint the same picture 
regarding an individual’s risk-taking profile, we computed zero-order correlations between 
self-report and task-derived risk-taking indices. Correlations were also obtained for scores 
derived from different conditions within a task (e.g., between number of pumps on high and 
low-capacity balloons in the BART) in order to ascertain whether different task components 
are equally sensitive and informative with respect to risk taking or whether, in fact, different 
task conditions yield different response patterns (for instance, due to adaptation to task 
demands). In order to examine whether the relation between measurements changes as a 
function of age, zero-order correlations between measures were also computed after splitting 
the data set into three age groups, comprising individuals aged between 18 and 39 (n=308), 40 
and 59 (n=353), and 60 and 90 years (n=241).  
The association between risk-taking scores stemming from different measurements 
across the whole sample were low (i.e., irrespective of age), and self-report was only weakly 
associated with behavioral measures, albeit more strongly with risk taking in the gambles 
task, r ≈ .2, than in the BART, r ≈ .1 (Figure 4a). 
Turning to risk-taking propensity as measured with the two different behavioral 
measures, performance on the BART showed weak or no correlation with the proportion of 
risky choices on the gambles task. This pattern suggests that even within the same modality 
(i.e., behavioral paradigm with financial incentive structure), tasks are likely to tap into 
different aspects of risk taking and therefore cannot be taken as exchangeable indicators of 
risk-taking propensity (cf. Henninger et al., 2010). Correlations between pumping on high and 
low-capacity balloons on the BART were markedly lower than those observed for risky 
choices in the two gambles conditions (r=0.37, r=0.71, respectively), perhaps reflecting 
commonly observed floor effects on pumping behavior in the BART and specifically the low-
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capacity balloon (e.g., Cavanagh et al., 2012; Henninger et al., 2010; Rolison et al., 2012; 
Schonberg et al., 2012).  
Do the associations between measurements change as a function of age? We did not 
observe substantially different directions and magnitudes of associations between 
measurements for different age groups (Figures 4b-d) compared with those obtained for the 
whole sample. However, one interesting pattern emerged for the association between 
measures obtained from the same task. For the BART, correlations between pumping on the 
low and high-risk balloons increased from the youngest (r=0.18) to the middle-aged (r=0.43) 
to the oldest group (r=0.5), with the difference between younger and older adults’ correlation 
coefficients being significant (z=3.95, p<.0001), suggesting that older individuals’ pumping 
behavior was not as context-dependent as that of younger participants. A similar pattern was 
observed for proportion of risky choices in the two gambles conditions, where correlations 
increased from the youngest (r=0.49), to the middle-aged (r=0.69), and again to the oldest 
group (r=0.8); as for the BART, the difference between younger and older adults’ correlation 
coefficients was significant (z=6.6, p<.0001). These results suggest that older adults were 
overall less adaptive in their risk-taking behavior as a function of task manipulations, perhaps 
signaling reduced cognitive plasticity. 
Discussion 
We investigated age-risk trajectories of three different measures of risk taking, namely 
a self-report and two different behavioral risk-taking measures using a large cross-sectional 
adult sample, and their convergent validity. The present findings paint a differentiated picture 
concerning the effect of age on risk taking. All three measures yielded some evidence for 
reduced risk taking with increased age: Relative to younger adults, older participants reported 
lower propensity for risk, pumped less in the BART in the low risk condition, and selected the 
risky gamble less often when the risky and safe option had the same expected value.  
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The pattern of declining self-reported risk taking across the adult human life span 
identified in our local and national sample falls in line with previous results (Dohmen et al., 
2011; Josef et al., 2016; Mata et al., 2016; Rolison et al., 2013; Shao & Lee, 2014). In line 
with our hypothesis, manipulations within behavioral measures led to divergent age-risk 
trajectories, which suggest specific mechanisms are at play in engendering specific age 
differences in risky choice, such as the learning and information integration demands required 
to complete each task (Frey et al., 2015; Mata et al., 2011). In the BART, age differences 
presumably emerged as a function of learning demands, because older adults only seem to 
have pumped less relative to younger adults in trials for which a higher maximum balloon 
capacity may have facilitated the elicitation of individual differences. Previous work by 
Henninger and colleagues (2010) supports this notion, suggesting processing speed to mediate 
age-related deficiencies in decision quality in the BART (Henniger et al., 2010; Mata et al., 
2011).  
In the gambles task, we expected individuals overall to select the safe option more 
often than the risky option in equal EV trials. Although in the long run selection of one option 
confers no benefit over selection of the other in equal EV trials, for a limited number of trials 
selecting the safe option arguably leads to more advantageous outcomes and risky choices 
may be motivated by the utility of gambling itself. Our estimates confirm this expectation. 
Both younger and older adults selected the risky option less often in equal EV trials, yet older 
adults tipped the balance in favor of the safe option. These patterns are in line with previous 
results of increased risk aversion for risky versus sure gain gambles in older adults (cf. 
certainty effect, Mather et al., 2012). Interestingly, we observed the opposite pattern in 
unequal EV trials (i.e., when the safe option had a higher expected value compared to the 
riskier option). Here, increasing age was associated with increased risk taking, despite the 
relative disadvantage of choosing the risky over the safe option. We do not propose that 
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unequal EV trials triggered more risk-seeking in older adults, but instead we suggest that – 
comparable to age-risk trajectories for different conditions in the BART – older adults were 
less able to adapt to within-task demands and consequently experienced challenges to EV 
calculation and maximization.  
Our results of an interaction between age and trial type in the gambles task are 
comparable to the results for risk-disadvantageous gain trials in the study by Weller and 
colleagues (2011), where a slight increase in disadvantageous risk taking by older adults was 
observed (cf. study by Tymula and colleagues (2013) for similar patterns of lower choice 
rationality in older adults). Moreover, the proportion of risky choices in unequal EV trials 
(current study) and risk-disadvantageous trials (Weller et al., 2011) made by younger and 
older adults was comparable (in both studies around 35% and 40%, respectively), despite the 
markedly lower number of trials completed by individuals in the current study. This suggests 
that age-related differences in individuals’ adaptation to the dynamic utility of risk taking 
describe a replicable, if not robust pattern. Crucially, in the study by Weller and colleagues 
(2011) as well as the current study, younger and older adults appeared to adapt their choice of 
the risky option to the task condition, namely by evidencing a decreased proportion of risky 
choices for unequal EV / risk-disadvantageous gain trials compared with equal EV / risk-
advantageous gain trials. Thus, whilst both younger and older adults in this study appear to 
reconcile changes in EV with lower risk taking, the slope was less negative for older 
compared with younger adults.  
In sum, the patterns of age differences in behavioral tasks seem to suggest a decline in 
propensity for risk across the life span, albeit with strong dependence on specific task 
characteristics. To note, although in the BART aging was associated with overly risk-averse 
behavior that was not optimal in the task, in the gambles task, aging was associated with 
increased risk taking when this was disadvantageous (i.e., the risky option had a lower 
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expected value). The blatant difference in the ecological rationality of risk taking in these two 
task conditions illustrates the need to understand when age differences in decision-making 
preferences and strategies lead to good or poor choices.  
Of further interest to the current study was the convergence between different 
measures adopted both within and across measurement traditions, specifically the extent to 
which they capture similar or dissimilar trajectories in risk taking. The current findings mirror 
significant yet weak correlations between self-report and behavioral measures obtained with 
cross-sectional life span (Josef et al., 2016), young adult (Mishra & Lalumière, 2011), case-
control (Szrek, Chao, Ramlagan, & Peltzer, 2012) and cross-cultural (Vieider et al., 2013) 
samples, and are suggestive of risk-related attitudes and propensities as measured via self-
report and behavioral paradigms to assess distinct facets of a complex construct. Questions 
pertaining to the mechanisms underlying convergence or divergence of risk-taking measures 
however remain open to investigation.  
Previous findings speaking to the self-report item’s heritability and test-retest 
reliability (Benjamin et al., 2012), stability (Josef et al., 2016) and correlation with real life 
behaviors (Dohmen et al., 2012) as well as more domain-specific risk taking measures 
(Dohmen et al., 2011; Vieider et al., 2015; Josef et al., 2016) suggest that this item does 
capture the phenotype of interest and renders the explanation of low correlations being driven 
by an excessively noisy self-report measure unlikely. Alternatively, we agree with the 
suggestion by Chuang and Schechter (2015) that self-report measures may simply be easier to 
understand than behavioral measures, which could account for the observed instability of risk-
taking propensity elicited via experimental paradigms as opposed to the relative stability of 
attitudes assessed via surveys (Chuang & Schechter, 2015). One limitation of the current 
study is the absence of cognitive control variables (e.g., processing speed, working memory, 
comprehension, numeracy) required for pinpointing potential drivers of age-related 
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differences in risk taking for the measures utilized. Given the scope and logistics of our 
approach it was not feasible to include further measures, yet we strongly recommend 
prospective studies to incorporate cognitive capacity measures to exclude alternative 
interpretations of age-related differences for different risk taking measures.  
Unfortunately, we were unable to extend our described gambles structure by losses and 
gamble pairs for which the risky option had the higher EV. Whilst losses seem to loom 
equally large for older adults, Weller and colleagues (2011) observed the proportion of 
disadvantageous risky choices in the loss domain to follow a similar trend to the gain domain, 
suggesting overall more disadvantageous risk taking by older than younger adults. Especially 
with respect to the convergent validity of risk propensity when losses are present (e.g. the 
BART or the possible loss-based interpretation of the self-reported risk taking item), 
correlations between measures may have been higher had we included mixed or loss only 
gambles.  
On a related note, we cannot completely rule out the possibility of priming effects of 
responding to a self-report item on behavior due to the fixed order of measures presented to 
our participants. However, we would argue that the existence of a priming effect would 
artificially inflate the correlations observed, perhaps due to an anchoring bias; if this was the 
case, the actual correlations between self-report and behavioral measures would be even 
lower than observed here, yielding further support for our main results, namely low 
convergent validity between risk-taking measures. Moreover, if individuals established a 
‘risk’ anchor from their self-report, the correlations between the two subsequent behavioral 
measures could expectedly be higher because the self-report primer should affect both tasks. 
Whilst we believe that a potential priming effect does not invalidate our conclusions, only a 
counterbalanced design can convincingly discount this possibility and further studies are 
required that directly examine the impact of measurement order on risk-taking indices. In 
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general, our results are in line with previous estimates of comparatively low convergence 
between self-report and behavioral measures (e.g., Josef et al., 2016), thus we submit that any 
biases due to priming do not substantially alter the main findings.  
There are three novel aspects of our results that deserve consideration in future work. 
One aspect concerns younger and older individuals’ adaptation to task characteristics on a 
trial-by-trial basis. Several motivational and affective frameworks have been formulated, 
according to which older individuals’ differential use of emotion regulation strategies dampen 
the impact of negative affect (Mata & Hertwig, 2011; Mata et al., 2011; Samanez-Larkin et 
al., 2007). In our sample, increasing age was associated with the administration of fewer 
pumps on the high-capacity (i.e., low risk) balloon as well as lower sensitivity to explosion 
trials. It would be interesting to also further examine whether older adults are less sensitive to 
losses than younger individuals, or, alternatively, do not extract the same meaning from loss 
cues in the BART. Second, in the described gambles task, increasing age was associated with 
selecting the risky option more often in trials where the certain option had the higher expected 
value compared with equal expected value trials. Future work should try to capture the 
specific strategies that can account for such changes (Mata, Schooler, & Rieskamp, 2007). 
Finally, we explored the age differences in within-task correlations and found that older 
adults’ risk-taking behavior was less sensitive to within-task manipulations. Future work 
could try to assess whether this lack of adaptivity is a marker for aging decision makers’ 
overall reduced cognitive plasticity (Lövdén, Bäckman, Lindenberger, Schaefer, & 
Schmiedek, 2010).   
In conclusion, different measures do not entirely succeed in capturing the same 
trajectories of risk-taking propensity across the life span, with the patterns of age reductions 
in risk taking being suggested to emerge as a function of learning and integration demands of 
specific measures. Our results show that in order to truly understand the life span 
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development of risk-taking propensity, research must take into account the convergent and 
predictive validity of self-report and behavioral measures of risk taking.   
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics for self-reported and performance-based risk-taking measures (N=902).  
 
Risk-taking measure Range Mean (SD) Median Mode 
Self-reported risk taking 0 -10 6.08 (1.81) 6.00 5.00 
Gambles: Proportion of risky choices (mean) 0.00 – 1.00 0.43 (0.28) 0.44 0.00 
Gambles: Proportion of risky choices (equal EV trials) 0.00 – 1.00 0.48 (0.30) 0.50 0.50 
Gambles: Proportion of risky choices (unequal EV trials) 0.00 – 1.00 0.39 (0.30) 0.38 0.00 
BART: Number of pumps (mean) 3.12 – 12.70 8.70 (1.57) 8.95 9.70 
BART: Number of pumps (low-capacity balloons) 3.10 – 8.05 6.50 (0.71) 6.55 6.40 
BART: Number of pumps (high-capacity balloons) 3.15 – 17.50 10.90 (2.81) 11.20 13.45 
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Table 2. Model parameters for fixed effects modeling of self-reported risk taking 
(N=902). Self-report scores were normalized prior to analysis. Age (normalized) was entered 
as a continuous variable, while sex was entered as categorical (dummy coded) variable. 
Brackets refer to the level of the categorical variable for which the parameters were 
estimated, relative to the reference level. Reference levels are given below the table. 
 
 b SE t  p  
Intercept 0.16 0.07 2.24 0.03 
Age -0.27* 0.10 -2.64 0.01 
Age^2 -0.03* 0.05 -0.56 0.57 
Age^3 0.06* 0.04 1.47 0.14 
Sex (female)1 -0.34 0.10 -3.58 <0.001 
Age x Sex  0.29 0.14 2.07 0.04 
Age^2 x Sex 0.09 0.07 1.32 0.19 
Age^3 x Sex -0.09 0.06 -1.47 0.14 
 
Note: b=regression coefficient; SE=standard error; t=test statistic; p=significance level; *=standardized 
regression coefficient; 1reference=male 
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Table 3. Model parameters for mixed-effects modeling of risky choices on a trial-by-trial 
basis on the gambles task (N=900). Shown are parameters for fixed effects only. Risky 
choice was modeled as a binary variable. Age (normalized) was entered as a continuous 
variable, while all other predictor variables were entered as categorical (dummy coded) 
variables. Brackets refer to the level of the categorical variable for which the parameters 
were estimated, relative to the reference level. Reference levels are given below the table.  
 
 b SE z  p  
Intercept -0.22 0.09 -2.53 0.01 
Age -0.12 0.08 -1.50 0.13 
Sex (female) 1 0.11 0.11 1.02 0.31 
Trial type (unequal EV) 2 -0.52 0.05 -11.45 <0.001 
Age x Sex 0.02 0.11 0.19 0.85 
Age x Trial type 0.24 0.04 5.33 <0.001 
 
Note: b=regression coefficient; SE=standard error; z=test statistic; p=significance 
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Table 4. Model parameters for mixed-effects modeling of the number of pumps 
administered on a trial-by-trial basis on the BART (N=902). Shown are parameters for fixed 
effects only. Prior to analysis, number of pumps was normalized (separately for the two 
balloon types). Age (normalized) and trial number (centered by balloon type) were entered as 
continuous variables; all other predictor variables were entered as categorical (dummy 
coded) variables. Brackets refer to the level of the categorical variable for which the 
parameters were estimated, relative to the reference level. Reference levels are given below 
the table. 
 
 b SE t  p  
Intercept 0.16 0.03 5.68 <0.001 
Age -0.002* 0.03 -0.07 0.95 
Sex (female)1 -0.02 0.03 -0.84 0.4 
Balloon capacity (high)2 -0.22 0.03 -6.72 <0.001 
Explosion trial (yes)3 -0.19 0.01 -17.81 <0.001 
Trial number -0.11 0.02 -4.98 <0.001 
Age x Sex -0.001 0.03 -0.03 0.98 
Age x Balloon capacity -0.1 0.03 -3.08 0.002 
Age x Explosion trial 0.03 0.01 2.82 0.005 
Age x Trial number -0.02 0.02 -1.06 0.29 
Balloon capacity x Trial number 0.25 0.03 9.12 <0.001 
Age x Balloon capacity x Trial number -0.002 0.03 -0.08 0.93 
 
Note: b=regression coefficient; SE=standard error; t=test statistic; p=significance level; *=standardized 
regression coefficient; 1reference=male; 2reference=low-capacity balloon; 3reference=previous trial did 
not end in explosion.  
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Figures 
Figure 1. Example layout of the gambles task. The side of the screen on which the 
certain outcome was presented was counterbalanced between trials. Participants selected 
their preferred option by clicking on the associated box. Between trials individuals were 
informed that their choice was logged and that the preferred option would be entered into the 
set from which their payoff was to be drawn. A button click took participants to the trial. 
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Figure 2. Example trials in the BART for an explosion trial, and a trial in which the 
participant cashed out. Underneath the balloon, the temporary account shows money earned 
on the current trial, the permanent account indicates how much had already been earned 
prior to the current trial. The last line indicates how much money was earned on the previous 
trial. For purposes of illustration, intermediate balloon inflations are not shown but would 
otherwise reflect a gradual increase of 0.02 CHF (Swiss Francs, 1 CHF ~ 0.98 USD) per 
additional pump. Color-capacity assignment was counterbalanced.
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Figure 3. Cross-sectional age trajectories (18–90 years) for three risk-taking measures. Trajectories are plotted against kernel density maps 
of the distribution of risk-taking indices as a function of age. Darker (lighter) areas represent higher (lower) density of observed scores. For the 
purpose of illustration, outcome variables were standardized and plotted against raw age. Indices and distributions for the behavioral measures 
were normalized by condition; zero points represent condition rather than task-specific means (thus are not the same). Panel A) Trajectory for the 
self-report measure based on coefficients obtained from a model that includes linear terms for age, gender and their interaction (model R2=0.03, 
p<.0001; N=902). B and C) Trajectories for description-based risky choices in (B) equal expected value (EV safe = EV risky), and (C) unequal 
expected value (EV safe > EV risky) trials; trajectories are based on model coefficients obtained from the full model (N=900; Table 3). D and E) 
Trajectories for experience-based pumping behavior in the BART for (D) low and (E) high capacity trials; trajectories are based on model 
coefficients obtained from the full model (N=902; Table 4). Accounting for the learning effect, pump trajectories refer to the last trial. 
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Figure 4. Zero-order correlation plots for risk-taking measures used in this study. Line 
thickness represents the strength of the correlation coefficients. Straight (dotted) lines 
represent positive (negative) correlations. Plots present correlations for risk-taking measures 
for (a) all participants in the study (18–90 years, N=902), (b) individuals between 18 and 39 
years of age (N=308), (c) individuals between 40 and 59 years of age (N=353), and (d) 
individuals between 60 and 90 years of age (N=241). The position and equal spacing 
between factors is for visual purposes only and not indicative of correlation strength. 
Associations are plotted for self-reported risk taking propensity (SR), pumping on low (B16) 
and high-capacity (B32) balloons in the BART, and proportion of risky choices in the gambles 
task for equal (Ge) and unequal expected value trials (Gu). 
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Previous work suggests that aging is associated with changes in risk taking but less is
known about their underlying neural basis, such as the potential age differences in the
neural processing of value and risk. The goal of the present study was to investigate
adult age differences in functional neural responses in a naturalistic risk-taking task.
Twenty-six young adults and 27 healthy older adults completed the Balloon Analogue
Risk Task while undergoing functional magnetic resonance imaging. Young and older
adults showed similar overt risk-taking behavior. Group comparison of neural activity
in response to risky vs. control stimuli revealed similar patterns of activation in the
bilateral striatum, anterior insula (AI) and ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC). Group
comparison of parametrically modulated activity in response to continued pumping
similarly revealed comparable results for both age groups in the AI and, potentially, the
striatum, yet differences emerged for regional activity in the vmPFC. At whole brain level,
insular, striatal and vmPFC activation was predictive of behavioral risk taking for young
but not older adults. The current results are interpreted and discussed as preserved
neural tracking of risk and reward in the AI and striatum, respectively, but altered value
coding in the vmPFC in the two age groups. The latter finding points toward older adults
exhibiting differential vmPFC-related integration and value coding. Furthermore, neural
activation holds differential predictive validity for behavioral risk taking in young and older
adults.
Keywords: aging, decision making, ventromedial prefrontal cortex, anterior insula, Balloon Analogue Risk Task
INTRODUCTION
Aging is associated with changes in cognition, emotion, and motivation that have important
consequences for decision making (Tymula et al., 2013; Samanez-Larkin and Knutson, 2015;
Schiebener and Brand, 2015). For example, recent meta-analyses suggest that aging is associated
with changes in a variety of risky choice tasks (Mata et al., 2011; Best and Charness, 2015). But what
are the potential mechanisms underlying age-related changes in dealing with risk and uncertainty?
In our work, we aim to contribute to the understanding of possible mechanisms underlying age
di erences in risk taking by investigating young and older adults’ neural activations associated with
a well-known risk-taking task, the Balloon Analogue Risk Task (BART; Lejuez et al., 2002). The
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BART is a popular and useful tool for measuring cognitive and
a ective mechanisms underlying risk-taking behavior (Lejuez
et al., 2002; Schonberg et al., 2012), thus also representing a
promising tool to uncover sources of age di erences in cognitive
and motivational components on decision making.
Participants in the BART are asked to pump up a
balloon as much as they like, which, although leading to
increased accumulation of (monetary) gains with each pump,
simultaneously increases the probability of the balloon exploding
(Lejuez et al., 2002). Thus, risk on the BART refers to the
probability of an explosion resulting in the loss of all accumulated
gains in a trial. The structure of the task captures not only
participants’ valuation of possible gains and losses simultaneously
but also a ective processes that could arise as a consequence
of the increasing tension and uncertainty associated with
additional pumps on a given balloon. As such, the BART
mimics the risk–reward trade-o  as well as the sequential process
that characterizes decisions in many natural environments
(Schonberg et al., 2011; Pleskac and Hertwig, 2014). Importantly,
the task may have some predictive validity for real-life impulsive
or risk-taking behavior, such as drug use, delinquency, gambling,
and risky sexual behaviors (Lejuez et al., 2003, 2004; Aklin et al.,
2005; Hunt et al., 2005).
The BART has foundwide application in the field of behavioral
as well as neural research, yielding a backdrop of findings for
the current work. Specifically, previous neuroimaging studies
have identified a set of key brain regions as being di erentially
involved in this task, including the ventromedial prefrontal
cortex (vmPFC), dorsal lateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC), anterior
cingulate cortex (ACC), anterior insula (AI), striatum, and the
midbrain (Rao et al., 2008, 2014; Chiu et al., 2012; Lighthall
et al., 2012; Schonberg et al., 2012; Kohno et al., 2013;
Telzer et al., 2013; Helfinstein et al., 2014). All of these areas
have been implicated—in some form or another and with
more or less specificity—in the construction, representation
and storage of subjective value (for reviews, see Glimcher,
2010; Levy and Glimcher, 2012; Bartra et al., 2013; Clithero
and Rangel, 2014). Specifically, although striatal and frontal
activation patterns are widely recognized as key regions for
value-based judgment and decision making, insular activation
appears to be more prevalent for paradigms in which decision
making extends beyond purely deliberative and into a ective
processing, including loss anticipation and harm avoidance
(Paulus et al., 2003; Knutson and Bossaerts, 2007; Preuscho 
et al., 2008; Mohr et al., 2010a; Bartra et al., 2013). Further
work relevant to risk taking on the BART pertains to the
neural correlates of uncertainty, with previous work implicating
the right AI in the tracking of uncertainty (e.g., Volz et al.,
2003). However, considering that uncertainty often implies the
possibility of loss or harm, it is somewhat unclear whether the
covariation between insular activity and uncertainty reflects the
tracking of the abstract (mathematical) or a ective component of
uncertainty.
Of particular interest to this study are previous results
obtained with the BART that identified decreasing vmPFC
activation as a neural correlate of risk taking (Schonberg et al.,
2012; Rao et al., 2014). For several decision-making tasks,
vmPFC activity has been implicated in the representation of
subjective value; that is, representing a signal that reflects the
outcome of an integration of reward, risk (uncertainty), and
potentially also a ective evaluation (Kim et al., 2010; Rangel
and Hare, 2010; Rushworth et al., 2011; Levy and Glimcher,
2012; Bartra et al., 2013). Some have proposed that the vmPFC
is a critical substrate for information integration which triggers
secondary emotional responses that help guide advantageous
decision-making (Bechara and Damasio, 2005; Levin et al., 2012).
Considering these previous studies and theoretical models of
decision making, vmPFC-related activation in the BART could
be representative of an integrative function of the vmPFC,
coding the decreasing subjective value of additional pumping
over time by integrating the potential gains with the increasing
probability of loss (i.e., explosion). Taken together, the properties
of the BART that make it a comparatively valid behavioral
measure of risk taking—where risk is understood not only as
outcome variability but also as exposure to potential loss—are
mirrored in neural activity patterns. Previous work that adopted
the BART in conjunction with findings from other paradigms
provide some insight into the possible functional roles of di erent
neural regions on the BART, including the coding of loss,
reward, uncertainty, and integrated (subjective) value, each of
which could be a ected by cognitive and neural changes due to
aging.
With regards to the computational drivers of age-related
behavioral and neural di erences in risk taking, it has been
proposed that agingmay be associated with di culties in learning
or representing the subjective (integrated) value of options,
which can conceptually be thought of as arising from noisy
representations due to low signal-to-noise ratio of information
processing (Li and Rieckmann, 2014). For example, older adults
typically show di culties in learning the utility of options from
probabilistic feedback, possibly due to age-related declines in
neuromodulator systems that help form value representations
(Li et al., 2007; Mohr et al., 2010b; Eppinger et al., 2011;
Chowdhury et al., 2013). In one study, Samanez-Larkin et al.
(2014) showed age-related reduction in the frontal representation
of reward prediction error for paradigms involving feedback-
based learning, but no such di erences for the representation
of reward magnitude. Moreover, several studies have shown
di erences in vmPFC-related reward and value signals as a
function of age (Baena et al., 2010; Mohr et al., 2010b; Eppinger
et al., 2013; Halfmann et al., 2016), leading to the suggestion that
increasing variability in vmPFC signaling accounts for di erences
in performance (Rogalsky et al., 2012; Halfmann et al., 2016). The
notion of increasingly varied neural responses, both with regards
to inter-individual and intra-individual variability, is not limited
to the vmPFC and related functions, but has already been found
in other neural areas implicated in decision-making processes
aversively a ected by age (Li et al., 2007; Samanez-Larkin et al.,
2010). Moreover, a ective changes over the human lifespan may
impact on decisions under risk, both behaviorally (Huang et al.,
2013; Shao and Lee, 2014) and neurally (Shao and Lee, 2014).
Taken together, multiple pathways are implicated in accounting
for age-related changes in decision making (under risk), and
several—such as altered information integration, feedback-based
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learning, or changes in a ective responses to stimuli, choices and
their outcomes—could play a role in leading to age di erences
in the BART. A few behavioral studies have used the BART
to investigate adult age di erences in risk taking. However, the
results of extant comparisons of young and older adults using the
BART are inconsistent; although two found that older adults were
somewhat less risk-seeking relative to young adults (Henninger
et al., 2010; Rolison et al., 2012), another found the opposite
(Cavanagh et al., 2012). Gaining a better understanding of the
di erent neural components underlying age di erences in the
BART could be helpful in predicting when young and older adults
di er in risk taking.
The goal of the present study was to investigate adult age
di erences in neural signals of risky decision making on the
BART, a paradigm that captures the perceptible escalating tension
between risk and reward not evident in other paradigms (e.g.,
described lotteries). Thus, we were interested in using the BART
to compare young and older adults’ neural signatures of risky
decision making and establish whether di erences arise in areas
previously implicated in processes subsumed in the concept
of risk taking, specifically the notion of harm avoidance and
tracking of potential losses in the insula and the representation of
utility (i.e., value) in the vmPFC. Moreover, we were particularly
interested in assessing whether signals originating in the insular
cortex or the vmPFC are similarly predictive of individual
di erences in behavioral outcomes (i.e., risky choices). We thus
hoped to contribute to the challenge of uncovering possible
age di erences in decision making under risk, and eventually
the dissociation of drivers of age-related di erences such as the
processing of reward, risk and subjective value.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
Twenty-six young and 27 older adults were recruited for
the present study. Young adults were students of Southwest
University, China, and older adults were recruited from
communities in or near Southwest University. One young
and three older adults were excluded due to excessive head
movement during scanning (see below for exclusion procedure).
In addition, one older adult was excluded for cashing out
all reward balloons after just one pump. Forty-eight healthy
right-handed participants were included in the final analyses,
25 young adults (11 male, mean age: 21.0 ± 1.6 years, age
range: 18–24 years) and 23 older adults (eight male, mean age:
65.3 ± 5.3 years, age range: 60–79 years). Participants had
no prior history of stroke, neurological or psychiatric disorder,
and all older participants were independent community-dwelling
adults whose Mini-Mental State Examination (MMSE; Folstein
et al., 1975) scores were above 26 (mean score: 29.2 ± 1.2).
Participants received 60 CNY (ca. 10 USD) for participation in
the study, with the opportunity to earn up to an additional 15
CNY (ca. 2.5 USD) based on performance in the decision task.
All participants provided written informed consent and the study
was approved by the Institutional Review Board of the Brain
Imaging Center, Southwest University, China.
Materials and Procedures
Participants completed a variant of the BART inside the MRI
scanner (for further information on previous uses of the BART,
see Lejuez et al., 2002; Schonberg et al., 2012). Prior to entering
the scanner, participants were given instructions and completed
a short practice trial. They were told that their goal was to
maximize their scores in the task to increase their final payment.
Participants could inflate a balloon on each of a number of
trials by pressing a “pump” button. Each pump could earn
participants 0.1 CNY (ca.0.02 USD); however, if the balloon
exploded, they would lose the money accumulated in that trial.
In order to avoid the explosion, participants could “cashout”
the money at any point and secure their money by adding
it to the “bank.” There were three balloon types in the task,
two reward balloons and one control balloon. Control balloons
were gray balloons, which did not explode but also had no
monetary value. Participants were simply asked to pump up the
gray balloons until they disappeared from the screen. The two
reward balloons could lead to monetary gains but di ered in
the maximum number of pumps that they could receive, thus
creating a distinction between high- and low-capacity balloons.
We used the two balloons as proxies for low- and high-risk
conditions in contrast to no risk for the control balloon in
order to examine whether behavioral and/or neural di erences
would emerge as a function of risk level and also whether this
e ect would be subject to age di erences. Participants were not
provided with any information about the di erences between
high- and low-capacity balloons but could in principle keep track
of the two di erent types because they were assigned a di erent
color, red or blue, with color assigned to each balloon type
being counterbalanced between participants. The probability of
the balloons exploding (or disappearing from the screen, in the
case of the control balloons) was p(explosion) = 1/(maximum-
pumps), with a maximum of 12, 20, 16 for the low-capacity,
high-capacity, and control balloons, respectively. The order of
presentation of the balloons was randomized. The task was
self-paced, therefore the number of balloons varied between
participants in the fixed-duration 10-min scanning run. The
interval between pumps varied randomly between 1 and 2 s, and
the interval between trials (balloons) varied between 1 and 12 s,
with a mean of 4.5 s.
Behavioral Analysis
We calculated the average number of pumps for cashout balloons
(i.e., adjusted pumps), as is typically done in the BART literature
in order to limit analyses to balloons for which the final number
of pumps was not capped by an explosion (Lejuez et al., 2002).We
also calculated the average number of reward trials, proportion
of cashout trials, and average reaction time for each pump. We
performed a 2 (age: young vs. older) ⇥ 2 (balloon: high- vs.
low-capacity) repeated measures ANOVA on adjusted pumps,
and conducted one-way ANOVAs on the number of reward
balloons, proportion of cashout trials, and mean reaction time
to estimate age di erences. Statistical analyses of behavioral data
were performed using SPSS 20.0 (IBM Corporation, Somers, NY,
USA).
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Image Acquisition
Participants were scanned at the Brain Imaging Center in
Southwest University using a 3.0 T Siemens TimTrioMRI system
(Erlangen, Germany). For each participant, functional echo
planar image data were collected using the following parameters:
time repetition (TR) = 2000 ms, time echo (TE) = 30 ms, flip
angle = 90 , field of view (FOV) = 200 mm ⇥ 200 mm, 33
axial slices, slice thickness = 3.0 mm, gap = 0.6 mm, acquisition
matrix = 64 ⇥ 64, in-plane resolution = 3.125 ⇥ 3.125, and
200 volumes. High-resolution, three-dimensional T1-weighted
structural images were acquired for each participant, with the
following parameters: 176 slices, acquisition matrix= 256⇥ 256,
voxel size= 1 mm⇥ 1 mm⇥ 1 mm, TR= 1900 ms, TE= 2.2 ms,
and flip angle= 9 .
Image Preprocessing
Data preprocessing was performed using the Statistical
Parametric Mapping program1 (SPM8). First, the di erence
in acquisition time between slices was corrected, followed by a
rigid-body correction for head motion. Participants included in
the present study had less than 3.0 mm maximum translation
and 3.0  rotation head motion throughout the scan. For
normalization, we used a study-specific template created using
unified segmentation and di eomorphic image registration
(DARTEL, Di eomorphic Anatomical Registration using
Exponential Lie Algebra; Ashburner, 2007). First, each subject’s
image was segmented into gray matter, white matter, and cerebral
spinal fluid probabilistic images. The segmented gray-matter
images were then normalized to Montreal Neurological Institute
(MNI) space as defined by SPM8. DARTEL represents better
localization of functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI)
activity than does the optimized normalization procedure, by
treating the brain template as a deformable probability density
map, comparing the signal intensities of each voxel for every
brain (Leshikar and Duarte, 2014). The resulting normalized
images were then spatially smoothed using a 6 mm full-width
half-maximum (FWHM) kernel to decrease spatial noise.
fMRI Analysis
Analysis of the functional MRI data was carried out in three
steps. First, neural activity was modeled using the general linear
model in a similar fashion to previous studies (Schonberg et al.,
2012) with a high-pass filter of 1/128 Hz. In the general linear
model analysis, two regressors for pumps were included: (1)
PumpsAverage, capturing average activity across all pumps, and
(2) PumpsParametric, capturing parametrically modulated activity
by sequentially increasing the number of pumps within each
trial. These two regressors were also implemented for the control
balloons (ControlAverage and ControlParametric). Because we found
no significant di erences between the activities elicited by the
low- and high-capacity balloons, the two experimental balloon
types were collapsed and a single regressor was used to model
both types of trials. In order to remove visual and motor e ects
unrelated to risk and reward processing, we contrasted the
reward pumps to those in the control condition (PumpsAverage
1http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm
vs. ControlAverage and PumpsParametric vs. ControlParametric). To
control for the potential confounding e ects of head movement,
six motion parameters (three translation and three rotation
parameters) were entered into the GLM as regressors of no
interest. The resulting activation patterns were labeled positive
e ects for a BOLD signal that was higher for reward than for
control balloons when contrasted, whereas higher BOLD for
control vs. reward balloons was taken to indicate a negative
e ect. Two-sample t-tests were computed to determine age group
di erences, specifically to examine BOLD signal di erences
between groups in each contrast to observe the influence of age
on neural activity related to risk taking. Moreover, in order to
illustrate the age di erences on “PumpsAverage vs. ControlAverage”
contrast more clearly, we conducted the two-sample t-tests
masked by a positive e ect map and a negative e ect map,
respectively, to observe the age di erences on the positive e ect
regions and negative e ect regions separately. The positive
e ect mask is a binary mask, which was generated from the
combination of young and older age groups’ positive e ect map
on “PumpsAverage vs. ControlAverage” contrast after correction,
and the negative e ect mask was generated likewise.
Whole-brain regression analyses were performed in order
to identify brain regions that correlated with participants’
risk-taking behavior. We examined the correlation between
each individual’s neural activity during PumpsParametric vs.
ControlParametric and his/her mean number of adjusted pumps.
The individual di erence analysis in the form of whole brain
regression was conducted both across groups and by age group.
In addition to the whole-brain regression analysis, region of
interest (ROI) analyses were adopted; these allowed us to test
for the neural–behavioral association in specific brain regions
that might not have been captured after correcting for multiple
comparisons at whole-brain level. ROIs were created as 4 mm
radius spherical regions covering the bilateral AI and striatum,
respectively, and an 8 mm radius spherical region in the vmPFC.
The center coordinates for the ROI masks (vmPFC [2 46  8];
left AI [ 36 20  6]; right AI [40 22  6]; left striatum [ 12 4 2];
right striatum [12 10  2]) were defined based on a recent meta-
analysis examining neural correlates of subjective value (Bartra
et al., 2013). In addition to using published coordinates to build
ROI masks, center coordinates derived from the current sample
(peak coordinate from PumpsParametric vs. ControlParametric across
age groups, vmPFC [ 15 39  12]; left AI [ 33 24 3]; right AI
[39 21 6]; left caudate [ 12 6 9]; right caudate [9 3 9]) were
used in secondary analyses aimed at testing the reliability of
the results. These supplementary analyses also included spheres
of di erent sizes, with sphere radii ranging from 3 to 10 mm,
covering 1-mm increments between the lower and upper bound.
Pearson’s correlation analysis was performed to evaluate the
relation between activation in the bilateral AI and the vmPFC
(activation from parametric contrast on increasing number of
pumps) and an individual’s behavioral performance (i.e., mean
adjusted pumps).
Functional magnetic resonance imaging analyses were
examined at a threshold corrected for multiple comparisons
(corrected by the false discovery rate, FDR, p < 0.05). All
coordinates are reported in MNI format. Anatomical labels
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of neural regions were obtained by importing the resulting
statistical parametric maps into xjview2.
RESULTS
Behavioral Results
Table 1 presents the average adjusted pumps, proportion of
cashout trials, and other BART variables separately for young and
older adults. We also plotted the performance as a function of
adjusted number of pumps for each participant in the two reward
balloons (Figure 1). For individuals’ distribution of pumps for
low- and high-risk balloons, see the (Supplementary Figure S1).
As expected, participants behaved adaptively by pumping more
in the high-capacity relative to the low-capacity balloon but most
participants showed risk-averse behavior in the sense of pumping
less than the expected value maximizing amount. Concerning
age di erences, as can be seen in Table 1 and Figure 1, older
adults were more likely to cash their earnings relative to young
adults, yet this tendency did not translate into a significantly
lower number of pumps or earnings for either balloon type.
A 2 (age: young vs. older) ⇥ 2 (balloon: high-capacity vs. low-
capacity) mixed-model ANOVA on adjusted pumps did not find
age di erences [F(1,46) = 0.82, p = 0.371] but a significant
e ect of balloon [F(1,46) = 8.17, p < 0.01] with more pumps
being observed for the high-capacity relative to the low-capacity
balloon. The interaction between age and balloon type was also
not significant [F(1,46) = 0.01, p = 0.944]. These results suggest
that both young and older participants learned to di erentiate
between the two balloons despite not having been explicitly
informed about the di erences. Moreover, average reaction times
were larger for older adults (Table 1).
In sum, although young and older adults did not di er in
average adjusted pumps, older adults had more cashout trials
than young adults, possibly indicating more risk-averse behavior
in older relative to young participants. We now turn to the issue
of potential age di erences in neural activations in the BART.
fMRI Results
In what follows, we present three sets of fMRI analyses. First,
we report comparisons between average neural activity associated
with pumping on experimental (i.e., balloons that were associated
with monetary gains/losses) relative to control balloons (i.e.,
balloons that were not associated with anymonetary gains/losses)
for young and older adults, as well as any di erences between the
two groups. This comparison allowed us to capture reward/loss
2http://www.alivelearn.net/xjview8
FIGURE 1 | Payoff as a function of average pumps for the (A)
low-capacity and (B) high-capacity reward balloons. The lines represent
the expected value of the specific average pumps across 10 trials of each
balloon type (the average number of trials experienced by participants). Each
dot represents a participant, with its diameter being a function of the
proportion of cashout trials.
processes and age di erences therein while subtracting activation
due to attentional or motor processes that were of no interest to
the current research. Second, we report parametric analyses of
the neural activity of experimental relative to control balloons
as a function of the number of pumps administered on a given
trial. The rationale for this second set of analyses is similar to the
one above but the pump-by-pump analysis provides a window
into the processing of risk and reward as it unfolds over the
course of a single trial. Finally, we report individual di erence
analyses that link neural activation of specific regions of interest
to behavioral levels of risk taking. These latter analyses clarify
the functional role of specific neural activations and whether
these are di erentially informative regarding individual and age
di erences in risk-taking behavior.
Neural Activity: Average Effects
A whole-brain contrast revealed widespread neural activity
for the reward vs. control pumps contrast. Specifically,
both young and older adults displayed positive e ects (i.e.,
PumpsAverage > ControlAverage) in the bilateral AI, striatum
(caudate and putamen), dorsal ACC, superior frontal cortex
and the visual cortex (Figure 2A, Red; Tables 2 and 3, Average:
PumpsAverage > ControlAverage). These areas have been identified
in previous studies of the BART (Rao et al., 2008; Schonberg
et al., 2012) and similar decision tasks (Mohr et al., 2010a; Wu
TABLE 1 | Behavioral results in young and older adults Groups (M ± SD).
Outcome Young adults Older adults F p
Mean adjusted pumps 4.82 ± 1.55 4.43 ± 1.56 0.76 0.388
Number of reward balloons experienced 20.92 ± 2.41 19.65 ± 3.24 2.39 0.129
Proportion of cashout trials 0.61 ± 0.12 0.70 ± 0.13 7.38 <0.010
Mean pump RT (ms) 521.10 ± 88.70 815.13 ± 341.18 17.33 <0.001
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FIGURE 2 | (A) Average activity during pumps in the young and older age group. The red scale represents PumpsAverage > ControlAverage and the blue scale
represents ControlAverage > PumpsAverage. (B) Age group differences for average neural activity during pumps. Blue patterns represent neural regions in which
negative effects were larger for the young compared with the older age group. Red patterns represent neural regions in which the positive effect was larger for older
than for young adults, p < 0.05, corrected (scale represents the range of t-values). No brain regions were discovered for which (1) young adults had larger positive
effects relative to older adults or (2) older adults had larger negative effects than young adults.
et al., 2012; Bartra et al., 2013) as being related to reward and risk
processing. Moreover, both age groups displayed negative e ects
(i.e., ControlAverage > PumpsAverage) in the inferior frontal gyrus,
middle temporal gyrus, precuneus, and the vmPFC (Figure 2A,
Blue; Tables 2 and 3, Average: ControlAverage > PumpsAverage). In
particular, activity in the vmPFC has been shown to correlate with
valuation in various decision-making tasks (Levy and Glimcher,
2012; Bartra et al., 2013), including the BART (Schonberg et al.,
2012; Rao et al., 2014).
Age group di erence analyses showed that young adults
had more activation than older adults in the postcentral gyrus,
superior temporal gyrus, middle frontal gyrus, and medial frontal
gyrus, whereas no regions were obtained for which older adults
had more activation. To further distinguish these age di erences,
we performed group di erence analyses masked separately
by positive and negative e ect maps. Young adults showed
more negative e ects (i.e., ControlAverage > PumpsAverage) than
older adults in the fusiform, bilateral middle occipital lobe,
precentral/postcentral gyrus, and a minor positive di erence
in vmPFC (Figure 2B, Blue); no regions were obtained for
which older adults had more negative e ects than young adults.
For positive e ects (i.e., PumpsAverage > ControlAverage), we
found that older adults showed higher activation in the middle
frontal gyrus, inferior parietal lobule, middle temporal gyrus,
putamen, middle occipital gyrus, and supplementary motor
area (SMA) (Figure 2B, Red); no regions were observed which
evidenced higher activation in young compared with older
adults.
Neural Activity: Parametric Effects
We aimed to capture the dynamic nature of risk processing in
the BART by estimating the parametric modulation of BOLD
responses as a function of the sequentially increasing pumps
on reward vs. control balloons (see Schonberg et al., 2012,
for a similar analysis). The parametric analysis yielded less
widespread neural activity compared to the average pumps
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TABLE 2 | Significant clusters of activation in young adults.
Region L/R/B X Y Z t-value Cluster size
Average
PumpsAverage > ControlAverage
Insula R 39 18 3 10.28 109
Insula L  33 21 3 8.66 142
Superior frontal gyrus R 30 57 15 7.12 143
Middle frontal gyrus L  33 54 9 5.05 92
Cingulate B 9 27 30 9.94 181
Calcarine R 18  96  3 6.82 55
Middle occipital gyrus L  18  96  3 7.06 67
ControlAverage > PumpsAverage
Temporal lobe, Parietal
lobe, Precuneus
B 21  78 39 11.40 15251
vmPFC B 36 42  18 7.27 478
Parametric
PumpsParametric > ControlParametric
Insula R 39 21 6 6.08 73
Insula L  39 15 0 5.29 59
Thalamus R 6  24 9 5.53 10
Cingulate R 9 30 30 6.28 36
ControlParametric > PumpsParametric
Postcentral L  66  18 27 7.30 495
Fusiform R 39  6  33 4.89 15
Middle frontal gyrus L  21 18 48 4.45 107
vmPFC L  12 33  15 5.51 58
Correlationa
Negative correlation
Insula R 33 21 0  4.86 64
Insula L  27 21  3  5.57 132
Caudate R 9 6 9  5.22 65
Caudate L  12 6 12  5.54 63
Anterior cingulate R 6 39 9  3.88 45
Positive correlation
Middle temporal gyrus L  45  60 3 7.59 293
Middle temporal gyrus R 54 0  24 5.07 64
Medial frontal gyrus L  18 39  12 5.15 111
Culmen R 15  36  24 5.14 58
R, Right; L, Left; B, Bilateral. aCorrelation with mean number of adjusted pumps.
contrast described above. Young adults displayed positive
e ects (i.e., PumpsParametric > ControlParametric) in the bilateral
AI, thalamus, and dorsal ACC, and negative e ects (i.e.,
ControlParametric > PumpsParametric) in the fusiform, postcentral
gyrus, and vmPFC. Older adults showed positive e ects in
the bilateral AI, caudate, and SMA, and displayed negative
e ects in some occipital-parietal regions, but, crucially, no
vmPFC areas survived correction (Figure 3A; Tables 2 and 3,
Parametric).
Further, although results from the between-group t-tests
did not survive whole brain correction, there were voxels in
the vmPFC that showed age group di erences at p < 0.005
uncorrected (Figure 3B). The decreasing activity of the vmPFC
obtained from the parametric contrast has been suggested to
capture value integration in the BART (Schonberg et al., 2012)
and the di erential pattern of vmPFC parametric activation for
young but not older adults suggests that the value integration
processes during sequentially increasing pumps is less distinct in
older adults compared with young adults. We explored young
and older adults’ activation maps at p < 0.005 uncorrected
to check for di erences which may have arisen due to factors
such as signal heterogeneity or the small number of subjects
in each group. At p < 0.005 uncorrected, we observed minor
striatal activation in both young and older adults (Supplementary
Figure S2), which might be suggestive of some form of reward
tracking in the striatum as a function of increasing number
of pumps. Interestingly, even at uncorrected level, older adults
did not show any vmPFC-related activity, pointing toward
genuine age-related di erences in vmPFC-related integrative
signaling.
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TABLE 3 | Significant clusters of activation in older adults.
Region L/R/B X Y Z t-value Cluster size
Average
PumpsAverage > ControlAverage
Supplementary motor
area, superior frontal
gyrus, insula, caudate,
putamen
B  6 0 51 11.20 10387
Lingual gyrus B 18  90  3 11.25 142
Middle temporal gyrus R 57  27  12 3.99 24
Inferior parietal lobule,
Precuneus, Middle
occipital gyrus
B 48  45 51 7.42 976
ControlAverage > PumpsAverage
Precuneus B  3  54 33 9.22 3330
Middle temporal gyrus L  36 24  27 5.38 409
Middle temporal gyrus R 60 6  15 8.32 201
Superior temporal
gyrus
R 63  54 21 5.95 490
Inferior frontal gyrus L  45 30  6 5.27 170
vmPFC B  9 57 36 7.89 326
Parametric
PumpsParametric > ControlParametric
Insula R 33 21  3 6.51 44
Insula L  33 21  9 7.35 56
Caudate R 15 6 3 5.08 13
Supplementary motor
area, cingulate
B 6 18 51 6.28 30
Lingual gyrus B  9  84  3 5.09 10
ControlParametric > PumpsParametric
Inferior occipital gyrus L  42  69  6 6.14 93
Lingual R 24  90  3 5.75 4
Superior parietal lobule L  21  81 45 5.29 25
Precentral gyrus R 51  12 54 4.61 7
R, Right; L, Left; B, Bilateral.
Regions Correlated with Behavioral Performance
We conducted a whole-brain regression analysis linking a
measure of risk taking, mean adjusted pumps in the BART,
and neural activity obtained from the “PumpsParametric vs.
ControlParametric” contrast. We thus hoped to assess how
individual di erences in behavioral risk taking were associated
with average neural activation patterns. Across age groups,
the regression analysis revealed significant negative correlations
between participants’ risk taking and activity in the bilateral
AI and caudate (Figure 4A; Table 4). In turn, positive
correlations were found between adjusted pumps and activity
in the bilateral middle occipital cortex, inferior parietal lobule,
and vmPFC. The positive association between behavior and
vmPFC activation is reflective of individual di erences in
the steepness of the predominantly negative slopes observed
in the vmPFC: individuals with flatter (i.e., smaller negative
e ect) slopes on average administered more pumps on cashout
balloons compared with individuals with steeper (i.e., greater
negative e ect) slopes. It is therefore postulated that individuals
take more risks on average (i.e., administer more pumps) if
the decrease in vmPFC activity is more gradual. Regarding
age-related di erences, young adults’ regression results were
similar to the findings obtained across all individuals, albeit
stronger in several regions (Figure 4B; Table 2, Correlation).
However, regression of whole brain activation on mean adjusted
pumps for older adults yielded no significant voxels at the
correction threshold of p < 0.05 and only very sparse
association patterns at p < 0.005 uncorrected (Supplementary
Figure S3).
To check that the whole brain regression results were not
influenced by outliers and visualize the results with respect to
individual di erences, additional ROI analyses were conducted
on the bilateral AI, bilateral striatum and vmPFC. In particular,
mean beta weights were extracted from spheres based on the
relevant center coordinates provided by Bartra et al. (2013)
to achieve an independent definition of the structures of
interest. To note, these analyses are merely for visualizing the
relationship between neural activity and performance in the
two age groups; the authors acknowledge a degree of circularity
when extracting activation from regions identified by whole brain
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FIGURE 3 | (A) Parametric modulation of increasing number of pumps in the young and older age group. The red scale represents PumpsParametric >
ControlParametric and the blue scale represents ControlParametric > PumpsParametric. p < 0.05, corrected. (B) Age group differences on parametric contrast. The blue
scale represents neural regions in which young adults had more negative effect than older adults. p < 0.005, uncorrected (scale represents the range of t-values). No
brain regions were discovered for (1) which older adults had larger negative effects relative to young adults or (2) age group differences on parametric positive effect
at this threshold.
analyses as being associated with performance. However, given
that no significant association was obtained from the whole
brain analyses for older adults, we were interested in visualizing
the distribution of performance against activity in both age
groups.
Activity in the seed region of the left AI during PumpsParametric
vs. ControlParametric was negatively correlated with adjusted
pumps in young (r =  0.60, p < 0.01), and older adults
(r =  0.51, p < 0.05; Z = 0.42, p > 0.05; Figure 5A).
A comparable pattern was found in the right AI, with older
adults showing a correlation between adjusted pumps and
brain activity that was similar to that found for young adults
(r =  0.44, p < 0.05, r =  0.58, p < 0.01, respectively;
Z = 0.62, p > 0.05; Figure 5B). These findings merely visualize
the whole brain regression results, suggestive of comparable
insular tracking of potential loss (uncertainty) in older and young
adults. In addition, extracted beta weights from the left (but
not right) striatum correlated negatively with mean number
of adjusted pumps in young (r =  0.68, p < 0.001) but not
older adults (r = 0.15, p = 0.50; Figure 5C); the di erence
between these two correlations was significant (Z = 3.17,
p < 0.01). As expected from the whole brain analyses, activation
in the vmPFC was positively correlated with adjusted pumps
in young adults (r = 0.48, p < 0.05), but not in older adults
(r =  0.22, p = 0.31; Figure 5D); the di erence between these
two correlations was significant (Z= 2.42, p< 0.05).We obtained
comparable results when using masks derived from peak contrast
coordinates and varying radii. To note, although occupying a
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FIGURE 4 | (A) Regions correlated with mean adjusted pumps (whole sample). (B) Regions correlated with mean adjusted pumps in young adults. Activity obtained
from parametric modulation of increasing number of pumps (PumpsParametric vs. ControlParametric) in the bilateral anterior insula (AI) is negatively related to and
ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) is positively related to participants’ mean adjusted pumps in the young adults. The red scale represents a positive correlation,
whereas the blue scale represents a negative correlation, p < 0.05, corrected (scale represents the range of t-values).
similar range, the distribution of mean beta weights extracted
from the parametric modulation of vmPFC activity in older
adults appears positively skewed compared with a relatively more
normal distribution for young adults (Figure 5D). In contrast,
the distribution of extracted mean activation slopes for the
insula and striatum is relatively more similar in older and young
adults.
Taken together, these results suggest that although neural
representations of reward and risk as well as the tracking thereof
remain relatively stable across age groups, their predictive validity
for behavior may be di erent for young and older adults.
Moreover, older adults’ tracking of value in the vmPFC was
di erent from that of young adults, also manifested by the
di erential vmPFC activation profiles and predictive validity of
vmPFC activation for mean pumping (i.e., risk taking) behavior
in the BART.
DISCUSSION
The present study investigated adult age di erences in behavior
and neural activations associated with the BART, a widely used
naturalistic risk-taking task (Lejuez et al., 2002). Specifically, we
asked young and older adults to undergo fMRI while completing
a version of the BART consisting of di erent types of balloons,
which either did (experimental) or did not (control) involve
monetary risks and rewards. The di erent balloon types were
leveraged to build contrasts that captured the neural signatures
associated with young and older adults’ risky decision-making
processes (Rao et al., 2008; Schonberg et al., 2012; Helfinstein
et al., 2014).
Our results indicate considerable similarity between young
and older adults in the behavioral outcomes of the BART,
including similar average number of pumps per balloon for
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TABLE 4 | Clusters correlated with mean number of adjusted pumps in across age groups.
Region L/R/B X Y Z t-value Cluster size
Negative correlation
Insula L  36 21  6  4.81 83
Insula R 33 21  3  4.52 33
Caudate B  12 6 18  4.62 36
Culmen B 3  57 0  5.89 13
Positive correlation
Inferior temporal gyrus L  48  57  9 4.58 38
Middle occipital gyrus R 42  69  12 4.75 23
Middle occipital gyrus L  21  84  3 4.73 62
Inferior parietal lobule L  45  45 45 4.59 36
Medial frontal gyrus L  18 45 3 4.19 12
Medial frontal gyrus L  12  27 57 4.60 12
R, Right; L, Left; B, Bilateral.
the two age groups. Older adults were, however, more likely to
cashout their temporary wins relative to young adults, potentially
indicating higher levels of risk-aversion with increased age (Mata
et al., 2011; Best and Charness, 2015). Overall, these behavioral
outcomes contribute to the heterogeneity of findings concerning
age di erences in the BART (Henninger et al., 2010; Cavanagh
et al., 2012; Rolison et al., 2012).
Concerning our neuroimaging results, we replicated past
findings with young adult samples suggesting a link between
neural activation and the processing of risk and reward.
Specifically, using contrasts between neural activation while
pumping in experimental relative to control balloons in the
BART, we found significant neural activations in the caudate,
bilateral insula, and parietal regions, as well as in the vmPFC,
which are comparable with previous findings (Rao et al., 2008,
2014; Schonberg et al., 2012). Also consistent with a previous
study that analyzed parametric neural activation as a function
of increased exposure to risk and rewards, we found that
vmPFC activity decreased whereas bilateral AI activity increased
as participants pumped up each balloon (Schonberg et al.,
2012). Concerning age di erences, group average comparisons
identified similar patterns of activations in the striatum and
AI as well as deactivation in the vmPFC in both age groups.
Our findings are in line with previous studies showing intact
representation of reward (Samanez-Larkin et al., 2007, 2014) and
loss anticipation (Samanez-Larkin et al., 2008; but see Samanez-
Larkin et al. (2007) for altered insular sensitivity during loss
anticipation). The lack of di erences between young and older
adults in ventral striatal activation during gain anticipation may
imply that the ventral striatal regions may not be as compromised
by age as are the neural substrates recruited in reward reversal
learning tasks, such as the PFC regions (Marschner et al.,
2005; Samanez-Larkin et al., 2007). Some di erences between
young and older individuals were observed for the average
contrasts: the comparatively lower deactivation/higher activation
for risky vs. control balloons in older adults may suggest
systematic di erences in the neural representation of value-
related processes, for instance slightly higher sensitivity to gains
(higher striatal activation) or weaker integration (less vmPFC
deactivation). It is noteworthy that some of the regions for which
age di erences were observed in the average contrast analysis
overlap with regions engaged in the default mode network
(Raichle et al., 2001) and brain networks identified for working
memory tasks (Tomasi et al., 2006). Consequently, it is also
possible that the few di erences observed for average contrasts
stem from older adults dealing di erently with the process of
being engaged in and completing a task with some memory
demands.
In contrast, parametric analyses at group level found that
young and older adults evidenced similar tracking of pumps in
the AI, but only young adults showed parametrically decreasing
activity in the vmPFC. Interestingly, strong striatal activation
might be expected as a function of parametric pumps, given that
the striatal coding of gains (cf. Tom et al., 2007) ought to be
reflected in the parametric tracking of pumps, the latter being a
potential proxy for increasing gain on a given trial in the BART.
The absence of a strong striatal signal in this study as well as
in the study by Schonberg et al. (2012) is likely to be reflective
of increasing pumps being processed not as increasing gain, but
as increased risk of loss. Against a backdrop of work that has
assigned the processing of risk to the insula (Volz et al., 2003;
Kuhnen and Knutson, 2005; Preuscho  et al., 2008; Samanez-
Larkin et al., 2008), our parametric results further support
findings from the average contrasts, speaking to unaltered insula-
based tracking of increasing risk in old age.
The combination of relatively preserved insula signaling
and age-related di erences in vmPFC signaling in response to
increasing risk observed from the parametric analyses support
the notion of the vmPFC as a platform for integration and
convergence of information (Schonberg et al., 2012; Bartra et al.,
2013; Clithero and Rangel, 2014; Halfmann et al., 2014, 2016).
Specifically, we propose that with age, individuals may attach
di erent weights to di erent aspects of a decision context,
or alternatively, are less consistent across time in the weights
attached to particular options. Put di erently, although older
and young individuals in the current study responded with
comparable risk and reward signals, the two groups di ered
with respect to the integration of risk and reward into a
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FIGURE 5 | Region of interest (ROI) analyses for links between individual neural and behavioral differences. (A) Participants’ mean adjusted pumps
negatively correlated with their BOLD signals in the left AI and (B) the right AI for both young and older adults. (C) Activity in the left striatum was significantly
correlated with mean adjusted pumps in young adults, but not in older adults. (D) Activity in the vmPFC was positively correlated with mean adjusted pumps in
young adults, but not in older adults. The boxplots on top of the plot show the distribution of mean adjusted pumps in the young and older age group, respectively,
whereas boxplots to the left of the plot show the distribution of the signal changes in the left/right AI, vmPFC and left striatum, respectively. ROIs were created as
4 mm radius spherical regions covering bilateral anterior insula and left striatum, and an 8 mm radius spherical region in the vmPFC (center coordinates based on
meta-analysis by Bartra et al., 2013).
subjective value signal. In support of this line of argument, past
theoretical and empirical work converges on the idea that value
representations are a ected by age-related anatomical and/or
functional di erences. Anatomically, there is a global declining of
gray matter volume in the prefrontal cortex (PFC) with age (Raz
et al., 1997), a thinner cortical thickness of left vmPFC (Cassidy
and Gutchess, 2012), and a decreasing white matter integrity in
thalamocorticostriatal paths, which run from the thalamus to the
medial PFC and from the medial PFC to the ventral striatum
(Samanez-Larkin et al., 2012). Functionally, impaired integration
processes from the vmPFC may arise from less e ective coding
by single systems or degrading glutamatergic projections from
the medial PFC to the striatum (Samanez-Larkin and Knutson,
2015). Recent work by Halfmann et al. (2014, 2016) linked
reduced vmPFC signaling to disadvantageous decision patterns
in the Iowa Gambling Task, which the authors interpreted as
support for the notion of noisier value representation in older
adults (Li et al., 2007; Samanez-Larkin et al., 2010). This view
is also consistent with previous studies showing age-related
reductions in activity during learning from rewards in the vmPFC
but not during learning from monetary losses in the insula
and striatum (Eppinger et al., 2013). Bridging the gap between
the neural and the behavioral level, it is conceivable that a
decreased signal-to-noise ratio in older adults may in part be
underlying the mixed behavioral patterns obtained in past work
using the BART (Henninger et al., 2010; Cavanagh et al., 2012;
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Rolison et al., 2012): di erent experimental implementations
of the BART may rely on more (or less) e cient integration
of information, hence decision outcomes are perhaps a ected
di erently by an integration process that is subject to age-related
changes. Although the current study cannot o er direct evidence
supporting this suggestion, the notion of heterogeneity in study
results being linked to brain signal heterogeneity o ers a potential
avenue for research aimed at connecting age-related neural and
behavioral di erences in decision-making tasks.
Current theories emphasize the contribution of both cognitive
and a ective processes to age di erences in decision making
(Samanez-Larkin and Knutson, 2015; Schiebener and Brand,
2015). Our results, however, indicate that what could be
potentially considered a ective components, such as neural
coding of risk in the AI and reward in the striatum, are relatively
preserved with aging. In turn, value coding and integration
in the vmPFC seems less robust. Whether such changes can
be deemed the result of cognitive or a ective components is
unclear. The absence of both a consistent group level value
signal and a correlation with behavior in the vmPFC in our
sample of older adults for instance may result from older adults
exhibiting potentially noisier intra-individual (e.g., Samanez-
Larkin et al., 2010) or more heterogeneous inter-individual
coding of value in this region, suggesting a more cognitive
explanation. Alternatively, given that we find older adults’ risk-
taking behavior to be linked with insula more so than with
vmPFC signaling in response to increasing risk, there may also be
motivational components associated with the relative importance
or attention devoted to gains and losses (Mata and Hertwig,
2011).
The exact mechanisms underlying age di erences in value
coding and integration in the vmPFC are still to be identified.
Future work using the BART could contribute to clarifying
these issues by manipulating task characteristics, such as
reward structure and loss probability, to better tease apart the
contribution of neural risk and reward signals in young and older
adults to an overall utility signal coded in the vmPFC. Future
work may also want to directly test the role of anatomical and
functional deficits in and between medial prefrontal and other
brain regions by using behavioral performance indices in voxel-
based morphometry (e.g., Strenziok et al., 2011; Peper et al., 2013;
Gilaie-Dotan et al., 2014), di usion tensor imaging (e.g., Kwon
et al., 2014; Van den Bos et al., 2014; Leong et al., 2016), or
e ective connectivity analysis (e.g., Hare et al., 2014).
With respect to limitations, risk and reward were directly
correlated in the current BART version hence it was not possible
to dissociate risk from reward through parametrically altering
each decision component. However, given the comparatively rich
pool of studies that have investigated risky decision making as
well as the impact of aging thereon, the advantage of using a task
that o ers external validity outweighs many of its shortcomings.
As alluded to above, future work is required which tries to
dissociate reward from risk as well as reward and risk from
subjective value. We are currently in the process of answering
this call to uncover di erential sensitivity to risk or rewards as
a function of age. Further, future studies should strive to collect
data from lifespan samples to account for intra- as well as inter-
individual change to derive neural and behavioral trajectories of
risk taking across the full range of the adult lifespan.
CONCLUSION
To conclude, our comparison of young and older adults’ neural
activation during decision making in the BART suggests that
the two age groups show similar patterns of activation in the
AI, possibly coding for the probability of loss, yet di er in
the recruitment of the vmPFC, which is thought to subserve
value integration and representation. Our results suggest that
the integration of risk and reward resulting in overall utility
representations may be a ected by aging. Our results show the
need for distinguishing di erent neural components underlying
risk taking, including the processing of risk, rewards, and the
integration of the two, to uncover possible di erences in risk
taking across the lifespan.
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Abstract  
Risk taking is linked to important life outcomes, including health, wealth and criminality, 
hence individual differences therein have become attractive targets for developmental and 
longitudinal research. It is currently unclear, however, to what extent biomarkers such as 
brain function are informative in those contexts, mainly because there has been a lack of 
studies examining the role of measurement on the neural representation of risk and its 
explanatory power for behavior. This however is crucial: Contrary to standard economic 
theory, the same information encountered in different ways can lead to different choices. In 
this study we report results from the MRI sample (N=116 young adults) of the Basel-Berlin 
Risk Study, for which we collected functional neuroimaging data in response to the Balloon 
Analog Risk Task as an example of experienced risk, and monetary gambles as an example of 
described risk. In our analyses, we address (1) the overlap of the average neural representation 
of risk in BART and monetary gambles, (2) whether individual activation differences are 
preserved across these two measures, and (3) the explanatory power of neural indices from 
BART and monetary gambles for risky choice, within and across measures. Our results 
suggest joint activation increases in nucleus accumbens for BART and monetary gambles, but 
inconsistent individual differences in nucleus accumbens, insula and anterior cingulate cortex 
activation across the two measures. Within measure, we obtained brain-behavior associations 
only for monetary gambles, but not for BART. Across measures, we observed a link between 
anterior cingulate cortex activation in response to risk in the BART and risky choice in 
monetary gambles. Our findings further help to clarify the commonalities and differences 
between the neural correlates of experienced and described risk, suggesting that these two 
types of measures should not be used interchangeably to capture risk preference. As such, our 
results have strong implications for longitudinal and developmental designs targeting 
individual differences in risk taking. 
  
 3 
Introduction  
Risk preference—whether in the economic sense of preferring monetary high-variance 
options over more certain ones, or, more commonly, preferring options involving uncertain 
but potentially sizeable negative consequences1—pervades decisions across various life 
domains, including health, wealth and criminality2,3. Consequently, risk preference, its core 
components (e.g., valuation, risk sensitivity, loss aversion), related constructs (e.g., self-
control, impulsivity), and the environmental influences upon them (e.g. peer environment, 
culture) have become promising targets for longitudinal, developmental and clinical research 
designs4–7.  
Description- and experience-based measures of risk taking 
 Unfortunately, the risk-preference literature offers numerous measures, but lacks a clear 
taxonomy of measures and the core capacities that they elicit8,9. Zooming in on behavioral 
measures of risk taking, recent studies observed divergent patterns of individual and age 
differences as a function of the measures used10–12, as well as weak or no correlations between 
various measures, suggesting they cannot be used interchangeably13–15. One factor 
contributing to the divergence of behavioral measures resides in the way individuals come to 
know about risk-relevant information: Information about potential outcomes and their 
probabilities can either be fully described and thus known in advance, or over time have to be 
ascertained from experiencing choice outcomes16. Description- and experience-based 
measures (henceforth referred to as described risk and experienced risk, respectively) share 
central characteristics of decision-making under risk, including the processing of outcome 
magnitudes and probabilities, and their integration into a subjective value (i.e. utility) signal 
informing choice. They differ, however, with regard to the (coincidental or necessary) 
involvement of additional cognitive processes, including affect, memory, strategy usage, and 
learning11,16–19. As a likely consequence of these differences, described and experienced risk 
have been found to elicit different choices and thus lead to different average (e.g., younger 
 4 
versus older) and individual risk profiles11,14.  
Given this description-experience gap16, a prerequisite for understanding individual 
differences in risk taking and for finding suitable targets for intervention will be to address 
questions such as “Under what conditions does the description-experience gap arise?”, “What 
are the underlying mechanisms?”, “Are described and experienced risk equally predictive of 
risk-taking behavior and life outcomes?”, and if not, “What drives the differential predictive 
validity of described and experienced risk?”. Our aim in this study is to offer a neural 
perspective on these issues using brain activation differences for described and experienced 
risk. 
Contribution of neural correlates of described and experienced risk to individual 
differences in risk taking 
In a bid to understand the biological underpinnings of risk taking, neuroimaging methods 
have been used to understand the neural correlates and mechanisms of (individual differences 
in) risk taking. Both qualitative reviews20,21 and quantitative meta-analyses of single 
neuroimaging studies22–24 converge on several neural regions as key correlates of risk taking 
and its constituent processes, including striatum, insular cortex, anterior cingulate cortex, 
(ventro)medial prefrontal cortex, and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. A subset of these regions 
has been advocated as being so crucial for risk taking that they form a neural “risk matrix”, 
differentially promoting (nucleus accumbens in ventral striatum), inhibiting (insular cortex), 
and controlling (anterior cingulate cortex) risky choice20.  
Unfortunately, the role of the measurements adopted to study risk taking and its neural 
correlates has so far received very little attention. Both described and experienced risk have 
been used to understand the neural basis of risk preference and associated processes (e.g., 
valuation, risk sensitivity, loss aversion)20,22–26, yet very few studies have directly compared 
the two. In a recent exception27, the overlap of neural function during reflective and impulsive 
risk taking was examined using the Game of Dice Task and Balloon Analogue Risk Task, 
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respectively, revealing joint activation increases in two of the three “risk matrix” regions, 
namely bilateral caudate and insula. It is plausible that such neural functional commonalities 
are attributable to the central processes shared by described and experienced risk (e.g., 
valuation). In that case, these seemingly measure-invariant neural endophenotypes may 
present useful targets for prevention and intervention. Two fundamental issues need to be 
addressed before such a path should be taken.  
First, the hitherto observed commonality of neural function in response to described and 
experienced risk does not necessarily indicate convergence (i.e. consistency) owing to the 
well-known but often neglected lack of a match between group-level (i.e., aggregate) and 
individual-level effects reported for instance in the developmental28 and social preferences 
literature29. In the neuroimaging literature on decision making, the proposition that average 
activation differences do not necessarily reflect individual-level patterns has already found 
some support: In a study30 which implemented three different reward paradigms and repeated 
MRI sessions, a reliable group-level reward-related BOLD signal was observed in striatum 
and orbitofrontal cortex, regardless of paradigm, session or contrast analysis (e.g., prediction 
or receipt of reward). However, at the level of the individual, intra-class correlation 
coefficients indicative of test-retest reliability for the different paradigms in ventral striatum 
and orbitofrontal cortex for most contrast analyses were low (0.1 – 0.2) and not significant30. 
In the current context of core substrates of decision making under risk, our current 
knowledge of common neural activation differences across measures is predominantly based 
on average activation patterns originating from different studies (i.e., different individuals). 
However, the same individual may respond very differently, neurally and behaviorally, to 
different measures of risk preference, for instance as a function of whether risk is described or 
experienced. It is therefore unclear whether repeated measures designs of neural activation for 
different measures would result in consistent neural activation, or if such designs would 
mirror the weak to no associations observed between behavioral indices of risk preference 
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obtained from repeated-measures designs (i.e., the same person completes multiple measures, 
and within-subject consistency is consequently evaluated)13. Thus, although the mechanisms 
underlying group-level convergence but individual-level divergence (e.g., low between-
subjects variability31) can be debated, it is clear that it would be misguided to expect group-
level results to reflect the individual level, and thus to be informative for individual 
differences analyses. Instead, studies are needed that investigate average (group-level) 
activation differences across different measures, but also target individual differences6,32.  
A second issue to address before using neural indices for intervention concerns the 
explanatory power of neural indices for risk-taking behavior and related life outcomes. At 
present, we do not know the extent to which neural indices of described and experienced risk 
are predictive of choice, both within and across measures. However, given that regional 
activation differences do not necessarily reflect useful, reliable predictors of observed 
behavior33, this is an important prerequisite for understanding individual differences. 
There is a regrettable absence of neuroimaging studies that have assessed described and 
experienced risk, addressed group- and individual-level effects, and investigated the 
explanatory power of neural indices for risky choice, both within and across measures. In the 
recent study which compared risk taking using the Game of Dice Task and the Balloon 
Analogue Risk Task27, significant within-measure brain–behavior associations were observed 
for described but not experienced risk27. Whether individual differences in neural activity for 
one task were preserved in the other was unfortunately not reported, neither whether brain-
behavior associations were observed across these two meaures27. This however is crucial for 
our understanding of individual differences in risk taking, especially where these inform 
studies investigating associated developmental trajectories2,7 or clinical outcomes4: If joint 
neural activation differences were observed for experienced and described risk, which applied 
at group- and individual level, and which evidenced explanatory power for observed behavior, 
the case for measure-invariant neural indices of risk taking would be further supported.   
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The current study: Neuroimaging component of the Basel-Berlin Risk Study  
To tackle the issues raised, the current study assesses the match between group- and 
individual-level effects for the neural representation of experienced and described risk, in two 
paradigms frequently adopted to examine individual differences in risk taking: the Balloon 
Analogue Risk Task (BART) and monetary gambles, respectively. Specifically, we report 
results from a neuroimaging component of the Basel-Berlin Risk Study (BBRS), a large-scale 
study assessing individual differences, psychometric structure and biological underpinnings of 
risk preference13,15,34. Participants in the BBRS completed a one-day laboratory session 
involving an extensive battery of measures assessing individual differences in risk taking 
(including self-report, frequency, and behavioral measures), cognitive capacity, personality, 
affect, and genetics (an overview of all subsamples, measures, and further details on the 
BBRS is reported on https://osf.io/rce7g). A subsample also completed an MRI session, 
which included structural and task-(in)dependent functional imaging sequences. 
The current study is based on task-dependent functional imaging data from 116 
individuals for experienced (BART) and described (monetary gambles) risk. These two 
measures were chosen because both are commonly used, relatively simple paradigms, for 
which average neural activation profiles25,26,35,36 as well as individual differences have been 
extensively investigated7,35,37–39. Importantly, both measures feature similar concepts such as 
loss, reward, and risk. Yet, whereas these parameters are explicitly described for monetary 
gambles, some of them (in particular “risk”) must be explored and learned from experience in 
the BART19,40. Based on these two measures, we examine (1) common and distinct neural 
correlates of experienced and described risk, (2) the consistency of individual differences in 
the neural representation of experienced and described risk, and (3) the explanatory power of 
neural indices of experienced and described risk for behavior. Thus, our unique design of a) 
investigating group- and individual-level neural representations of risk, and b) implementing 
two prototypical measures capturing both experienced and described risk allows us to 
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systematically understand which components of the neural response to risk are measure-
(in)variant. This approach therefore promises to bring us one step closer to understanding the 
role of task characteristics to individual differences in risk taking14,41. Zooming in on 
experienced risk, performance-based indices of the BART have been shown to predict 
outcomes as critical as drug use, teenage pregnancy and criminal activity42,43 and neural 
indicators thereof have been used to understand developmental aspects of risk taking7,38. By 
examining the explanatory power of activation differences in response to risk in the BART, 
we aim to learn more about the mechanisms underlying the predictive success of this 
experience-based measure for real life risk-taking behaviors. 
In what follows, we first report results concerning group-level analyses of similarities 
between average neural activation patterns in response to experienced and described risk. 
Specifically, we were interested in whether any or potentially all joint activation differences 
would be located in “risk matrix” regions, that is, whether overlapping activation differences 
in response to experienced and described risk would be found in nucleus accumbens, insula 
and/or anterior cingulate cortex20. Secondly, we report results from individual-level analyses 
examining whether group-level activation patterns are representative of individual-level 
patterns. Thirdly, we report results pertaining to the explanatory power of neural indices 
common to experienced and described risk, both within and across tasks.  
Given task-specific demands, it is possible that the “risk matrix” regions (nucleus 
accumbens, insula and anterior cingulate cortex) are recruited more strongly by one task than 
the other. Thus, for those “risk matrix” brain regions that were not conjunction regions, we 
additionally probed their individual-level consistency and explanatory power. 
Materials and Method 
Participants 
For this neuroimaging study, we recruited an imaging subsample of 133 young adults 
from an existing pool of individuals who had participated in a large study on individual 
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differences in risk preference, the Basel-Berlin Risk Study (BBRS)13. The sample size is 
reflective of oversampling to achieve an effective sample size of N~10044 in case of 
participant exclusions (e.g. due to excessive head motion in the scanner, image artefacts). The 
BBRS was run in Basel and in Berlin, but for the current study we recruited only individuals 
from the Berlin site due to the location of the neuroimaging facilities available. Exclusion 
criteria for participation in the MRI session were safety-limiting permanent implants, a 
history of neurological or psychiatric conditions, usage of psychoactive medication or 
substances, and receiving psychiatric treatment. Two participants aborted the session before 
any functional sequences were collected, thus were removed from all subsequent analyses. 
We excluded a further five participants due to excessive head motion inside the scanner (see 
image preprocessing section for movement parameter thresholds), one participant due to 
incidental anatomical findings, four participants due to incomplete data (e.g., only one 
paradigm was completed inside the scanner), and five participants due to non-compliance 
with the scanner protocol (e.g., falling asleep, reports of having mixed up button box 
responses). The final sample included in all analyses comprised 116 participants (62 females, 
mean age at scan = 25.4 years, SD = 2.6 years, range = 20.4–30.1 years). 
All participants provided written informed consent. Ethical approval for this study was 
obtained from the German Society for Psychology (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Psychologie), 
and the ethics committee of the Center for Adaptive Rationality, Max Planck Institute for 
Human Development. 
Experimental paradigms 
Inside the scanner, participants completed the BART26 and a monetary gambles 
paradigm35; we describe the two paradigms in more detail below. The MRI session further 
involved the collection of data outside the scanner, such as various self-reported demographic 
data, including date of birth, gender, marital status, educational attainment, native language 
and current occupation. Of note, only gender and age at the MRI session (calculated from date 
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of birth) were included as covariates in the current analyses; all other demographic measures 
were merely collected to describe the sample and ascertain the external validity of our 
findings with respect to sample characteristics. We further assessed individual’s height and 
weight, and collected data from a verbal fluency task, various self-report measures of 
impulsivity45, eating-related behaviors and attitudes46–48; these measures were not part of the 
current analyses and are therefore not reported further. All measures and instructions were 
presented in German. 
Balloon Analogue Risk Task (BART). The BART is a commonly used measure of 
risk preference49 that has also found wide application in neuroimaging research25–27,37,50–52. 
Individuals sequentially inflate a series of virtual balloons in the absence of a priori 
knowledge about the underlying contingencies (i.e., the maximum capacity of the balloons, 
which determines the distribution of trial-specific explosion points); these, however, can be 
learned from experience as individuals move from trial to trial and receive feedback (i.e., 
whether or not a balloon exploded on the previous trial). Given this structure, successful 
performance in the BART is predicated on decisions that are informed by the construction and 
updating of a mental representation of explosion distributions for a given balloon type over 
time.  
The BART version implemented in the current study featured two risky balloon types 
and a control balloon (Figure 1A). The maximum capacity for the two risky balloons was set 
to be 12, and 20; that is, on average balloons with a capacity of 12 burst earlier than balloons 
with a capacity of 20. Risky balloons were represented in blue and red to discriminate 
between balloon types based on capacity, with capacity-color assignment being randomized 
between participants but stable across the two runs. The two different risky balloon types 
have been shown to systematically influence the number of decisions to inflate14,26. Hence, we 
were interested in examining whether this pattern extends to choice-specific neural activation. 
Control balloons were presented in gray, had a maximum capacity of 16, and were added to 
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control for neural processes of no interest (e.g., motor or visual processes) hence required no 
decision-making (participants merely inflated the balloon until it disappeared from the 
screen).  
On any given trial, balloon capacity was determined via a random draw from a 
uniform distribution of values between one and the maximum capacity for the presented 
balloon type. Participants completed two runs of the BART, with a short break in-between. 
Each run was programmed to continue for 10 min, after which the final balloon was 
presented. Given that decisions are made sequentially and may become more difficult as the 
number of successful pumps in a trial increases, we did not impose a time limit on the 
decision phase of a given trial, resulting in the number of balloons played to vary between 
individuals (Table 1). Intervals between trials and between successive stimuli within trials 
were randomized (mean inter-trial interval = 4.39 s, range = 1–11 s; mean inter-stimulus 
interval = 1.5 s, range = 1–2 s).  
The outcome variable typically used in the BART to reflect individuals’ risk 
preference is the average number of pumps administered on cash out trials40,49,52,53. In line 
with previous research13,14, in the current study the adjusted average number of pumps was 
highly correlated with the average number of pumps across all balloons (r = 0.97, p < 0.001). 
Given these results, we used the average number of pumps across all balloons as outcome 
variable in the BART because it allowed us to retain a maximum number of trials for analysis 
while working with congruent trial numbers in both neural and behavioral analyses. To 
understand if individuals’ behavior in the BART is reflective of a differentiation between 
balloon types, and also to check if some commonly observed BART effects (e.g. effect of 
explosion on pumping/stopping behavior14,40) were present in the MRI sample, we applied a 
mixed-effects model to individuals’ trial-by-trial behavioral data. 
It has been suggested that computational models of the BART can help to disentangle 
different cognitive processes underlying the observed behavior in this task, including gain and 
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loss sensitivity, response consistency, risk preference, or learning18,40. However, attempts to 
model the BART have frequently resulted in highly correlated model parameters and failed 
parameter recovery18, suggesting that the purported benefit of using parameters obtained from 
currently available models may be limited. We set out to model the behavior in the BART 
with two standard models: a target model that assumes a fixed strategy is being used19,54, and 
a Bayesian sequential risk-taking model that allows for dynamic updating processes19. Yet, in 
line with past research the estimation of the model parameters turned out to be unreliable, and 
we thus do not report the modeling attempt here (a possible reason for the unreliable model 
parameters may consist of the lack of strong learning effects). Consequently, we relied on the 
average number of pumps as a simpler and generic index of risk preference in all subsequent 
analyses.  
Gambles paradigm. We adopted a monetary gambles paradigm with mixed outcomes  
as an example of a description-based risk-taking measure (i.e., both gains and losses were 
possible; Figure 1B, left panel)35,36,39,55. In brief, individuals made repeated choices between 
two options: a gamble offering a 50% chance of a gain and a 50% chance of a loss, or a sure 
outcome of zero. In contrast to experienced risk, monetary gambles simulate a different 
decision context, namely one where decisions are informed by known, described outcomes 
and associated probabilities (decisions from description)16. Participants made a total of 144 
decisions between a sure zero-outcome and a 50/50 gamble. Individual gambles were 
constructed to populate an asymmetric 12x12 payoff matrix (Figure 1B, right panel) with 
gains between 10 and 32 (increments of 2) and losses between 5 and 16 (increments of 1). 
Each gamble was presented once, with the order of gamble presentation randomized between 
participants. On a given trial, once the gamble was presented, participants had 3 s to accept or 
reject the gamble via respective button presses. Although in previous studies participants gave 
responses indicating the strength of their decision35,39, we collected binary responses 
(accept/reject) only. The rationale for this decision was that responses under time pressure 
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may bias individuals towards using more extreme responses56 and that previously reported 
analyses were commonly conducted for collapsed (binary) responses35,39, thus we expected no 
substantial benefit from adopting more fine-grained response options. Participants completed 
two runs with a short pause in-between, each run featuring 72 gambles. Jitters were 
introduced between trials (mean inter-trial interval = 4.32 s, range = 1–11 s). 
For every individual we computed the proportion of accepted gambles out of all 
gambles for which a response was provided as a risk-preference index. A simple model that 
captures the sensitivity to gains versus losses has been used to capture decision-making for 
monetary gambles35,36,39. However, the critical parameter of this model, loss aversion, was 
highly correlated with the proportion of accepted gambles (r = -0.9, p < 0.001). 
Consequently, we relied on the proportion of accepted gambles as a simpler and generic index 
of risk preference in all subsequent analyses. 
Experimental procedure 
Participants who had previously completed the laboratory session of the BBRS were 
contacted via phone and informed about the MRI follow-up study. Interested individuals were 
screened for any contraindications regarding MRI safety. For the current analyses, we did not 
link participants’ data from the laboratory and MRI session, and only used data collected 
during the MRI session. At the time of the MRI session, individuals completed a 2-min 
training run for the BART and monetary gambles before entering the scanner. The scanner 
protocol took 75 minutes and included a high-resolution structural scan, two functional 
sequences for the BART, two functional sequences for monetary gambles, a resting state 
sequence and a diffusion-weighted imaging sequence. For the current study, only the high-
resolution structural scan and the functional sequences were utilized, with the structural scan 
only serving normalization purposes during preprocessing of functional imaging data. The 
resting-state and diffusion-weighted sequences were not part of the current analysis and are 
therefore not discussed further. The order of scanner sequences was fixed, the BART 
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preceding the gambles task. The risk-taking paradigms were presented using E-Prime 2.0 
software (Psychology Software Tools, Pittsburgh, PA), and responses inside the scanner were 
collected via a COVILEX response box system (series 1.X, Magdeburg, Germany) using the 
right-hand index and middle finger.  
After the MRI session, individuals reported demographic data and completed 
additional measures reported above. Individuals received a fixed fee of 25 Euro for their 
participation. In addition, individuals could increase their earnings based on performance in 
the two scanner paradigms. For the BART, participants received 0.05 Euro for each 
successful pump on a balloon that was cashed out, i.e. did not explode. For monetary 
gambles, one trial was drawn at random and, if the participant had accepted the trial, was 
played out. The resulting loss or gain was combined with money made in the BART. Trials 
which were drawn but which the participant had rejected resulted in a 0 Euro outcome. 
Participants were told about the incentive structure at the start of the MRI session and 
received cash earnings at the end of the session (average actual payment = 41.50 Euro, SD = 
14.50 Euro). 
Statistical analysis of behavioral data 
First, we aimed to assess whether the behavioral patterns obtained for the two 
measures matched those found in past work, and to identify whether specific aspects of the 
paradigm (e.g., balloon types in BART, explosions14,40) need to be considered in 
neuroimaging analyses. Individuals’ trial-by-trial risk preference in the two fMRI paradigms 
was examined using mixed-effects regression analyses. For the BART, number of pumps in a 
given trial was regressed onto average effects of balloon capacity (12/20), whether the 
previous trial ended in an explosion, age and sex, allowing for random effects for balloon 
capacity and previous explosion (nested within individual). Control balloons were not 
included in the mixed-effects modeling, as these merely constitute baseline balloons for the 
neural analyses and do not offer any insight with regards to decision-making in the BART. 
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For monetary gambles a logistic mixed-effects model was specified, in which the binary 
choice outcome (reject/accept) of a given trial was regressed onto average effects of 
magnitude of the gain, magnitude of the loss, age and sex, as well as individual effects for 
gain and loss magnitude.  
Before running the models, all continuous variables were normalized and categorical 
variables dummy-coded. In the BART, number of pumps was normalized separately for each 
of the two experimental balloon types. 
All behavioral analyses were run in R (R Project for Statistical Computing; 
RRID:SCR_001905 http://r-project.org), using the packages lme4 (lme4: Linear mixed-
effects models using Eigen and S4; R package v 1.1–8; http://CRAN.R-
project.org/package=lme4) and lmerTest (lmerTest: Tests in linear mixed effects models; R 
package v 2.0–25; http://CRAN.R-project.org/package=lmerTest). We used the functions 
lmer and glmer for the mixed-effects models of continuous and binary outcome variables, 
respectively. To obtain p-values for the fixed-effects test statistics in lmerTest, the calculation 
of the denominator degrees of freedom adopts Satterthwaite’s approximation (cf. SAS proc 
mixed theory). 
Behavioral and survey data collected during the MRI session, as well as R analyses 
scripts are accessible via the Open Science Framework (LINK FOR REVIEWERS).  
MRI data acquisition and image preprocessing 
Neuroimaging data were collected at the Magnetic Resonance Imaging Laboratory at 
the Max Planck Institute for Human Development (Berlin, Germany) on a 3T Siemens MRI 
system with 12-channel head coil. Participants received a magnetization-prepared rapid 
gradient echo (MP-RAGE) sequence (repetition time = 2500 ms, echo time = 4.77 ms, 
inversion time = 1100 ms, flip angle = 7 degrees, field of view = 256 × 256 mm2, 192 slices, 
voxel size = 1 × 1 × 1 mm3). In each of the four functional runs, up to 320 functional T2*-
weighted BOLD echo-planar images were acquired for every person (repetition time = 2010 
 16 
ms, echo time = 30 ms, flip angle = 78 degrees, field of view = 192 × 192 mm2, voxel size = 3 
× 3 × 3 mm3, 33 transversal slices/volume with 15% distance factor). Resting-state and 
diffusion-weighted imaging sequences were not part of the current analyses, hence are not 
specified here. 
Image preprocessing and analyses were carried out using standard procedures 
implemented in SPM 8 (http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/software/spm8/; cf. Penny et al., 
2011). Preprocessing involved realignment and co-registration of functional to structural 
volumes. Volumes were nonlinearly warped into standard stereotactic (MNI) space based on 
structural scans using the New Segment method (Ashburner, 2008). To control for spatial 
noise and average effects that may arise as a function of residual anatomical differences 
between subjects, images were spatially smoothed using an 8-mm full-width half-maximum 
Gaussian kernel. 
fMRI model specification 
At the level of the individual, we concatenated the two runs collected for each of the 
two risk-taking paradigms, and specified one general linear model (GLM) for BART and one 
for monetary gambles (see details below). Activation parameter estimates were obtained by 
convolving event onsets with a canonical hemodynamic response function, filtering out of 
low-frequency components of the time-series data above 128 s (considered to be noise), and 
correcting for further temporal error autocorrelation by pre-whitening the data using an AR(1) 
model (cf. Henson, 2003). Movement parameters were entered as covariates. Given the 
current focus on neural correlates of decision making under risk rather than correlates of 
anticipation or feedback-related processes, all analyses involved modeling the time from trial 
onset (i.e., display of stimulus) to choice. 
BART. To model the neural activation in response to experienced risk in the BART, 
we specified a first level design matrix for each individual which included the following 
regressors per run (see Figure S1 for an exemplary design matrix): Onset vector of pumps for 
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control balloons, two onset vectors for pumps on reward balloons, onset vector for cash outs, 
onset vector for explosions, and six motion parameters estimated during the realignment 
process. The design matrix was set up to estimate activation differences across the two BART 
runs. The two onset vectors for pumps on reward balloons differentiated between pumps on 
balloons that matched the trial history of cash-out decisions, and the second vector captured 
all remaining pumps on reward balloons. Including an onset vector with only those pumps 
that matched the number of preceding pumps observed for cash out decisions was deemed 
necessary to account for the fact that cash out decisions may happen earlier on in the trial, 
thus a contrast should attempt to match the time point at which a pump/cash out happened. 
We did not differentiate between onsets for high- and low-capacity balloons because 
preliminary analyses in which we contrasted pumps on high-capacity with pumps on low-
capacity balloons yielded no significantly different neural activations as a function of balloon 
type; consequently, we collapsed pumps across high- and low-capacity balloons for all 
analyses. It was not possible to incorporate onset vectors for the two balloon types in the main 
analyses because for some individuals this resulted in empty onset vectors for cash out or 
explosion events. The onset vector for explosions was included in order to account for 
additional variance, better isolate the main effects of interest, and also remove neural 
responses to explosions from baseline activity. 
For our main contrast of interest—risky versus safe decisions—we contrasted cash-out 
decisions with matched pumps, using the contrast weights [0 1 0 -1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0] to assess 
Pumps (matched) > Cash out, and [0 -1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0] for Pumps (matched) < Cash out. 
Neuroimaging analyses of BART data usually involve contrasting activation differences in 
response to pumps on risky balloons with pumps on control balloons25,26,52. This procedure, 
however, does not address the question of risk preference directly because it merely contrasts 
activation for conditions with and without a decision component, and thus provides a general 
picture of the neural correlates of decision-making, but not risk preference. The ubiquity of 
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contrasting risky and control pumps in the BART in the literature, however, allows for a 
direct comparison of group-based results originating from different studies. Thus, we 
supplemented our focal analysis with a contrast of all pumps on risky versus control balloons, 
using the contrast weights [-2 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0] to compute Control pumps < Reward 
pumps, and [2 -1 -1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0] to compute Control pumps > Reward pumps. 
Monetary gambles. For the individual-level modeling of monetary gambles 
decisions, we specified one GLM, which targeted the neural representation of risky versus 
safe decisions36 and included the following regressors (see Figure S2 for an exemplary design 
matrix): Onset vector for all accept decisions, onset vector for all reject decisions, six motion 
parameters estimated during the realignment procedure. The design matrix was set up to 
estimate activation differences across the two runs of monetary gambles. The simplicity of the 
paradigm allowed for this comparatively straightforward design matrix with only two 
regressors of interest, nevertheless yielding clean (event-unrelated) baseline activity. 
Emulating previous analyses36 and striving for a contrast analysis that is comparable for risk 
in both BART and monetary gambles, individuals’ Accept decisions were contrasted with 
Reject decisions, using the contrast weights [1 -1 0 0 0 0 0 0] for Accept > Reject, and [-1 1 0 
0 0 0 0 0] for Accept < Reject.  
At the level of the group, we specified a flexible factorial design with subject and 
paradigm as separate factors in order to obtain statistical parametric maps for mean activation 
patterns in the two measures and compute a conjunction (see Figure S3 for design matrix). 
Within-subject contrast images from risky versus safe decisions in monetary gambles and the 
BART were entered as two blocks, one block per measure. We assumed independence for the 
subject and paradigm factors, but assumed equal variance only for the subject factor. Gender 
and age were entered as covariates of no interest.  
All initial contrast analyses were conducted at the level of the whole brain. 
Accounting for multiple comparisons, a cluster-forming threshold (p<.001, uncorrected) was 
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applied, followed by family-wise error correction at peak level (p<.05) to account for multiple 
testing. To avoid putting too much emphasis on potentially uninformative single activated 
voxels, we applied an extent threshold of a minimum of 100 contiguous voxels for all whole-
brain group-level analyses. As we were agnostic regarding the potential overlap of voxels 
activated by both fMRI paradigms, we removed the extent threshold from our conjunction 
analysis. We report voxel coordinates in MNI space (mm) and also report the extent of the 
cluster within which the voxel is located. For sake of brevity, we report only peak voxel 
coordinates with the highest t-value in the associated cluster. Anatomical labels were obtained 
from the Neuromorphometrics Atlas in SPM8. Results are displayed on a customized study-
specific group template, which we created by averaging all normalized structural volumes of 
all participants.  
Statistical analyses of fMRI data 
Three main goals drove the specification of our fMRI analyses. First, we wanted to 
test whether we could find group-level neural activation common to both paradigms as a 
function of risk (i.e., pumping relative to cashing out in the BART; accepting relative to 
rejecting an offer for monetary gambles), and to see if these map onto “risk matrix” regions. 
For this purpose, we conducted a conjunction analysis of risky versus safe decisions in the 
BART and monetary gambles following standard implementation routines in SPM. 
Specifically, we performed a conjunction analysis over 2 orthogonal contrasts which tested 
the conjunction null hypothesis rather than the global null hypothesis, allowing us to infer a 
conjunction of two effects (risky versus safe in experienced and described risk) at significant 
voxels57. We used visualizations of group maps for BART and monetary gambles to establish 
whether average brain activity for contrasts of interests were comparable to published 
functional brain maps and whether our paradigms could capture typical neural reactions to 
risk25,26,35,39.  
Second, we wanted to assess whether individual differences in risk processing were 
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consistent across measures. Recall that common activation in response to risk at group-level is 
not necessarily synonymous with consistent individual differences: even if the majority of 
individuals shows comparable patterns in each measure, this majority does not need to be 
made up of the same individuals. For this purpose, we extracted mean beta values from risky 
versus safe contrast images obtained for individual-level analyses of the BART (pumps versus 
cash out) and monetary gambles (accept versus reject) using regions of interest (ROI), and 
then conducted correlational analyses between the neural indices of the two measures (brain–
brain associations). The ROIs were informed by brain regions previously implicated in risk 
processing20, namely bilateral nucleus accumbens (NAcc), bilateral insular cortex, and 
anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), and potentially any other regions revealed by conjunction 
analyses to be implicated in risk taking in BART and monetary gambles. The ROIs were 
structurally defined based on the Hammersmith atlas nr30r83 (http://brain-
development.org/brain-atlases/adult-brain-maximum-probability-map-hammers-mith-atlas-
n30r83-in-mni-space/).  
Third, we aimed to examine the explanatory power of experience- and description-
based risk-related neural activation for risk-taking behavior, both within and across measures. 
To this end, we conducted two whole brain multiple regression analyses, modeling whether 
individual differences in the neural response to risky versus safe decision-making (1) in the 
BART was associated with mean number of pumps, and (2) in monetary gambles was 
associated with proportion of accepted gambles. To establish whether the explanatory power 
of neural activation differences is measure-invariant, we conducted a third whole-brain 
multiple regression analysis, examining whether neural signal in response to risk in the BART 
was predictive of proportion of accepted gambles. Given the temporal order of the two 
measures, we did not test whether neural signal in monetary gambles accounted for BART 
behavior. 
All analyses controlled for age and gender. Following-on from whole brain analyses, 
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we conducted brain–behavior associations focusing the ROIs described above. These 
additional ROI analyses were conducted (1) to further probe the results obtained from whole 
brain analyses given the ROIs’ a priori importance for risk-related processing20, and (2) 
because the expected effect sizes are likely to be modest and may not survive stringent whole 
brain correction thresholds. For this purpose, we estimated brain–behavior associations by 
means of linear regression analyses with standardized variables, yielding partial correlation 
coefficients for links between paradigm-specific mean beta values extracted from the ROIs 
and behavioral indices of risk preference in the BART (mean number of pumps) and in 
monetary gambles (proportion of accepted gambles). 
Initial plotting of mean beta values extracted from ROIs indicated relatively normally 
distributed mean signals for both measures, except for a small number of possible outliers for 
signals extracted from ACC (n = 2) and insula (n = 1) in the BART, and ACC (n = 1) in 
monetary gambles. To account for any biasing effects, we computed robust regression 
analyses (“rlm” function in R package MASS using method “MM”; Venables and Ripley, 
2002) and obtained a correlation coefficient of r = 0.97 (p < 0.001) between the coefficients 
from standard and robust analyses. Consequently, we only report estimates obtained from 
standard regression analyses. Results from ROI analyses were not confounded by laterality 
because similar findings were obtained from analyses extracting mean beta values from the 
two hemispheres separately. Concatenating the two runs from each paradigm to compute one 
neural index did not bias the results; comparable findings were observed for supplemental 
ROI analyses based on two separate runs per measure. 
To control for the number of analyses conducted, we report which of the associations 
reach significance thresholds after family-wise error correction. For this purpose, we define 
four families of tests: (1) brain–brain associations (three tests); (2) brain–behavior 
associations for BART (four tests; one whole brain multiple regression analysis and three 
regression analyses based on extracted mean beta values from ROIs); (3) brain–behavior 
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associations for monetary gambles (four tests; one whole brain multiple regression analysis 
and three regression analyses based on extracted mean beta values from ROIs); and (4) brain–
behavior associations across the two measures (four tests; one whole brain multiple regression 
analysis plus three regression analyses based on extracted mean beta values from ROIs). 
ROI data and corresponding R analyses scripts are available from the Open Science 
Framework (LINK FOR REVIEWERS). Uncorrected group-level maps are available via 
NeuroVault (LINK FOR REVIEWERS). We can provide access to individual-level 
neuroimaging data and SPM/Matlab scripts upon request. 
Results 
Behavioral results 
Group-based descriptive statistics for behavior in the two fMRI paradigms are given in 
Table 1. Collapsed across both types of risky balloons, number of pumps in the BART was 
approximately normally distributed (mean = 4.98, SD = 1.05; Figure 1C, left panel). As 
reported previously, participants generally showed risk-averse behavior in the BART, 
indicated by the mean number of pumps for the low-capacity (mean = 4.45, SD = 1.06) and 
high-capacity (mean = 5.50, SD = 1.52) balloons falling below the optimal mean number of 
pumps (6 and 10, respectively). Results from the mixed-effects modeling of the BART (Table 
2) suggested main effects of gender (b = -0.16, SE = 0.08, p = 0.04) and previous explosion (b 
= -0.14, SE = 0.03, p < 0.001). As expected, the mean number of pumps was lower for low-
capacity (mean pumps = 4.45, SD = 1.06) than high-capacity (mean pumps = 5.50, SD = 
1.52) balloons (cf. Schonberg et al., 2012), yet this difference did not translate into a 
significant main effect of balloon capacity (b = 0.03, SE = 0.06, p = 0.70). The main effect of 
previous explosion was not informative for the planned fMRI analyses, but falls in line with 
previous studies showing downward adjustment of pumping immediately following an 
explosion trial14,58.  
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Risk preference in monetary gambles—indexed by the proportion of gambles 
accepted—was approximately normally distributed (Figure 1C, middle panel). The results 
from the mixed-effects logistic regression model for monetary gambles yielded a main effect 
of age (b = -0.60, SE = 0.09, p < 0.001), gender (b = -0.37, SE = 0.19, p = 0.04), magnitude 
of gain (b = 0.39, SE = 0.02, p < 0.001) and loss (b = -0.84, SE = 0.03, p < 0.001) on 
individuals’ decisions to reject or accept a risky gamble (Table 3).  
Examination of risk preference across the two measures revealed a lack of consistency 
at the level of the individual because proportion accepted in monetary gambles was not 
significantly associated with mean number of pumps in the BART (r = -0.11, p = 0.24; Figure 
1C, right panel). The lack of behavioral consistency was not a result of combining the two 
runs to compute one behavioral index for each task, as risky choice was consistent over the 
two runs in monetary gambles (r = 0.86, p < 0.001) and the BART (r = 0.63, p < 0.001). 
Neuroimaging results 
Group-level analyses.  
In the BART, taking a risk (decisions to pump) versus going safe (decisions to cash 
out) was associated with increased activity in striatum (specifically bilateral NAcc), left 
anterior insula, and right precentral gyrus, extending into supplementary motor cortex (Table 
4, Figure 2A); results for this contrast are comparable with previous results27. Due to the 
various cognitive and visual aspects surrounding cash-out decisions, examination of the 
reverse main effect revealed widespread bilateral decreased activity, particularly in thalamus 
extending into hippocampal and parahippocampal regions and lateral occipital cortex. 
Because of the very short temporal delay between cash-out decisions and the subsequent 
visual feedback (~ 1 s), inclusion of the onset and duration of the visual feedback for cash-out 
decisions in the GLM did not achieve a more localized cash-out signal. Replication analyses 
of average activation differences for pumps on risky versus control balloons yielded results 
comparable with those of previous studies25,26, including increased activation for peak 
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coordinates located in bilateral ventral and dorsal striatum, bilateral anterior insular cortex, 
inter-hemispheric anterior cingulate and prefrontal cortex, as well as decreased activation in 
inter-hemispheric ventromedial prefrontal cortex, posterior cingulate and posterior parietal 
cortex, and bilateral parahippocampal gyrus and posterior insula (Table 4). 
For monetary gambles, decisions to accept a risky gamble, when compared with 
decisions to reject, were associated with increased activation in several neural regions, 
including peak coordinates located in bilateral caudate extending into NAcc, right ACC, left 
angular gyrus, left inferior temporal and frontal gyrus (Table 4, Figure 2B). Examination of 
the reverse main effect yielded no significant deactivation. The pattern of activations found is 
compatible with those found in similar measures involving decisions from description23,36,59. 
One of our main goals was to examine the overlap of neural activation differences in 
response to experienced and described risk. A conjunction analysis of activation differences 
in response to risky versus safe options in the BART and monetary gambles revealed a 
common risk signal in the ventral striatum (Table 4). As can be seen in Figure 2C, joint 
activation differences are locally restricted to a small portion of the ventral striatum, the 
nucleus accumbens. Thus, on average, taking a risk seems to elicit a localized, measure-
invariant neural signal in nucleus accumbens.  
To summarize, at the level of the whole brain, group-level differences obtained for 
experienced risk in the BART and described risk in monetary gambles were in line with 
previous studies. Crucially, consistency of group-level activation differences across the two 
paradigms was observed for jointly increased activation in NAcc in response to risky versus 
safe decisions. Next, we turn to individual-level analyses to investigate if individual 
differences in the neural response to risk are preserved across the two measures, and to 
examine their explanatory power for risky choice. 
Individual-level analyses.  
Consistency of neural activation across paradigms. In a first step, we examined 
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whether the NAcc being a conjunction region for experience- and description-based risk 
activation means this region is informative for individual differences by examining the 
consistency of neural signal across measures. Contrary to what might be expected, mean 
activation in NAcc in the BART was not significantly predictive of NAcc activation in 
monetary gambles (Table 5, Figure 3A). Thus, although at the level of the group the two 
measures converged on NAcc activity, individual differences were not preserved across 
measures. In other words, we found group-level but not individual-level consistency for 
experience- and description-based risk-taking28.  
In a second step, we also examined the consistency of the neural signal in the 
remaining “risk matrix” regions. Mean activation in both insula and ACC in the BART were 
significantly predictive of activation differences in ACC and insula in monetary gambles, 
respectively; these associations, however, were small and negative rather than the positive 
correlations required to suggest consistency (Table 5, Figure 3A). The ROI-based results 
remained significant after application of correction thresholds (FWE) for the number of tests. 
Thus, although we observed associations between individual differences in regional neural 
activations in the two paradigms, we did not find consistency. 
Explanatory power of risk-related neural signal for risk preference within and 
across paradigms. To present a useful target for intervention, neural indices should hold some 
explanatory power for behavior or critical outcomes, at least for the measure from which they 
were derived and ideally even across measures. In a first step, we used whole-brain analyses 
supplemented by ROI analyses for “risk matrix” regions to examine whether activation 
differences in the BART were predictive of mean number of pumps, and whether activation 
differences in monetary gambles were predictive of proportion of accepted gambles. For the 
BART, whole brain as well as ROI analyses revealed no significant associations between risk-
related activation differences and performance as measured by mean number of pumps (see 
Table 5, Figure 3C for results from ROI analyses). In contrast, for monetary gambles, whole-
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brain analyses revealed a set of neural regions for which the risk-related signal was associated 
with the proportion of gambles an individual accepted, including positive associations in 
voxel clusters in bilateral occipital pole, central operculum, and superior temporal gyrus, as 
well as negative associations in bilateral anterior insula, supramarginal gyrus, middle 
cingulate gyrus and inferior temporal gyrus (Table S1). ROI-analyses further supported the 
involvement of “risk matrix” regions in predicting choice in monetary gambles. Specifically, 
mean activation in NAcc, insula and ACC extracted from Accept versus Reject decisions in 
monetary gambles was significantly negatively associated with the proportion of risky 
gambles accepted (all p < 0.001; Table 5, Figure 3B). The links between neural signal and 
behavior in monetary gambles remained significant after controlling (FWE) for the number of 
tests conducted.  
In a second step, we were interested in brain-behavior associations across measures, 
that is, whether activation differences in BART were predictive of risky choice in monetary 
gambles. Whole-brain analyses did not reveal a significant brain-behavior association across 
measures. Only when we probed ROI-specific neural signal did we observe mean activation 
in the ACC to be significantly positively associated with the proportion of gambles accepted 
(p = 0.01; Table 5; Figure 3D), which is suggestive of control and monitoring processes in the 
BART to account for some variance in choice in monetary gambles.  
Discussion  
In this study, we investigated the neural basis of risk taking under experienced and 
described risk. Specifically, our aim was to examine (1) commonalities and distinctions 
between the neural correlates of experienced and described risk, (2) the consistency of 
individual differences in the neural response to experienced and described risk, and (3) the 
explanatory power of neural indices of experienced and described risk for behavior. We 
investigated these propositions by focusing our analyses on group as well as individual 
activation differences in response to two risk-taking measures, namely the BART and 
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monetary gambles, which, respectively, are prototypical measures of experienced and 
described risk.  
Average activation differences for experienced and described risk  
At the level of the group, we replicated previously published activation differences for 
risky versus safe choices under experienced and described risk25–27,35,36,39,52. One of our main 
aims was to address the functional overlap of decisions made under experienced and 
described risk. Comparative examination of average activation differences in the two 
paradigms revealed bilateral NAcc as a source of jointly increased activation for risky versus 
safe decisions. Our conjunction results in NAcc support previous work27 which identified 
striatal and insula activation to jointly increase for reflective and impulsive risk taking. The 
striatum in general has been implicated in reward processing60,61, and if we consult 
neurosynth (neurosynth.org) to establish a reverse inference of process given location using   
meta-analytical procedures, the highest posterior probability for a cognitive process given our 
peak conjunction coordinates was indeed observed to be for reward processing (posterior 
probability= 0.81). In principle, the observed joint NAcc activation differences for risky 
versus safe decisions in BART and monetary gambles are not surprising. The motivation for 
risk-taking behavior lies in the potential for reward, and in the two measures used in this 
study, risk and reward always coincided; we return to this issue in the study limitations. Thus, 
we cannot completely isolate risk signal from reward, especially since both risk and reward 
have been found to be encoded, albeit temporarily differentiated, in striatum60.  
An alternative explanation for a common NAcc signal for experienced and described 
risk is the role of the ventral striatum in the coding of prediction error. The brain computes 
several mutually-informative choice-relevant signals (including goal value, decision value, 
and prediction error), and dissociation of these signals by means of a bespoke MRI task 
suggested ventral striatal activation to code prediction error instead of goal or decision 
value62. Prediction error is of course based on the comparison of expected and achieved 
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outcomes, and the structural as well as functional interconnectedness of different brain 
regions implicated in the computation of different choice-relevant signals suggests that 
ventral striatal activation is not devoid of a value signal. However, if we want to understand 
commonalities between different risk-taking measures, especially in the search for 
endophenotypes suitable for intervention, it is important to distinguish between these different 
decision components. Our measures do not allow us to disentangle different choice-relevant 
signals, leaving open the possibility that, instead of signaling reward processing, the main 
commonality between experience- and description-based risk taking may be comparison of 
the current option with the status quo.  
In contrast to previous results27, we obtained no further conjunction regions for the 
two tasks, including insular cortex. The insula is heavily implicated in signaling subjective 
feelings, interoception, and explicit motivation63, and as such is thought to inhibit risky 
choice20. In this study, group-level activation differences in insula were observed for BART 
but not monetary gambles, supporting the argument that experienced risk involves potentially 
more affective and motivational processes compared with described risk1,16. To note, in the 
study comparing activation differences in the BART and Game of Dice Task27, described risk 
on average activated the insular cortex. This insula-based discrepancy between the current 
and previous work emphasizes that even two seemingly similar measures of described risk do 
not necessarily result in overlapping neural signals, given comparable contrast analyses.  
Individual-level consistency of activation differences for experienced and described risk 
Given that averages are not necessarily reflective of individual-level behavioral28,29 or even 
neural30 patterns, we examined whether individual differences in neural activation are 
preserved across our two measures. Interestingly, we observed a lack of consistency of 
individual differences in neural activation for risky versus safe decisions under experienced 
and described risk. On aggregate, joint activation increases were localized in NAcc, but 
individual differences in NAcc activation were not preserved from BART to monetary 
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gambles. Examination of further regions previously identified as core functional correlates of 
risk and risk preference20, i.e. insula and ACC, also failed to yield consistent (that is, 
positively correlated) individual differences across measures. From these results we take 
home that it is important to recognize that individuals respond very differently to different 
risk-taking measures, both behaviorally13 and neurally, hence it is unrealistic to expect 
individual differences in neural function observed in one measure or context to be informative 
for neural function in another measure or context.  
Explanatory Power of Neural Indices for Behavior 
Our third major aim was to examine the explanatory power of neural activation 
differences in response to experienced and described risk for risky choice. In particular, we 
were interested in the extent to which activation differences previously suggested as 
differentially promoting (NAcc), inhibiting (insula) and controlling (ACC) risky choice20 
might play a different role for brain-behavior associations using indices related to experienced 
or described risk.  
In a first step, we examined the explanatory power of neural indices for behavior 
within measure, and our results first and foremost suggest explanatory power to vary as a 
function of risk measure. In the BART, whole-brain and ROI analyses converged on 
activation differences in response to risky versus safe decisions not being predictive of mean 
number of pumps. In contrast, for monetary gambles, whole-brain and ROI analyses indicated 
activation differences in bilateral nucleus accumbens, insula, and ACC in response to risk to 
be predictive of proportion of accepted gambles. Based on the strength of the associations 
obtained, the strongest predictor of description-based risky choice was NAcc activation, 
followed by ACC and insula activation. Considering the proposed roles of NAcc, insula and 
ACC in the promotion, inhibition, and control of risky choice20, the observed associations for 
ACC and insula were in the expected negative direction; the more affect-based inhibition and 
control-related processes are experienced, the lower the number of risky gambles that are 
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accepted. The negative association between NAcc activation and risky choice in monetary 
gambles is informative, if we recall that for monetary gambles we used a quantitative index of 
risky choice (proportion accepted gambles), and that our neural index is an average signal 
over all Accept decisions, meaning individuals with an on average lower NAcc signal 
accepted more risky gambles. It is possible that this association is a corollary of our payoff 
matrix not being calibrated to individuals, which may result in choice being less discerning 
for those who place a similar subjective value on all gambles. Future research could easily 
remedy this issue by calibrating payoff matrices, for instance via an adaptive willingness-to-
pay measure. 
In a second step, we were interested in whether brain-behavior associations could be 
established across measures, that is, whether neural activation differences in the BART are 
predictive of choice in monetary gambles. Whole brain analyses revealed no brain-behavior 
association across experienced and described risk; our results are in line with previous 
findings27 indicating no association between neural and behavioral indices originating from 
different risk-taking measures. Additional ROI analyses identified a link between ACC 
activation in the BART and proportion of accepted gambles. However, we refrain from 
placing too much emphasis on interpreting this link, firstly because whole-brain analyses did 
not support this association, and secondly because an association across measures involving 
BART neural indices seems surprising, given the lack of within-measure brain-behavior 
associations for BART. Instead, we err on the side of caution and treat this association 
between BART activation and monetary gambles choice as an informative starting point for 
further investigation, which, if replicated, could pave the way for neural endophenotypes 
serving as targets for intervention efforts.  
Taken together, individual-level analyses of brain-behavior associations within and 
across measures first and foremost hint at the explanatory power of single neural indices for 
behavior being measure-dependent. We suggest that this measure-dependent explanatory 
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power arises as a potential consequence of the specific processes afforded by experienced and 
described risk16,41. In an experience-based, sequential decision-making measure such as the 
BART, which involves dynamic balloons and initially unknown risk distributions, activation 
differences in a single region are less likely to be highly correlated with choice, because 
choice depends on many interconnected processes1,18,19. In contrast, the simple, perhaps 
monotonous nature of description-based monetary gambles lends itself very well to the use of 
a choice rule, which, at brain level, is evident in choice-relevant neural signal (e.g., a reward 
signal coding for the attractiveness of a particular gamble). As a consequence, any 
explanatory links between neural function and risk preference have to be interpreted with 
caution, for they may be measurement-specific rather than capturing general associations 
between brain function and risk preference. 
Limitations 
 In this study we adopted two paradigmatic risk-taking measures as examples of 
experienced and described risk inside the scanner, which limits generalization. However, with 
regards to the main findings, past research has shown that other tasks do not fare much better 
regarding behavioral consistency13,15,27,64, hence it is questionable whether selecting different 
measures would have resulted in more extensive convergence at group- and individual level, 
or higher explanatory power for behavior. To allow for a more comprehensive assessment of 
measure-invariant neural activation at group- and individual level for these two types of tasks, 
one might be tempted to implement additional paradigms, including further risk-taking 
measures based on experienced (e.g., Iowa Gambling Task65 or Columbia Card Task66) and 
described risk (e.g., multiple price lists67). Adoption of multiple measures of each type would 
also facilitate further interesting analyses, including whether the neural differences between 
described and experienced risk are greater than the differences among different measures of 
experienced and among different measures of described risk.  
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Despite our best efforts to create contrasts targeting the neural risk component in 
BART and monetary gambles, risk and reward may not be easily distinguishable as the two 
components coincided in both measures. This is a special limitation for contrast analyses 
which average activation differences over particular events (e.g. Pumps or Accept decisions). 
One way to disentangle risk from reward is to use parametric analyses that map activation to 
specific functional forms, such as increases in risk or reward. Parametric analyses were not 
applied here because we aimed to compare and contrast BART and monetary gambles, and 
parametric analyses were in principle only possible for the former but not the latter. 
Moreover, standard implementations of the BART, like the one used here and 
elsewhere7,26,37,38,49, do not allow for the isolation of risk from reward signal even by using 
parametric analyses, because risk and reward increase linearly over a given trial. Thus, task 
manipulations are required which can disentangle risk from reward in the BART. One way to 
do this would be to include non-linear payoff functions but keep a linear risk function, and 
then (non)linear parametric analyses could be applied to examine (non)linear activation 
differences.  
In designing the study, we faced decisions regarding task order, that is, whether to run 
a fixed task order or counterbalance task order between participants. We opted for a fixed task 
order because randomization for some analyses would have required splitting the sample into 
two groups based on order, thus reducing power. Based on our sample’s behavior, it is 
unlikely that BART preceding gambles prompted strong order effects on risky choice. The 
overall level of observed risk-taking in BART and monetary gambles was comparable to 
previous independent investigations26,35, and risky choice within a task was relatively 
consistent across the two runs. The correlations between risky choice in BART and monetary 
gambles also did not change substantially as a function of run number.  
Implications 
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 Risk preference, including its related constructs (e.g., self-control) and associated 
cognitive processes (e.g., reward sensitivity), has been found to be predictive of crucial life 
outcomes, including psychopathology, health, wealth, and criminality2–4,7. As such, individual 
differences in risk taking and related constructs are also the focus of many developmental and 
longitudinal research efforts7,68,69. Interestingly, much progress has been made identifying the 
biological basis of risk preference, including its genetic basis70, hormonal71,72 and neural 
pathways20,22. In contrast, the extent to which biomarkers such as neural function differ 
depending on the risk-taking measure and whether they are reliable predictors of behavior is 
much less understood. To make progress, we make the following three recommendations. 
Firstly, our direct comparison of experienced and described risk clearly implies that 
different risk-taking measures should not be used interchangeably and without a clear 
rationale for why a particular measure was chosen. There exists a tempting richness of risk-
taking measures, and whenever a particular measure is used we recommend that researchers 
make their selection criteria transparent. On the one hand, increased transparency will help 
the individual researcher to make more informed choices between different risk-taking 
measures for their studies. On the other hand, increased transparency should help the research 
community to establish a taxonomy of risk-taking measures, their core capacities, biological 
underpinnings, and usefulness for research designs targeting individual differences, including 
longitudinal and intervention studies. 
Secondly, whenever it is feasible to include multiple measures in their design, we 
encourage researchers to do so. The adoption of multiple risk-taking measures in the same 
study has two benefits. One, it enables direct comparison of measures for a given sample, 
which makes prediction analyses across measures possible. Two, and perhaps more 
importantly, adoption of multiple measures means psychometric models can be applied13,33,71 
which provide insights for our understanding of risk taking as a phenotype, and its 
dimensionality.  
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 Thirdly, if state-based, task-dependent neural activation indices do not present useful, 
reliable targets for intervention purposes, perhaps more trait-like endophenotypes such as 
brain morphometry, structural connectivity, or task-independent functional connectivity 
measures offer more promising targets39,73–77. Multi-modal, multi-measure projects such as 
BrainTime7, Adolescent Brain Cognitive Development Study68, and a research framework 
aimed at establishing an ontology of self-regulation69 could provide suitable research designs 
to address these open questions in the future.  
Conclusion 
Many longitudinal, clinically relevant and developmental research designs focus on 
risk preference as a critical predictor or outcome, and often aim to establish links between 
individual differences in risk preference and neural structure or function2,4,7,77. Until recently, 
neuroimaging studies investigated primarily group-level neural representations of risk and 
paid less attention to individual differences or measurement convergence. To successfully 
target individual differences in risk taking and understand the biological underpinnings, a 
switch is required –especially within neuroscience– from group-level to individual-level 
research6,32, and from single to multi-measure research33. If the ultimate aim is to help 
individuals navigate an uncertain, risk-laden world and make better choices, we first need to 
be prepared to navigate and map the mainly unchartered territory of our risk-taking measures. 
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FIGURES 
 
Figure 1. fMRI paradigms and performance. A, BART. a, Example cash-out trial. b, Example 
explosion trial. B, Monetary gambles. a, Example “Reject” trial. b, Example “Accept” trial. c, Payoff 
matrix overlaid with heatmap showing the observed probability of gamble acceptance. C, Risky choice 
in the two fMRI paradigms. a, Distribution of mean number of pumps in the BART, collapsed across 
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all risky balloons. b, Distribution of proportion accepted trials in monetary gambles. c, Association 
between risky choice in the BART and monetary gambles. 
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Figure 2. Statistical parametric maps of activation differences obtained for risky versus safe 
decisions under experienced and described risk. A, BART, Pumps > Cash out (FWE =.05, k>100). B, 
Monetary gambles, Accept > Reject (FWE =.05, k>100). C, Conjunction of joint increased activation 
differences in response to risky versus safe decisions in the BART (Pumps > Cash out) and monetary 
gambles (Accept > Reject) (FWE =.05). Activation differences are displayed on a customized study-
group structural template. Note: The right (left) side of the image corresponds to the right (left) side of 
the brain. 
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Figure 3. Partial correlations (controlling for age and gender) between mean neural signal 
extracted from ROIs for BART contrast (Pumps vs. Cash out), mean neural signal extracted from 
ROIs for monetary gambles contrast (Accept vs. Reject), mean number of pumps in BART, and 
proportion accepted trials in monetary gambles. A, Association between regional neural signals across 
measures (brain–brain). B, Brain–behavior association BART. C, Brain–behavior association 
monetary gambles. D, Brain–behavior association across measures. Note: NAcc = nucleus accumbens; 
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ACC = anterior cingulate cortex. All variables were z-standardized prior to plotting and analysis. 
Intercepts and slopes were estimated using robust regression analyses. 
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TABLES 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics for outcome measures for the BART and monetary 
gambles. 
Outcome Mean (SD) Range 
BART   
Number of completed trials (including controls) 60.72 (6.23) 37–73 
Number of low-capacity balloons (max. 12) 20.12 (2.12) 12–25 
Number of high-capacity balloons (max. 20) 20.25 (2.20) 12–25 
Average pumps on low-capacity balloons (max. 12) 4.45 (1.06) 2.40–6.95 
Average pumps on high-capacity balloons (max. 20) 5.50 (1.52) 2.25–9.93 
Number of explosions experienced 15.81 (3.81) 6–24 
Reaction time pumps control (seconds) 0.62 (0.47) 0.002–15.25 
Reaction time pumps risky (seconds) 0.71 (0.53) 0.002–15.09 
Reaction time cash out (seconds) 0.90 (0.70) 0.27–11.59 
MONETARY GAMBLES   
Number of valid responses 142.67 (1.96) 133–144 
Proportion accepted gambles 0.47 (0.16) 0.13–0.92 
Reaction time accept decisions (seconds) 1.31 (0.47) 0.46–2.98 
Reaction time reject decisions (seconds) 1.30 (0.44) 0.07–2.99 
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Table 2. Mixed effects linear regression model for trial-by-trial number of pumps in 
the BART. 
 
 Estimate SE df t  p 
Intercept 0.16 0.07 136.63 2.44 0.02 
Age 0.02 0.04 111.26 0.38 0.70 
Sex -0.16 0.08 111.22 -2.07 0.04 
Capacity 0.03 0.06 113.21 0.49 0.63 
Explosion on previous trial -0.14 0.03 111.04 -4.19 < 0.001 
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Table 3. Mixed-effects logistic regression model for trial-by-trial decision making (0 
= Reject, 1 = Accept) in monetary gambles. 
 
 Estimate SE z  p 
Intercept 0.52 0.15 3.55 < 0.001 
Age -0.59 0.09 -6.35 < 0.001 
Sex -0.37 0.19 -2.02 0.04 
Gain 0.39 0.02 25.73 < 0.001 
Loss (absolute) -0.84 0.03 -25.47 < 0.001 
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Table 4. Significant peak coordinates obtained from group-level contrast analyses for 
main contrasts of interest in BART and monetary gambles. 
  MNI (mm)    
Region R/L x y z T  k 
BART: Pumps > Cash out 
Supplementary motor cortex L -6 -2 60 11.07 2534 
Posterior cingulate gyrus R 24 -42 14 8.26 206 
Nucleus accumbens L -6 8 -4 7.84 106 
Nucleus accumbens R 8 8 -4 7.83 137 
Anterior insula L -30 26 4 7.45 177 
Anterior insula R 40 22 6 7.10 170 
Posterior cingulate gyrus L -14 -34 20 6.56 131 
BART: Cash out > Pumps 
Inferior occipital gyrus L -38 -76 -12 20.00 100274 
BART: Pumps_Risky > Pumps_Control 
Supplementary motor cortex R 4 22 40 25.61 49140 
Supramarginal gyrus R 46 -42 44 17.26 5649 
Occipital pole L -12 -102 -2 15.10 2845 
BART: Pumps_Control > Pumps_Risky 
Angular gyrus L -48 -66 22 21.21 50828 
Medial frontal cortex L -2 58 -12 18.65 5684 
MONETARY GAMBLES: Accept > Reject 
Caudate / Nucleus accumbens R 10 16 -2 7.31 278 
Inferior frontal gyrus (triangular part) L -44 34 14 7.00 427 
Caudate / Nucleus accumbens L -8 16 -2 6.94 209 
Angular gyrus L -32 -72 36 6.89 1182 
Inferior temporal gyrus L -50 -66 -12 6.21 449 
Supramarginal gyrus L -46 -40 40 5.93 358 
Precentral gyrus L -36 4 26 5.83 165 
Middle frontal gyrus L -24 14 50 5.58 176 
CONJUNCTION Pumps > Cash out & Accept > Reject 
Nucleus accumbens R 8 12 0 6.03 49 
Nucleus accumbens L -8 10 -4 5.72 36 
All analyses whole-brain, with cluster-forming threshold (p<.001, uncorrected) and peak-level FWER-
correction (extent threshold k >100; controlled for effects of age and gender); k = number of voxels in 
cluster within which peak coordinate is located. Extent threshold not applied to conjunction analysis. 
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Table 5. Partial correlations (controlling for age and gender) between regional (ROI) neural and behavioral indices of risk preference, 
computed within and across paradigms. 
 
Analysis Index NAcc  Insula ACC  
  b (SE) t (p) b (SE) t (p) b (SE) t (p)  
Brain–brain:  Monetary gambles activation ~ BART activation -0.06 
(0.09) 
-0.67 
(.50) 
-0.46 
(0.09) 
-5.37 
(<.001) 
-0.47 
(0.08) 
-5.54 
(<.001) 
 
Brain–behavior: Within paradigms BART: Mean number of pumps 0.02 
(0.09) 
0.24 
(.81) 
0.04 
(0.09) 
0.38 
(.70) 
-0.17 
(0.09) 
-1.79 
(.08) 
 
 Monetary gambles: Proportion Accept -0.50 
(0.08) 
-5.97 
(<.001) 
-0.31 
(0.09) 
-3.56 
(<.001) 
-0.39 
(0.08) 
-4.63 
(<.001) 
 
Brain–behavior: Across paradigms Proportion Accept ~ BART activation 0.07 
(0.09) 
0.75 
(.46) 
0.15 
(0.09) 
1.61 
(.11) 
0.24 
(0.09) 
2.61 
(.01) 
 
 
Note: Estimates obtained from linear regression analyses with standardized outcome and predictor variables. For models within paradigms, 
behavioral outcome paradigms and neural predictors originated from the same paradigm. For models across paradigms, the behavioral outcome 
originated from monetary gambles, and the neural predictors from BART. ACC = anterior cingulate cortex, NAcc = nucleus accumbens.
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SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIALS 
 
 
 
Figure S1. Exemplary SPM design matrix for first (i.e. individual) level modeling of 
neural activation in BART. 
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Figure S2. Exemplary SPM design matrix for first (i.e. individual) level modeling of 
neural activation in monetary gambles. 
 
  
 55 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure S3. SPM design matrix for second (i.e. group) level modeling of main effects 
for BART, monetary gambles, and their conjunction. 
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Table S1. Significant peak coordinates obtained from multiple regression analysis to 
identify brain–behavior associations for monetary gambles. 
  MNI (mm)    
Region R/L x y z T  Voxels 
Accept>Reject ~ Proportion accepted gambles: Positive association 
Occipital pole R 24 -96 16 8.39 376 
Central operculum R 40 -12 20 8.06 406 
Precentral gyrus R 26 -22 52 7.85 1017 
Occipital pole L -26 -96 14 7.23 262 
Medial frontal cortex R 10 48 -14 7.12 358 
Middle temporal gyrus L -56 -10 -20 6.75 437 
Superior temporal gyrus R 62 -30 12 6.57 205 
Parietal operculum L -38 -40 18 6.14 101 
Superior temporal gyrus R 60 -8 -6 6.06 153 
Accept>Reject ~ Proportion accepted gambles: Negative association 
Anterior insula R 36 24 -4 12.89 10048 
Anterior insula L -34 18 -6 11.82 1155 
Supramarginal gyrus R 42 -40 42 11.61 4519 
Supramarginal gyrus L -50 -38 46 10.60 2888 
Middle cingulate gyrus L -2 -26 30 8.22 313 
Precentral gyrus L -52 8 28 7.76 700 
Inferior temporal gyrus R 56 -56 -14 7.36 240 
Precentral gyrus L -28 -12 52 7.29 321 
All analyses whole-brain, cluster-forming threshold (p<.001, uncorrected) with peak-level FWER-
correction and extent threshold k >100, controlled for effects of age and gender; k = number of voxels 
in cluster within which peak coordinate is located. 
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Abstract 
The neural functional correlates of risk-related processes have been mapped 
extensively, but much less is known about the extent to which neural structure contributes to 
individual differences in risk preference. Given the life time impact of some decisions made 
under risk, gaining a better understanding of the biological underpinnings is a worthwhile 
endeavor which may hold some insights for prevention and intervention purposes. To 
overcome some of the shortcomings of previous studies, including the use of single indices 
for both risk preference and neural structure, we combine multi-modal imaging with 
psychometrically derived risk preference factors in the imaging sub-sample (N=131 young 
adults) of the Basel-Berlin Risk Study. We focus our analyses on volumetric and connectivity 
indices for a set of regions identified by Neurosynth-facilitated meta-analytical procedures as 
core correlates of the term ‘risk’. To quantify the robustness of the contribution of individual 
neural indices, we compliment traditional multiple regression analyses with Bayesian model 
comparison and selection. Our results suggest that structural indices can account for variance 
in a general risk preference factor but are not predictive of domain-specific risk preferences. 
At the level of individual predictors, we observed grey matter volume in ventral striatum to be 
the most influential predictor of general risk preference, followed by grey matter volume in 
frontal regions and degree centrality of the amygdala. We did however not observe a role for 
previously identified indices, including insula and posterior parietal cortex. We discuss our 
findings in light of the suggestion of the general risk preference factor capturing the trait 
dimension of risk taking, and address reasons for the observed absence of previously 
established brain-behavior associations. We also provide a roadmap of methodological 
improvements for the study of risk taking in particular, and cognitive neuroscience in general. 
 
Keywords: risk preference, brain structure, volume, degree centrality, psychometric factors 
  
 3 
Introduction  
Risk is ubiquitous, whether it is defined in the economic sense as outcome variance, or 
the more common notion of the prospect of a reward coupled with the chance of a sizeable 
loss (Nigg, 2017; Schonberg, Fox, & Poldrack, 2011). Which career should be pursued, stock 
invested in, or medical treatment selected? Who should one marry, lend money to, or vote 
for? The answer to any of these and related questions depends, in part, on the decision-
maker’s willingness to accept risk. Making decisions in a world of uncertain outcomes can be 
a highly challenging and consequential enterprise. The lifetime impact of individual 
differences in risk taking and related constructs such as self-control has been demonstrated for 
(mental) health, wealth, substance use, criminality and general well-being (Aklin, Lejuez, 
Zvolensky, Kahler, & Gwadz, 2005; Moffitt et al., 2011; Sharma, Markon, & Clark, 2014; 
Steinberg, 2013), and thus the following question arises: If variability in risk taking influences 
many critical aspects of a person’s life, what influences variability in risk taking? 
Individual Differences in Risk Taking 
Many factors appear to contribute to intra- and inter-individual differences in risk 
taking, including gender (Byrnes, Miller, & Schafer, 1999; Wilson & Daly, 1985), age 
(Cavanagh et al., 2012; Defoe, Dubas, Figner, & van Aken, 2015; Josef et al., 2016; 
Mamerow, Frey, & Mata, 2016; Mata, Josef, Samanez-Larkin, & Hertwig, 2011), economic 
status (Payne, Brown-Iannuzzi, & Hannay, 2017), family background (Banducci, Felton, 
Dahne, Ninnemann, & Lejuez, 2015; Kennison, Wood, Byrd-Craven, & Downing, 2016), 
peer relationships (Telzer, Fuligni, Liebermann, Miernicki, & Galvan, 2014), reproductive 
cycle (Sylwester & Pawłowski, 2011), stress (Lighthall, Mather, & Gorlick, 2009), and 
affective state (Shao & Lee, 2014), to name but a few. More recently, the characteristics of 
risk-taking measures, specifically behavioral measures, have become a topic of interest. 
Studies have shown that differences between measures, regarding the format of information, 
the use of decision strategies, as well as the involvement of various cognitive and affective 
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processes, can lead to very different choices and consequently different risk profiles (Figner, 
Mackinlay, Wilkening, & Weber, 2008; Frey, Mata, & Hertwig, 2015; Hertwig & Erev, 2009; 
Mamerow et al., 2016; Mata et al., 2011; Schonberg et al., 2011; Shao & Lee, 2014).  
For many of these factors, the distal mechanisms underlying their association with 
variability in risk taking are still unclear; nonetheless, biological pathways are frequently 
invoked as mediating said relationships. The final biological frontier may be to lay bare the 
genetic architecture of individual differences in risk taking and its mediating role for the 
association between various individual or measure-specific characteristics. Indeed, twin 
studies have estimated the genetic contribution to individual differences in risk taking to 
range between 25% and 50% (Benjamin et al., 2012; Wang, Zheng, Xuan, Chen, & Li, 2016), 
with as many (or as few) as 611 independent genetic loci associated with risk tolerance and 
risky behaviors (Karlsson Linnér et al., 2018). However, the complexity of this enterprise, at 
least for now, means higher-level pathways stand out as promising candidates for studying the 
biological underpinnings of risk preference and risk taking, including neural pathways. 
Neural Structural Correlates of Risk Taking  
Activation differences in the brain in response to risk have been extensively mapped, 
leading to various qualitative and quantitative reviews of the available literature implicating a 
core set of regions in the functional representation of risk and risk taking, including the 
striatum, insular cortex, anterior cingulate cortex, dorsolateral and medial prefrontal cortex 
(Bartra, McGuire, & Kable, 2013; Knutson & Huettel, 2015; Mohr, Biele, & Heekeren, 2010; 
Platt & Huettel, 2008; Wu, Sacchet, & Knutson, 2012). Much less is known about structural 
differences that may contribute to the biological basis of individual differences in risk taking. 
Why might structure play a role for risk taking? For one, because the identification of specific 
genetic loci that are common to different risk-taking domains (Karlsson Linnér et al., 2018) 
potentially hints at the existence of genetic predisposition for a general risk tolerance trait. In 
turn, this genetic predisposition may be expressed not only in how the brain responds and 
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processes risk ‘on the fly’, but is perhaps also expressed in more stable characteristics of the 
neural network, such as structural indices.  
Grey matter volume. One variable which has received some attention in the past is 
grey matter volume (GMV). Studies have suggested a positive correlation between varying 
indices of risk taking and GMV in a range of brain structures, including right insula, 
amygdala, thalamus, orbitofrontal cortex for boys (Peper, Koolschijn, & Crone, 2013), and 
right posterior parietal cortex (Canessa et al., 2013; Gilaie-Dotan et al., 2014; Grubb, Tymula, 
Gilaie-Dotan, Glimcher, & Levy, 2016; Jung, Lee, Lerman, & Kable, 2018; Lin, Lin, & Wu, 
2016; Nasiriavanaki et al., 2015). In contrast, there were no differences in local or global 
GMV between male adolescents classified as high- or low-risk takers, based on either their 
responses to a self-report inventory or their risky choices on a simulated driving test (Kwon, 
Vorobyev, Moe, Parkkola, & Ha, 2014). 
Research on concrete risky behaviors or relevant psychopathologies has also yielded 
informative insights into the structural correlates of risk taking. For example, Cheetham and 
colleagues (2012) observed (lower) orbitofrontal cortex volume at age 12 to predict initiation 
of cannabis use at age 16. Moreover, in a sample of non-alcohol-dependent Japanese men, 
GMV in bilateral frontal gyri was negatively associated with lifetime intake of alcohol (Taki 
et al., 2006). In addition to substance use, research into the structural correlates of behavioral 
addictions has also provided enlightening findings. For example, GMV is higher in 
frontostriatal areas of pathological gamblers compared with controls (Koehler, Hasselmann, 
Wüstenberg, Heinz, & Romanczuk-Seiferth, 2013). For internet gaming disorder, symptom 
severity and deficits in cognitive control are also correlated with increased striatal GMV (Cai 
et al., 2015), but lower GMV in insula, anterior cingulate cortex, precuneus, superior parietal 
cortex, and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (Lin, Dong, Wang, & Du, 2015).  
In summary, GMV seems to be linked with different behavioral indices of risk taking. 
However, it is currently not known to what extent macro level GMV differences result from 
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micro level differences in tissue composition. Grey matter is composed of cell bodies, axon 
terminals, and dendrites, yet it is currently unclear how these neuronal components are linked 
with endophenotypes such as risk-taking behavior. Moreover, the influence of volumetric 
differences could also be limited by regional connectivity. Consider a very straightforward 
example: it has been observed that amygdala GMV is positively correlated with risk tolerance 
and negatively with anxiety (Jung et al., 2018; Milham et al., 2005). However, if an 
amygdala-based anxiety-signal cannot proliferate in the neural network due to compromised 
connections, this anxiety signal will likely be inconsequential. Thus, an understanding of 
structural connectivity differences may provide a fuller picture of the possible mechanisms 
underlying individual difference in risk taking. 
Structural connectivity. In addition to a significant contribution of amygdala GMV, 
Jung and colleagues (2018) also found degree centrality (or node strength) of the bilateral 
amygdala to be predictive of risk tolerance. In the study by Kwon and colleagues (2014), 
which used a simulated driving task to classify adolescent males as high- or low risk-takers, 
high risk-takers were observed to have higher integrity of frontal subgyral white matter (WM) 
than low risk-takers, even though there were no volumetric differences between the two 
groups(Kwon et al., 2014). WM integrity in a prefrontal cortex-insula-midbrain-striatum 
network was also observed as being positively correlated with the number of risky choices in 
the Balloon Analogue Risk Task (Kohno, Morales, Guttman, & London, 2017), whereas 
lower fronto-limbic WM integrity at baseline was predictive of adolescent substance use and 
delinquent/aggressive risk-taking behaviors at 18-months follow up (Jacobus et al., 2013).  
As with GMV, additional insights can be derived from studies involving specific 
(psychopathological) study populations. For example, teenagers with a family history of 
alcohol use disorders are more likely to initiate alcohol consumption during adolescence 
compared with teenagers without such a family history, and the former have been found to 
have higher WM integrity for connections between reward (nucleus accumbens) and salience 
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regions (orbitofrontal cortex) compared with the latter (Squeglia et al., 2015). Moreover, 
comparison of healthy controls with internet gaming addicts also suggest various differences 
in WM integrity that correlate with duration of pathology (Jeong, Han, Kim, Lee, & Renshaw, 
2016).  
In summary, research has started to emerge that studies the connection between the 
structural architecture of the brain and risk taking, yielding some insights into the 
involvement of different regions in individual differences in risk taking. Unfortunately, many 
study designs do not allow for conclusions about structural causes, effects or corollaries of 
pathology, and caution is warranted when interpreting observed links between neural 
structural indices and behavior. Furthermore, the aforementioned studies have applied a 
plethora of risk-taking measures. Recent research has argued that (especially behavioral) risk-
taking measures do not correlate (Frey, Pedroni, Mata, Rieskamp, & Hertwig, 2017), which 
raises the question to what extent brain-behavior associations observed in the literature 
depend on the risk-taking measure itself. In the current study, we attempt to tackle some of 
the shortcomings of previous neuroimaging studies by combining psychometrically derived 
risk preference factors with multi-modal neuroimaging, in order to shed light on the 
association between indices of neural architecture and the psychometric structure of risk 
preference. 
The Current Study 
 The current study is a follow-up to the Basel-Berlin Risk Study (BBRS), a large multi-
site study of individual difference in risk taking that aims to address questions about the 
psychometric structure of risk taking and its biological underpinnings (an overview of all 
subsamples, measures, and further details on the BBRS is reported on https://osf.io/rce7g). 
One key contribution of the BBRS to date has been the extraction of psychometrically derived 
risk preference factors from a comprehensive battery of laboratory-based self-report, 
behavioral and frequency measures of risk taking completed by a large sample of young 
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adults (Frey et al., 2017). Here, we utilize these psychometric factors in order to circumvent 
issues of generalization stemming from the availability and (in some cases it could be argued 
arbitrary, criterion-free) usage of different risk-taking measures. 
Risk preference factors versus single measures. Whilst previous analyses of 
structural brain-behavior associations have relied predominantly on single measures of risk 
preference (Canessa et al., 2013; Grubb et al., 2016; Jung et al., 2018; Kohno et al., 2017; Lin 
et al., 2016; Nasiriavanaki et al., 2015; Peper et al., 2013), several reasons stoked our interest 
in using psychometrically derived factors instead of specific measures.  
One reason for using latent variables is that they present a more principled approach to 
understanding whether neuroanatomy is predictive of individual differences in risk 
preference, compared with brain-behavior associations based on single indices. A vast 
number of risk-taking measures exist (Appelt, Milch, Handgraaf, & Weber, 2011; Aven, 
2012) and many different measures have found application in neuroimaging studies (Knutson 
& Huettel, 2015; Mohr et al., 2010; Wu et al., 2012). However, given the low convergence 
between different risk-taking measures, especially between behavioral measures (Frey et al., 
2017; Pedroni et al., 2017) —implying that different measures cannot be used interchangeably 
and may even yield different life span trajectories (Mamerow et al., 2016; Mata et al., 2011; 
van den Bos & Hertwig, 2017)— previously established links between neural structure and 
risk taking or risk preference may be measure-specific. In other words, neural markers 
predictive of risk-related outcomes in one context may not be predictive of the same outcomes 
in another context. In the first instance, this would limit the utility of neural markers for 
understanding general mechanisms underlying individual differences in risk taking, and in a 
second instance limits their utility as targets for longitudinal (Braams, van Duijvenvoorde, 
Peper, & Crone, 2015; Casey et al., 2018) or pre-/intervention designs (Büchel et al., 2017; 
Cheetham et al., 2012; Conrod et al., 2013). Related to the issue of convergence, but zooming 
in on the measure itself, psychometric factors promise to reflect more error-free and thus 
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more reliable measures of risk preference. For instance, the general risk preference factor R 
extracted by Frey and colleagues (2017) was observed to have a 6-months retest reliability of 
.85, whereas many of the behavioral measures tested yielded retest reliabilities below .5. 
Much like convergence between measures, measurement reliability plays a critical role for 
brain-behavior associations: if the risk-taking measure used is unreliable, any associations 
between neural and behavioral indices are purely contextual and state-dependent, and would 
be unlikely to emerge at retest. Unreliable brain-behavior associations are not only 
uninformative for theoretical purposes but also of limited utility in practice. 
A second reason stems from the finding that the general risk preference factor R 
accounts for 61% of the variance explained by all risk-taking measures (Frey et al., 2017). In 
conjunction with the high stability of R over time, this suggests that R potentially captures the 
trait-dimension of risk taking. If R can be thought of as a trait, it is reasonable to suggest that 
state-independent indices such as neuroanatomical variables fare well in accounting for 
individual differences therein. One of the goals of cognitive neuroscience has become to 
predict behavior, attitudes or outcomes from neuroimaging indices at ever greater remove 
(Braams et al., 2015; Büchel et al., 2017; Cheetham et al., 2012; Poldrack et al., 2018; 
Rosenberg, Casey, & Holmes, 2018), hence ‘trait’-like neural variables such as grey matter 
volume or neural connectivity present attractive target variables to establish such brain-
behavior associations. This is not to say that anatomy is fixed; clearly we expect changes over 
time in the structure of the brain (Koolschijn & Crone, 2013; Sowell, Thompson, & Toga, 
2004). However, anatomical variables are not (as) susceptible to the influence of contextual 
factors which may play a role for brain-behavior associations based on neural functional 
indices, including on-task activation differences (Tisdall et al., submitted) and off-task resting 
state connectivity (Grigg & Grady, 2010). 
A third reason for using factors concerns the domain-specificity of some of the factors. 
In addition to the general risk preference factor R, Frey and colleagues (2017) extracted seven 
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domain-specific risk preference factors which (due to being orthogonal) explained additional 
unique variance across the battery of risk-taking measures used. One of these domain-specific 
factors was composed of only behavioral measures of risk preference, including various types 
of risky gambles presented in the form of (monetary) lotteries. Importantly, many insights 
into brain-behavior associations using structural indices come not only from single risk-taking 
indices, but they also come predominantly from studies that have used variants of (monetary) 
lotteries or similar risk-laden decision scenarios (Canessa et al., 2013; Gilaie-Dotan et al., 
2014; Jung et al., 2018; C. S. Lin et al., 2016). Using the BBRS risk preference factors, any 
associations between previously identified regions included in this study and the risk 
preference factor composed of lottery measures (F7) would provide a conceptual replication. 
Multi-modal imaging. It has been argued that function follows form, and that different 
functional networks in the brain map more or less directly onto the structural connectome 
(Horn, Ostwald, Reisert, & Blankenburg, 2014). The idea to combine imaging modalities to 
better understand individual differences in risk taking, especially the extent to which different 
functional and structural characteristics of the brain individually and in concert shape risky 
choice, has been appreciated for some time (Canessa et al., 2013; Jung et al., 2018; Kohno et 
al., 2017; Leong, Pestilli, Wu, Samanez-Larkin, & Knutson, 2016; C. S. Lin et al., 2016). For 
example, Kohno, Morales, Guttman and London (2017) studied risk taking in the widely-used 
Balloon Analogue Risk Task (Lejuez et al., 2002) using both functional and diffusion-
weighted imaging. The results suggested that a core set of regions with established functional 
correlates in the task (including striatum, insula, prefrontal cortex and midbrain) are also 
structurally implicated: the higher the integrity of white-matter tracts in a risk network 
comprising striatum, insula, prefrontal cortex and midbrain, the more risky choices 
individuals made on the task. In another recent example, Jung, Lee, Lerman and Kable (2018) 
combined anatomical with resting state imaging to understand individual differences in risk 
tolerance on a monetary lottery task. A combination of amygdala grey matter volume and the 
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functional connectivity (at rest) between amygdala and the medial prefrontal cortex was 
observed to explain 27% of common variance in risk tolerance, whereas individually both 
indices explained only 10% and 19% of variance, respectively.  
On the one hand, these findings highlight the need to expand the neural risk network 
to include the amygdala, a region which so far —perhaps due to signal drop out in subcortical 
regions as a function of scanning parameters selected to maximize signal associated with 
higher-order cognitive processes in cortical regions— has not received as much attention as 
for instance the striatum, frontal cortex and insula (Knutson & Huettel, 2015; Mohr et al., 
2010; Platt & Huettel, 2008). On the other hand, these findings clearly demonstrate the 
benefit of multi-modal imaging for explaining additional variance and formulating 
predictions. Whether or not to include additional modalities in a neuroimaging study will 
largely depend on a cost-benefit analysis of additional scanning time against additional 
variance explained. Jung and colleagues’ (2018) results suggest that adding some modalities 
to the model of risk tolerance can indeed lead to a better understanding not only of individual 
neural predictors, but ultimately also their respective roles, interaction and mutual influence 
within a neural network that contributes to individual differences in risk taking.  
In the current study, we combine volumetry and structural connectomics to examine 
the extent to which different anatomical (i.e. off-task, context-independent) aspects of the 
neural risk network account for individual differences in risk preference factors. As discussed 
above, previous studies have observed both grey matter volume and structural connectivity 
indices to account for risky choice. Our unique contribution is threefold. (1) Using both 
volumetric and connectivity indices, we try to predict psychometrically derived risk 
preference factors given their discussed advantages over single measures. (2) We examine the 
contribution of individual regions within a comprehensive neural risk network which we built 
using meta-analytical procedures implemented via Neurosynth. (3) We supplement the 
traditional approach using multiple regression analyses with Bayesian model comparison to 
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quantify the evidence for a specific model (i.e. neural index) having generated the risk 
preference factor over a baseline model. Taken together, we view our contribution as a well-
powered conceptual replication attempt of previous findings as well as the discovery of 
potentially new links between neural structure and risk preference. 
Materials and Method 
Participants 
Participants of this study were members of the “imaging subsample” of the Basel-
Berlin Risk Study (BBRS; https://osf.io/rce7g), a multi-site study investigating individual 
differences in risk preference in a large sample of young adults via collection of multiple 
measures of risk preference (N=1507; about 50% of the sample tested at each site). For the 
“imaging subsample”, 133 healthy young adults were recruited at the Berlin site for 
participation in a neuroimaging study investigating the neural correlates of individual 
differences in risk preference (i.e., as a follow-up to the main lab session of the BBRS; see 
https://osf.io/rce7g for an overview of all subsamples). The final sample size reflects 
oversampling to achieve an effective sample size of N=100 (Yarkoni, 2009). To be eligible 
for participation, individuals were required to have completed the BBRS laboratory session, 
be right-handed, and be free of any contraindications concerning health and safety inside the 
MR scanner (e.g. permanent (electrical) implants, usage of psychoactive substances or 
medications, neurological or psychiatric conditions). Two individuals ended their 
participation before any neuroimaging data was acquired, hence these two individuals were 
removed from all analyses. A further seven participants aborted the MRI session early, which 
meant diffusion-weighted imaging sequences could not be acquired for these individuals. The 
final sample for all volumetric analyses thus comprises 131 individuals (69 females, mean age 
at scan = 25.3 years, SD = 2.6 years, range = 20.4 to 30.2 years), and for all structural 
connectivity analyses the final sample comprises 124 individuals (66 females, mean age at 
scan = 25.3 years, SD = 2.6 years, range = 20.4 to 30.1 years).  
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All participants provided written informed consent. Ethical approval for this study was 
granted by the German Society for Psychology (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Psychologie), and 
the ethics committee of the Max Planck Institute for Human Development. 
Risk preference factors 
As indices of risk preference in the current study, we utilized psychometric factors that 
were extracted across 39 widely used risk-taking measures collected from the full BBRS 
sample (for a comprehensive list of measures and details on latent variable modeling analyses, 
see (Frey et al., 2017). The implemented bifactor model gave rise to a general risk preference 
factor, R (akin to the general factor of intelligence) that captured 61% of the explained 
variance across risk-taking measures, and seven specific orthogonal factors that captured 
additional domain- or situation-specific variance. These seven factors were suggested to 
represent attitudes and behaviors associated with health risk taking (F1), financial risk taking 
(F2), recreational risk taking (F3), impulsivity (F4), traffic risk taking (F5), occupational risk 
taking (F6), and choices among (monetary) lotteries (F7).  
Experimental procedure 
Details concerning the laboratory component of the BBRS, including individual 
measures and study protocol, are reported by Frey and colleagues (2017). For the MRI study, 
individuals who had completed the BBRS (Berlin-site) were contacted via phone and 
informed about the follow-up MRI session. Individuals who expressed an interest in 
participating in the MRI session were screened for any conditions or circumstances 
preventing them from entering the scanner, and were preliminarily included in the MRI study. 
Due to a temporal overlap between the end of behavioral data collection in the laboratory and 
the start of the MRI component, individuals were contacted with varying delays after having 
completed the BBRS laboratory component. As a result, the MRI sample was heterogeneous 
with regards to the delay between the laboratory and MRI session (mean delay = 196 days, 
SD = 121 days, range = 1 to 453 days). 
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On the day of the MRI session, participants were once again checked for MRI 
contraindications, fully informed about the study protocol and prepared for the scanner. 
Participants also completed brief training runs for the tasks completed inside the scanner, as 
part of functional analyses not included in the current analyses (Tisdall et al., submitted). The 
full MRI protocol took around 75 minutes, and included a high-resolution structural scan, four 
functional runs, a resting state scan and a diffusion-weighted imaging sequence. Given our 
aim to investigate the structural correlates of the psychometric structure of risk preference in 
this study, we only used data coming from the high-resolution structural scan for volumetric 
analyses and diffusion-weighted imaging data for structural connectivity analyses. The 
functional and resting state sequences were not included in the current project, hence are not 
discussed further. The order of the MRI sequences was fixed for all participants. Following 
the scan, individuals responded to demographic questions (date of birth, gender, marital 
status, educational attainment, native language and current occupation). Following the MRI 
session, we collected demographic data from the participants, including their age, gender, 
marital status, and educational background. Furthermore, individuals completed several 
questionnaires and a verbal fluency task; these measures were part of a separate project (i.e. 
these additional measures were not used for the current analyses) and are thus not discussed 
further. 
 At the end of the MRI session, individuals received their participation fee of 25 Euro 
(1 Euro ~ 1.1 USD), and any additional earnings achieved based on performance in the two 
MRI paradigms used to address the functional neural correlates of risk preference (Tisdall et 
al., submitted). On average, participants in the MRI session were paid 41.50 Euro (SD=14.50 
Euro) for their participation.  
Regions of interest 
We focused our investigation on neural regions of interest (ROIs) which we identified 
via Neurosynth meta-analysis (http://neurosynth.org/analyses/terms/risk/, accessed December 
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7, 2016) as core neural correlates of the search term ‘risk’. At the time of the Neurosynth 
search, close to 500 individual studies contributed to the statistical parametric map of clusters 
associated with the search term ‘risk’. We selected voxels identified via forward inference as 
consistently activated in studies given the term ‘risk’, rather than voxels which reverse 
inference indicates as preferentially associated with the term ‘risk’ (Yarkoni, Poldrack, 
Nichols, Van Essen, & Wager, 2011). Reverse inference maps are commonly preferred over 
forward inference maps, as the former are more diagnostic of the search term and thus more 
specific to a particular cognitive process, whereas the latter are usually more inclusive and 
thus may include incidental activations (Yarkoni et al., 2011). For this study however, we 
were interested in the forward inference maps, considering the plethora of definitions, 
measures and processes connected with risk preferences (Appelt et al., 2011; Dohmen et al., 
2011; Schonberg et al., 2011). For example, depending on the adopted definition and 
measurement of risk, affective components might be incidental or central components of risk 
preference (Figner, Mackinlay, Wilkening, & Weber, 2009; Samanez-Larkin & Knutson, 
2015). Thus, to capture the diversity of processes connected with the search term, we based 
all our analyses on activation in voxels yielded by forward inference, from ‘risk’ to brain 
regions.  
The resulting z-score map (corrected for multiple comparisons with a false discovery 
rate of 0.01 and containing only positive activations) was smoothed (3x3x3 full-width at half 
maximum kernel) to increase the signal to noise ratio, followed by application of thresholding 
and clustering procedures to identify suitable clusters of activated voxels. The final binary 
‘risk’ parcellation contained 18 regions (Figure 1), including eight bilateral (amygdala, 
ventral striatum, thalamus, anterior insular cortex, precentral gyrus, superior lateral occipital 
cortex, superior parietal lobule/angular gyrus, and middle frontal gyrus), and two medial 
(paracingulate gyrus, precuneus) regions. These 18 regions served both as ROIs for 
morphometry analyses and nodes for structural connectivity analyses. In line with the idea of 
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presenting a conceptual replication of past findings, many regions which previous studies 
have identified as being linked to risk-taking indices are included in the risk network derived 
from Neurosynth, including amygdala, thalamus, parietal regions and insula (Canessa et al., 
2013; Gilaie-Dotan et al., 2014; Jung et al., 2018; C. S. Lin et al., 2016). 
MRI data acquisition and image preprocessing 
All neuroimaging data was collected on a 3T Siemens MRI system with 12-channel 
head coil at the Magnetic Resonance Imaging Laboratory at the Max Planck Institute for 
Human Development (Berlin, Germany). We acquired high-resolution T1-weighted images 
via a standard magnetization-prepared rapid gradient echo (MP-RAGE) sequence (repetition 
time = 2500ms; echo time = 4.77ms; inversion time = 1100ms; flip angle = 7º; FoV = 256 x 
256 mm2; 192 slices; voxel size = 1 x 1 x 1 mm3). Structural connectivity data was acquired 
via one diffusion-weighted imaging (DWI) sequence (transverse orientation; 69 slices; voxel 
size = 2.0 x 2.0 x 2.0 mm3; 61 diffusion directions; TR=10s; TE=94ms; TA=684s).  
Preprocessing of MRI data for morphometry analyses. Preprocessing of the T1-
weighted images prior to statistical analysis was performed using the Computational Anatomy 
Toolbox (CAT12; http://www.neuro.uni-jena.de/cat/) implemented in SPM12 (Functional 
Imaging Laboratory, Wellcome Department of Imaging Neuroscience, London; 
www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm), and comprised the following six steps: (1) Segmentation of 
individuals’ images into grey matter, white matter, and cerebrospinal fluid components, (2) 
spatial normalization to Montreal Neurological Institute space using diffeometric anatomical 
registration through exponentiated lie algebra (DARTEL) normalization, (3) removal of noise 
using the default procedures implemented in CAT12, (4) performance of quality checks 
including inspection of the segmentation and normalization results via display of the same 
slice for all images, and screening for outliers by visualizing the covariance between volumes, 
(5) smoothing of the grey matter images with a 8mm (full-width half-maximum) Gaussian 
kernel, and (6) computation of total intracranial volume for every individual.  
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The workflow created normalized modulated grey matter images, which allow for the 
comparison of absolute amount of grey matter tissue. For ROI analyses, mean grey matter 
volume (GMV) was extracted for the 18 ROIs included in the risk parcellation. All 
subsequent statistical analyses included total intracranial volume to control for individual 
differences in absolute brain size. 
Preprocessing of MRI data for structural connectivity analyses. For analyses of 
diffusion-weighted imaging data, we used the structural connectivity analysis pipeline 
implemented in LEAD Connectome v2.1.0 (http://www.lead-connectome.org; (Horn & 
Blankenburg, 2016; Horn et al., 2014)). The Gibbs ringing removal tool was applied to dMRI 
data (Kellner, Dhital, & Reisert, 2016). To estimate a whole-brain fiber-set, a white-matter 
mask was estimated based on the T1-image using the Unified Segmentation approach 
(Ashburner & Friston, 2005) as implemented in SPM12, followed by the sampling of 
individual fibers within the white matter mask (co-registered to the b0-images). After initial 
co-registration and spatial normalization of T1 and b0 anatomical volumes into MNI space 
(using the MNI 152 NLIN Asym 2009b template), a whole-brain fiber set of 500’000 tracks 
was estimated by seeding randomly from each voxel in the white matter mask, using the 
Generalized q-Sampling Imaging approach (GQI; Yeh, Wedeen, & Tseng, 2010) as 
implemented in DSI-Studio (http://dsi-studio.labsolver.org). This model-free approach 
computes the orientational distribution of the density of diffusing water. Notably, the 
described procedure represents an established and automated default pathway implemented in 
Lead-Connectome (Darby, Laganiere, Pascual-Leone, Prasad, & Fox, 2017; Fox et al., 2014; 
Horn, Kühn, et al., 2017; Horn, Reich, et al., 2017; Horn, Neumann, Degen, Schneider, & 
Kühn, 2017). 
Also implemented in LEAD Connectome, we computed degree centrality as our local 
connectivity measure of interest for the 18 nodes contained in the risk parcellation map. 
Nodal degree centrality is a graph-theoretic metric indicative of how central a particular node 
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is in a network (Rubinov & Sporns, 2010), the neurobiological interpretation being that nodes 
with a high degree of centrality are linked to (and thus are potentially interacting with) many 
other nodes in the network. Mathematically, degree centrality is calculated as the sum of all 
direct connections between a given node and the remaining nodes in the network: the more 
direct connections (i.e. the more first neighbors), the more central a node is in a network. As 
such, nodal degree centrality represents a simple yet highly informative local connectomic 
indicator, which we used in all subsequent analyses pertaining to structural connectivity.  
Statistical analyses 
All statistical analyses were performed in the software R (R Core Team, 2014) and aimed 
to identify the explanatory power of neuroanatomical substrates for individual differences in 
risk preference, measured as latent variables (i.e. general and specific factors of risk 
preference). To ensure that the values for the general and the seven specific factors observed 
for the MRI sample were representative of the relationships between factors observed in the 
full BBRS sample, we computed zero-order correlations and compared these with the 
correlations reported by Frey and colleagues (2017). Distributions of factor values and neural 
structural indices were plotted to determine the validity of parametric statistical approaches 
for factors as outcome measures, and to identify any potential outliers which might unduly 
influence the results. Given that we used two sets of neural predictors derived from the same 
unit (i.e., the brain), we computed zero-order correlation coefficients between all volumetric 
(GMV) and between all connectivity (degree centrality) indices to test for multicollinearity. 
For those individuals contained in both the volumetric and the connectivity analyses, we also 
computed correlation coefficients for the association between volume and connectivity of a 
given ROI (node) to test for multicollinearity between local GMV and degree centrality, 
respectively.  
In a first step, we used a traditional approach to estimate the proportion of variance in 
inter-individual differences in risk preference that can be accounted for by individual 
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differences in neuroanatomy, assessed as local mean GMV and nodal degree centrality. To 
this end, for each of the eight psychometric factors we estimated a) a full model regressing the 
factor of risk preference factor on all indices of GMV and nodal degree centrality; and b) two 
separate models only including either the indices of GMV or the indices of nodal degree 
centrality, in order to investigate how much (more) variance in risk preference can be 
captured by information about volumetric and connectivity. For this first set of analyses, we 
report adjusted R-squared and alpha for every model. To account for the increase in the rate 
of false positives as a result of running a large number of regression models, we report which 
of the nominally significant results remain significant after adoption of a family-wise error 
rate. Specifically, we maintained an alpha level of .05 within each set of analyses involving 
combined, volumetric, and connectivity indices for a total of eight factors, yielding an alpha 
level for these first analyses of .05/8 = .00625. For significant associations between the risk 
preference factors and GMV, we employed multiple regression analyses (controlling for total 
intracranial volume, age and gender) to test whether ROI regions would also show significant 
effects at the level of the whole brain. 
In a second step, we assessed the robustness of these linear regression results, and in 
particular focused on the contribution of each neural index to the overall amount of variance 
explained in risk preference. For this, we pursued a Bayesian approach to model comparison 
and model selection using the BayesFactor package in R (Morey & Rouder, 2015). Model 
comparisons based on Bayes factors provide a likelihood for a specific model over a baseline 
model given the data. In our context, we implemented all models consisting of only one 
neural index as predictor and tested these models’ likelihoods over an intercept-only model. 
Thereby, the resulting Bayes factors are indicative of the importance of each single predictor.   
Prior to analysis, all predictor (GMV, degree centrality) variables were z-standardized and 
regressed onto age and gender. Accounting for overall brain size in our volumetric analyses, 
we also regressed mean grey matter volume in the 18 risk network ROIs on total intracranial 
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volume. The risk preference factors were extracted from z-standardized measures, thus were 
already on a comparable scale, and were introduced into the current analyses as residuals after 
regressing out age, gender and test site of the BBRS laboratory session.  
Results 
Distribution of neural structural indices and BBRS risk preference factors 
 Initial inspection of the distribution of GMV and degree centrality revealed an 
approximately normal distribution for GMV but also identified one outlier in amygdala 
connectivity (6.5 SDs and 4.6 SDs above the mean for degree centrality in right and left 
amygdala, respectively). Transformation approaches were unsuccessful in removing the 
influence of this observation, hence we excluded this individual from connectivity analyses 
and from analyses of volume and connectivity combined. As shown in Figure 2, correlations 
between the two hemispheres of bilaterally represented structures were high for both GMV 
(mean correlation between hemispheres of 8 ROIs r =.74, SD=0.24) and for degree centrality 
(mean correlation between hemispheres of 8 nodes r=.72, SD=0.14). To account for the 
observed multicollinearity between predictors, we computed a mean GMV score and a mean 
degree centrality score across the two hemispheres for every individual and proceeded with 
analyses including 10 regions (Figure 3).  
All risk preference factors were approximately normally distributed in both samples 
(Figure 4), justifying parametric statistical analyses. Pearson correlations between factors 
(Figure 5) were comparable to the correlation coefficients observed by Frey and colleagues 
(2017) and indicated orthogonality between the risk preference factors. Moreover, we 
obtained no significant associations between GMV and degree centrality in a given region 
(range of correlation coefficients r=-.08 to .17, all p>.05), suggesting these to be 
(neurobiologically) independent indices that warrant separate as well as combined 
examination.  
Brain – behavior associations 
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We now turn to the results from analyses assessing the link between neural structure 
and psychometric (risk preference) factors. First, we report the results from multiple linear 
regression analyses aimed at estimating the amount of common variance in risk preference 
factors accounted for by volumetric indices, connectivity indices, and volumetric and 
connectivity indices combined. Regression coefficients are reported as standardized 
coefficients and the percentage of variance explained is based on adjusted R-squared (R^2). 
In a second step, we report the results from a model comparison approach to better understand 
the (robustness of the) contribution of individual structural markers for risk preference. For 
this second set of analyses, we report Bayes factors quantifying the likelihood of one model 
over an intercept model given the data. 
Multiple regression analyses. Reported in Table 1 are the results from a first set of 
analyses aimed at estimating common variance in risk preference factors captured by 
individual differences in neural structure. Specifically, we found that volumetric indices alone 
accounted for almost 9 percent of variance in R (R^2=.087, p=.02), connectivity indices alone 
accounted for 5% of variance (R^2=.051, p=.10) and both volumetric and connectivity indices 
combined explained over 15 percent of variance in R (R^2=.152, p=.009). At the level of 
individual predictors, for the model containing only volumetric indices, only mean GMV in 
ventral striatum was significantly predictive of R (b=0.39, SE=0.13, t=2.93, p=.004). Despite 
the overall non-significance of the model containing only connectivity indices, at the level of 
individual predictors, degree centrality of amygdala emerged as significantly associated with 
R (b=0.32, SE=0.11, t=2.85, p=.005), as well as degree centrality of thalamus (b=-0.39, 
SE=0.16, t=-2.40, p=.018) and precuneus (b=0.37, SE=0.18, t=2.00, p=.049). For the model 
containing both volumetric and connectivity indices, GMV in ventral striatum (b=0.32, 
SE=0.15, t=2.21, p=.029), degree centrality of the amygdala (b=0.25, SE=0.11, t=2.19, 
p=.031), and degree centrality of the precuneus(b=-0.33, SE=0.16, t=-2.01, p=.047) remained 
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significant predictors of R. In addition, we observed GMV in the ROI covering lateral frontal 
cortex (b=-0.34, SE=0.17, t=-2.01, p=.047) to also be significantly predictive of R.  
In contrast to the findings for the general risk preference factors, structural indices 
appear to bear no relation to differences in situation or domain-specific risk factors (F1 to F7). 
As a likely reflection of the small effect sizes revealed by ROI analyses, whole brain 
regression analyses did not reveal significant associations at voxel-level between grey matter 
volume and the general risk preference factor. Moreover, although the effects of neural 
volume as well as neural volume and connectivity combined on R survived the false positive 
threshold of p<.05, they did not survive family-wise error correction thresholds. However, by 
employing model comparisons based on Bayes factors in the next step, we achieved a test of 
the contribution of neural structural markers to general risk preference independently of an 
alpha increase due to multiple comparisons.  
  Model comparison with individual predictors. To assess the independent 
contribution of neural structural markers to individual differences in risk preference, we ran a 
model comparison of individual predictors using Bayes factor analysis. Specifically, a Bayes 
factor of 1 indicates that the tested model is as likely as the intercept model to have generated 
the data, whereas a value above 1 would indicate the tested model is more likely to have 
generated the data than the intercept model. Several models turned out to obtain positive 
(strong?) evidence that the respective neural markers are predictive for inter-individual 
differences in R, namely (Figures 6 and 7): ventral striatal GMV (BF=5.93, R^2=5.2%), 
frontal GMV (BF=2.70, R^2=3.9%), superior frontal gyrus GMV (BF=2.39, R^2=3.7%), 
amygdala degree centrality (BF=1.97 R^2=3.3%), and precuneus degree centrality (BF=1.06 
R^2=2.2%). In other words, compared with an intercept model, a model containing ventral 
striatal GMV is close to 6 times as likely to have generated the observed general risk factor 
values, and a model containing amygdala degree centrality almost twice as likely. 
Interestingly, our analyses for R revealed Bayes factors below 1 –suggestive of the tested 
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model being less likely than the intercept model to have generated the observed outcome 
variable data– for regions which have previously been reported to be associated with a variety 
of risk-taking measures, including GMV in amygdala, insula and parietal cortex (Gilaie-
Dotan et al., 2014; Jung et al., 2018; C. S. Lin et al., 2016; Nasiriavanaki et al., 2015).  
Discussion 
The aim of the current study was to estimate the contribution of neural structure to 
individual differences in risk preference. To overcome some of the limitations of previous 
studies, including the use of single measures of neural structure and risk taking, we used 
multi-modal imaging and psychometrically derived risk preference factors, focusing 
specifically on regions of interest which meta-analytical procedures suggested as core neural 
correlates of ‘risk’. Our results suggest that neural structure can explain variance in risk 
preference, but also that this depends on the structural index used, as well as whether we try 
to account for general or domain-specific risk preference. Volumetric indices alone explained 
almost 9% of variance in the general risk preference factor R. Though degree centrality as an 
indicator of local connectivity alone only accounted for a small (5%) amount of variance, in 
combination with volumetric indices over 15% in common variance in general risk preference 
was explained.  
Contribution of variability in neural structures to individual differences in risk 
preference 
At the level of individual predictors, Bayesian model comparison yielded evidence in 
support of GMV in ventral striatum as an influential predictor of general risk preference, 
individually accounting for over 5% of common variance in R. In particular, we observed a 
positive association between GMV in ventral striatum and R, which falls in line with 
observations of increased frontostriatal volume in pathological gamblers and internet gaming 
addicts (Cai et al., 2015; Koehler et al., 2013). Functionally, the ventral striatum has a 
dominant role in reward-related processes (Hare, O’Doherty, Camerer, Schultz, & Rangel, 
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2008; Knutson & Huettel, 2015; Mohr et al., 2010; Wu et al., 2012), thus our findings of a 
positive association between ventral striatal GMV and general risk preference support and 
extend the proposition of reward-sensitivity as a key component of risk taking to the structural 
domain. Interestingly, our findings for ventral striatal GMV are mirrored by research on 
pathologies, but not by studies investigating the neural structural correlates of risk taking in 
healthy adults using behavioral risk-taking measures, such as monetary lotteries or the 
Balloon Analogue Risk Task (Canessa et al., 2017; Gilaie-Dotan et al., 2014; Jung et al., 
2018; Nasiriavanaki et al., 2015). One explanation for this pattern of results resides in the 
interpretation of R. The general risk preference factor captures common variance across all 
risk-taking measures adopted in the Basel-Berlin Risk Study (BBRS), it accounts for over 
60% of the explained variance, and has high retest reliability (Frey et al., 2017). 
Consequently, R may represent the trait dimension of risk preference. With this in mind, the 
trait dimension may predispose an individual to (psycho)pathology, and the domain-specific 
components may drive the concrete expression of aberrant behaviors (e.g. pathological 
gambling). Thus, R and pathology may share biological substrates. It is unfortunately not 
possible to test this hypothesis within the scope of the BBRS, because the sample comprises 
only healthy young adults who are free of neurological or psychiatric disorders. However, in 
principle, gaining an understanding of the extent to which R is implicated in and shares 
biological substrates with pathology would substantially boost our understanding of this risk 
taking.  
In addition to ventral striatal GMV, we also obtained evidence for a contribution to 
general risk preference by GMV in lateral frontal cortices, and superior frontal gyrus, each 
explaining around 3% of common variance. The negative associations observed for lateral 
frontal cortices and superior frontal gyrus with risk preference support previous results 
implicating smaller frontal volume in the commencement of cannabis usage in adolescence 
(Cheetham et al., 2012), lifetime intake of alcohol (Taki et al., 2006) and internet gaming 
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disorder (X. Lin et al., 2015). As with ventral striatal GMV, our results fall in line with 
findings from studies of pathological samples. One possible route from smaller frontal 
volume to higher risk preference is to consider the predominant involvement of fronto-parietal 
networks in control processes, including the inhibition of (motor) responses (Hampshire & 
Sharp, 2015); we return to the role of the frontal cortex below. 
For the connectivity indices, we obtained some evidence for degree centrality of 
amygdala and precuneus; the latter’s contribution barely extended beyond the intercept 
model, thus we will not speculate on the role of precuneus for general risk preference and 
instead await studies which provide further evidence for the importance of this neural 
structure. In contrast, the observed positive association between amygdala degree centrality 
and general risk preference mirrors recent findings for risk tolerance reported by Jung and 
colleagues (2018). In their study, amygdala centrality in isolation was predictive of risk 
tolerance, but this effect did not remain significant in a model containing volumetric and 
functional connectivity indices (Jung et al., 2018). In our study, amygdala centrality was 
observed to account for less variance in general risk preference as reported for risk tolerance 
(3.3% versus 7%, respectively). However, the fact that we obtained evidence for amygdala 
centrality for a risk preference factor psychometrically derived from a large battery of risk-
taking measures, could be taken to suggest that amygdala connectivity does indeed play a role 
for risk taking, regardless of the index used. As such, this strengthens our earlier 
recommendation to reserve a place for the amygdala on the neural correlates of risk’s most 
wanted list. The amygdala has been implicated in fear processing as well as various anxiety-
related pathologies (Davis, 1992; Ledoux, 2003; Milham et al., 2005), and as such may 
indeed play a central role for risk taking in the course of stimuli being evaluated as potentially 
threatening or inciting fear. A well-connected amygdala not only facilitates fear-related 
signals to travel through the neural risk network, but it also receives control signals from the 
(pre)frontal cortex (Aron, Robbins, & Poldrack, 2014; Hampshire, 2015; Hampshire & Sharp, 
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2015). This fronto-limbic feedback loop may ameliorate the initial evaluation of a threatening 
stimulus, for example by inhibiting / dampening somatic markers. Corroborating the role of a 
well-connected amygdala in risk preference, Jung and colleagues (2018) found off-task 
functional connectivity between amygdala and the medial prefrontal cortex to be positively 
associated with risk tolerance. 
Failed conceptual replication: Implications for research on risk taking 
Interestingly, and somewhat against our expectations, structural indices were not 
predictive of domain-specific factors, including F7. Considering that this factor comprises 
behavioral measures most often used in (neuroimaging) research on risk, such as monetary 
lotteries (Frey et al., 2017), we expected to find some overlap between our results and 
previously identified structural correlates of risk for F7, including volume in posterior parietal 
cortex, amygdala, thalamus, and insula (Canessa et al., 2013; Gilaie-Dotan et al., 2014; Grubb 
et al., 2016; Jung et al., 2018; Nasiriavanaki et al., 2015). What does our failed attempt at a 
conceptual replication imply for the robustness of previously identified neural structural 
correlates of risk taking?  
We suggest that the lack of an overlap between the current study and previous work 
highlights the gap between behavioral measures of risk taking (Frey et al., 2017; Mamerow et 
al., 2016; Mata et al., 2011; Pedroni et al., 2017; Sharma et al., 2014) and the contextual 
specificity of established biomarkers for risk taking. For example, some (behavioral) risk-
taking measures rely heavily on the representation and processing of numbers, especially 
outcome magnitudes and probabilities. One seemingly robust finding in the literature is the 
positive association between GMV in right posterior parietal cortex and risk tolerance as 
assessed using monetary lotteries (Gilaie-Dotan et al., 2014; Grubb et al., 2016). Feeding the 
reported peak coordinates for right posterior parietal cortex (MNI-space, x=27, y=-78, z=48) 
into meta-analytic procedures on Neurosynth (neurosynth.org), the term describing cognitive 
processes for these coordinates with the highest posterior probability was indeed ‘numerical’ 
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(P(term|coordinates)=0.86, z=4.6), followed by ‘navigation’ (P(term|coordinates)=0.87, 
z=4.42). We acknowledge that these terms are associated with voxel activations rather than 
structural indices, but they provide a first principled approach to identifying associated 
candidate cognitive processes. Different measures place different demands on the individual, 
and whilst they may all have a ‘risk-taking tag’, some measures may differentiate individuals 
first and foremost based on cognitive capacity or affective components rather than risk 
preference (Figner et al., 2009; Frey et al., 2015; Hertwig & Erev, 2009; Mata et al., 2011). 
Thus, it is possible that the reported association between risk tolerance and the right posterior 
parietal cortex really is an association between numerical ability and right posterior parietal 
cortex (Gilaie-Dotan et al., 2014; Grubb et al., 2016). 
Importantly, our results do not suggest that previously established brain-behavior 
associations are false positives. Instead, our results imply that trying to generalize findings 
obtained using one measure is, at best, difficult given the low convergence between measures 
(Frey et al., 2017; Mamerow et al., 2016; Pedroni et al., 2017). In the worst case, attempts at 
generalization are misleading and hindering progress because we may believe that an 
established link addresses a phenotype as a whole, when in actual fact the link is contextual 
and measure-specific. Akin to research on the role of hormones for sensation seeking and 
reward sensitivity in adolescence (Harden et al., 2017), our approach to risk preference as a 
latent construct ambitiously tries to break away from single indices, instead addressing the 
phenotype as a whole. 
Limitations 
Even by combining volumetric and connectivity indices we explained a maximum of 
15% of variance in the general risk preference factor. Perhaps we are missing vital portions of 
variance by using additive linear models which do not include interaction terms. In a complex 
neural network, regional characteristics are likely to interact. While the current study is 
underpowered for an exhaustive search of the best possible model in the (theoretically) 
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complete model space, it is also questionable whether any such model, including interaction 
terms, is interpretable or informative. At present, it may be more critical to understand the 
building blocks of our models, which includes how best to measure the outcome variable (i.e. 
risk taking) and understand the extent to which different neural indices (e.g. functional, 
structural) contribute to our understanding of individual differences.  
On a related note, we are seeking to explain variance in a risk preference factor that 
represents -to a large degree- variance across self-report inventories. If there was a mismatch 
between what individuals report (and thus makes up R) and what they actually do in real life, 
neural indices would be hard-pressed to account for variance in such a factor. However, self-
report inventories and frequency items in the Basel-Berlin Risk Study were moderately 
correlated, suggesting that what people do and what they say does not substantially diverge. 
Given that we were only able to look at GMV at the macro level, we refrain from 
speculating about the microstructural mechanisms driving the aforementioned relationships. 
Grey matter comprises cell bodies, axon terminals and dendrites, which in turn play different 
roles for neuronal signaling. How different neuronal components and their functions relate to 
risk-taking behavior and attitudes is however at present not understood. Thus, by looking at 
macro level characteristics such as GMV we only discover associations, but not the 
underlying mechanisms. This however is crucial for bridging the gap between different 
variables and risk taking using biological pathways and ultimately understanding the 
biological basis of risk preference. 
Conclusion 
By combining multi-modal imaging with psychometrically informed risk preference 
factors, we hope to contribute to the growing field of research on inter-and intra-individual 
differences in risk taking. For a phenotype with potentially grave consequences, we still know 
comparatively little about how best to measure it, which / how different factors influence risk 
taking, what its biological underpinnings are, and whether / how an understanding of 
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individual differences can help with prevention and intervention efforts. We present a first 
step in this direction by looking past the narrow scope of single measures, whilst encouraging 
others to follow suit. Beyond the current phenotype of interest and intended as a general 
recommendation for cognitive neuroscience, mapping the convergence of different (neural) 
indices will provide a basic scientific understanding of the organization of the human mind 
and brain that exceeds the sum of its parts.  
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FIGURES 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Risk mask used for extraction of mean grey matter volume for volumetric 
analyses and as nodes for connectivity analyses. 
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Figure 2. Correlation matrix of neuroanatomical indices in risk network. Upper 
triangle reflects Pearson correlation coefficients for associations between GMV in 18 risk 
network ROIs. Lower triangle reflects Pearson correlation coefficients for associations 
between degree centrality in 18 risk network nodes. 
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Figure 3. Frequency distribution of neuroanatomical indices in the risk network. 
Distribution of mean grey matter volume (N=131, upper two rows), and distribution of nodal 
degree centrality (N=123, lower two rows). 
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Figure 4. Frequency distribution of risk preference factors (N=131).  
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Figure 5. Pearson correlation coefficients for associations between risk preference 
factors (N=131). Note: As expected, correlations between risk preference factors for the 
connectivity subsample (N=123) were almost identical to those obtained from the full sample 
(mean correlation between factor correlation matrices obtained from volumetric sample and 
from connectivity sample r=.99, p<.001). 
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Figure 6. Bayes factor model comparison for all volumetric and connectivity indices 
as predictors of the general risk preference factor (N=123). All models were compared against 
an intercept model. A value of 1 indicates the tested model to be as likely as the intercept 
model to have generated the observed values of the outcome variable. Note: dc=degree 
centrality, gm=grey matter volume, vstria=ventral striatum, amyg=amygdala, ipl=inferior 
parietal lobule, dmpfc=dorsomedial prefrontal cortex, sfg=superior frontal gyrus, 
thal=thlalamus 
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Figure 7. Scatterplots showing the association between general risk preference factor 
R and the five structural markers favored by model comparison as more likely generators of 
individual differences in risk preference than an intercept model. GMV = mean grey matter 
volume. 
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TABLES 
 
Table 1. Results from multiple regression models assessing the link between 
neuroanatomy and risk preference factors. Reported are model-specific alpha and variance 
explained by (1) all volumetric indices (GMV, N=131), (2) all connectivity indices (DC, 
N=123), and (3) volumetric and connectivity indices together (GMV & DC, N=123).  
 
BBRS 
Factor 
GMV 
adjR^2 
GMV         
p 
DC          
adjR^2 
DC          
p 
GMV & DC 
adjR^2 
GMV & DC 
p 
R 0.087 0.02* 0.051 0.101 0.152 0.009* 
Health -0.037 0.864 0.03 0.197 0.002 0.456 
Finance -0.023 0.71 -0.035 0.82 -0.088 0.958 
Recreation -0.013 0.595 0 0.452 -0.065 0.884 
Impulsivity 0.033 0.17 -0.005 0.498 0.034 0.261 
Traffic 0.005 0.399 0.004 0.403 0.006 0.429 
Occupation -0.056 0.978 -0.066 0.991 -0.114 0.992 
Lotteries 0.008 0.359 0.028 0.21 0.022 0.326 
GMV = grey matter volume, DC=degree centrality, adjR^2 = adjusted R-squared, p = alpha level, * p<.05. 
 
 
 
 
 
